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Abstract 
 
The overarching focus of this thesis is Serbian government strategies 
under the Serbian Progressive Party towards European integration based on a 
rationalist approach to Europe. Current research on Serbia assumes the rationalist 
approach whereby Serbian elites’ strategies towards EU integration are driven by 
the logic of consequences, in the calculation of benefits and losses resulting from 
EU membership. This study will take the analysis further by examining Serbian 
government strategies towards EU accession through the prism of rationalism as 
well as statecraft where the desire for power has been one of the main driving 
forces for the Progressives’ strategy to EU conditionality. The research will be a 
comparative case study using two distinct policy areas of Kosovo and media 
freedom in Serbia and argue that the Progressives have engaged in partial 
compliance with regard to Kosovo and fake compliance in the area of media 
freedom. Both cases have reputational costs of compliance but the differences in 
outcomes can be attributed to the extent of the EU’s competencies in each policy 
area and the visibility of Serbian compliance to conditionality. Media freedom, an 
internal issue, is a low visible area as media freedom legislation is namely in the 
hands of national governments, thereby limiting the EU’s capacity to regulate and 
enforce media freedom in some of its own member states as well applicants. 
Kosovo is a highly visible policy area as a consequence of the presence of external 
actors monitoring Serbian compliance, thereby increasing the EU’s capacity in this 
field and making Serbian compliance/non-compliance difficult to hide.  
Previous scholarship on EU integration in applicant states analyses the 
EU’s conditionality-driven approach which enforces compliance on acceding 
countries. However, the thesis seeks to contribute to the existing research by 
questioning the sustainability of such an approach and the EU’s legitimacy as a 
normative power seeking to export its values to accession countries. Serbia, is an 
example within a national context, that seeks to elucidate this argument especially 
in light of the EU’s exchange of regional stability (Kosovo) for external lenience on 
matters of democracy (media freedom). 
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For Oliver Ivanović (1953-2018), Serbian politician in Kosovo: 
May he see the work he dedicated himself to, finished. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
  
While the EU was preoccupied with its expansion towards the Central and 
Eastern European countries (CEECs) at the beginning of 2000, the Western 
Balkans had just emerged out of a violent civil war, leaving behind failed and weak 
states with contested borders and limited state capacities. Concerned over the 
prospect of future wars and regional instability, the EU expanded its transformative 
power to its southeast European neighbours, offering the possibility, albeit 
tenuously, of eventual accession to the EU. The aim of the Stabilisation and 
Association Process (SAP), which became the EU’s policy towards the Western 
Balkans, was the overall transformation rather than accession of these newly 
formed states (Fakiolas and Tzifakis 2008, p. 387). The SAP, launched in 1999, 
led to the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) which 
complemented the political, economic and legal conditions arising from the 
Copenhagen Criteria, also a prerequisite for accession. The political conditions 
stemming from the Copenhagen criteria included: the “stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities;” the economic conditions pertained to a functioning market 
economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces” while the 
legal criteria dealt with the implementation of the acquis (European Council 1993). 
Similar to the European Commission’s Association Agreements with the Central 
and East European countries, the SAAs included additional conditionality of 
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), regional cooperation, good neighbourly relations, and the development of 
civil society and institution building (Papadimitriou 2001, p. 77).  
       Serbia’s European integration process officially commenced shortly following 
the overthrow of the Milošević regime by the Democratic Opposition of Serbia 
(DOS)1 in 2000. The EU then offered the prospects of both Europeanisation and 
democratisation to Serbia to support the new change in government by lifting its 
economic sanctions, providing reconstruction assistance through financial aid 
                                                          
1 The DOS was a coalition of eighteen ideologically very different parties that had opposed 
the Milošević regime, and had successfully ousted him on 5 October 2000, marking the 
beginning of Serbia’s democratic transition (Subotić 2014). 
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packages and signing trade agreements (Radeljić 2014, p. 245). In 2003, the EU 
confirmed Serbia as a potential candidate for membership at the Thessaloniki EU 
Council Summit (European Commission 2016b). Since then, Serbia has begun its 
slow democratic transition away from its nationalistic past and moving towards a 
more European future. However, the process of EU integration in the Western 
Balkans, primarily in Serbia, has been slow with setbacks and the freezing of 
negotiations. Unlike its neighbours, the Serbian case represents a dynamic and 
complex political shift that still has elements of nationalism but since 2012, the 
election of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) has demonstrated what other 
previous governments were unable to achieve including the normalisation of 
relations with Kosovo-an enormous milestone in Serbian-EU relations. These 
achievements are mainly a result of the policies of the Serbian Progressive Party, 
the party responsible for spearheading Serbia’s European integration process. 
Some of the most prominent and influential members of the SNS, namely Serb 
President and leader of the SNS, Aleksandar Vučić, and former President 
Tomislav Nikolić2, were once members of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) under 
Milošević, an extremist, nationalist party that promoted anti-Western and anti-
European foreign policy, an ideology of anti-globalism as well as a Greater Serbia. 
As a result, their pro-European policies are questioned even today and some 
argue, have similarities from when they were in power under the Milošević regime.  
Thus, this thesis seeks to analyse the strategies of the Progressive-led 
government vis-à-vis EU integration using the two case studies of Kosovo and 
media freedom in order to assess why the policy changes of the Progressive-led 
government relate to a rationalist rather than a constructivist approach to EU 
accession. The rationalist approach posits that applicant states accede according 
to careful cost-benefit calculations of the material incentives arising out of 
membership while the constructivist approach follows the logic of appropriateness 
where norms and values are considered to be the drivers of policy change. The 
research in particular will examine Serbia as a case study where the rationalist 
argument of EU rewards relating to economic benefits as being the drivers of 
domestic change can come into conflict with EU values in the accession process, 
thereby elucidating the problems of the EU’s ability in exporting its norms and 
values to candidates and member states.  
                                                          
2 Aleksandar Vučić was Prime Minister from April 2014-2017, after which he cemented 
his victory as Serbian President, replacing Nikolić following the presidential elections in 
Serbia.  
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The introduction is divided into two parts, with the first part framing the 
research and setting out the questions and central argument(s) while the second 
part aims to provide a brief contextual overview of the Serbian Progressive Party. 
Section 1.2 will provide an analysis of the focus and aims of the thesis, outlining 
how the research seeks to contribute to the existing field of scholarship on 
Europeanisation vis-à-vis the EU’s conditionality approach, and the repercussions 
this would have for the wider constructivist argument. Then, we set out the 
research questions in relation to the study (1.3) and how they contribute to the 
overall argument (1.4). We also provide a preliminary outline of the current state 
of research, which will be discussed in more depth in the Literature Review and 
how the study seeks to identify the gaps in the literature on Serbian government 
strategy towards accession under the Progressive-led government (1.5). In the 
second half of the introduction, we use Marko Stojić’s (2013, 2014) theoretical 
framework for categorising Serbian political parties based on their position on the 
EU and Serbia’s EU membership respectively in order to analyse the trajectory of 
the Serbian Progressive Party from being a far right, anti-EU party to one adopting 
a pro-EU policy. We evaluate Stojić’s (2013, 2014) conceptual framework as 
insufficient when examining the political shift of the Serbian Progressive Party, and 
thus employ both rationalist theory and statecraft when analysing the trajectory of 
the SNS. We conclude with an outline of the thesis chapters.  
 
1.2 Aims and Focus 
 
 Although not yet a member state of the EU, Serbia’s candidacy for 
accession was confirmed in March 2012 by the European Commission shortly 
after it had delivered its Opinion on Serbia’s EU membership application 
(European Council 2012). This announcement came shortly preceding the victory 
of the Progressive Party and the ousting of the Democrats during the May 2012 
parliamentary and presidential elections in Serbia. As the thesis will seek to argue, 
following their victory and the formation of a new coalition government with the 
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the Progressives remained committed to their 
mandate of achieving EU membership, accomplishing far more than any of the 
previous governments when it came to European integration. This included the 
opening of accession negotiations in January 2014 and eight out of thirty-five 
chapters. Additionally, they were responsible for signing a landmark deal with 
Kosovo (the “Brussels Agreement”), a feat that the previous governments’-
including Tadić’s Democratic “For A European Serbia” coalition-were unable to 
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achieve. Although the Progressives and their leader, Aleksandar Vučić, became 
the drivers of political change, many scholars and experts (Bieber 2015; 
Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015; Kostovicova 2014a and 2014b; Stahl 2013; 
Prelec, T. 2016, Irion 2014) have questioned whether the government’s sudden 
shift in adapting pro-EU policies represented a conformity and acceptance of 
European values and norms in line with the constructivist argument. Given the 
nationalist background of the Progressives, particularly evident in the fact that the 
Progressives emerged from a schism in the extreme right, nationalist Serbian 
Radical Party, this is not so surprising.  
The focus of the thesis is centred on the Progressive-led Serbian 
government from May 2012-December 2017 and the strategies they employed 
towards European integration in the two key policy areas of Kosovo and freedom 
of the media, which will be treated as separate case studies in the research. The 
central aim of the thesis is to examine how Serbia fits into the wider scholarship 
debate about how countries may accede while not adopting an EU ‘mindset,’ and 
the issues this may cause for the EU. In this regard, the single country study on 
Serbia will contribute to the research and existing literature regarding the EU’s 
carrot-and-stick conditionality approach where countries accede as a 
consequence of the material benefits arising out of EU accession in line with 
rationalist theory. Although applicant states can positively identify with the EU, this 
does not necessarily lead to a change in values or the adoption of EU standards 
in the constructivist sense. These have been cases regarding the Central and East 
European countries, which joined the EU in the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, 
particularly Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland. Both Bulgaria and Romania 
suffered an increase in organised crime and corruption in the post-accession 
period, while the Polish government’s anti-discriminatory policies against the 
LGBT community (including in banning pride parades and hate speech) between 
2005-2007 did not reflect a resonance with EU norms and values (Ganev 2013; 
O’Dwyer 2012, pp. 344-348).  The case of Hungary, on the other hand, witnessed 
a decline in media standards particularly with the election of Viktor Orbán’s 
Christian, national, and conservative government in 2010 which had resulted in a 
one-party colonisation of the media, thereby restricting media freedoms (Bajomi-
Lázár 2013, p. 85). The examples of Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Poland fit 
into the wider debate of whether the EU can impose values when the “carrot” is 
economic. In this regard, the future of the EU as a normative power, or an upholder 
of the values it seeks to export to both member states and non-applicants, is called 
into question. 
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Serbia offers a unique perspective in part due to its nationalist 
predisposition towards preserving Kosovo, which has more often than not 
hindered and even suspended Serbia’s Europeanisation process. Therefore, it can 
be argued that the various governments’ policies towards retaining Kosovo are 
considered to be at odds with EU values and norms of democracy.3 Hudson (2010) 
argues that the existence of the Kosovo issue “proves that Serbia’s national 
identity is still based primarily in ethnicity as opposed to democratic civic norms” 
(p. 28). The thesis will seek to argue that this is present even in the pro-EU policies 
of the Serbian Progressive Party where EU integration was used as means to 
protect Serbian national interests in Kosovo and thus, did not represent 
congruence with EU norms and Serbian national interest and discourse. 
Therefore, the thesis will explore how Serbian government strategy under the 
Progressive Party towards European integration fits into the wider existing 
framework of the EU’s conditionality mechanism where material incentives are the 
drivers of domestic change although this change may not result in an 
institutionalisation of norms. This rationalist approach considerably weakens the 
constructivist argument and the EU’s capacity to expand while exporting its values. 
 
1.3 Research Questions and Overview of the Methodological Framework 
 
 The main research questions that surround the focus of the overall thesis 
are:  
 What is the Serbian government strategy, under the Progressive Party, 
towards EU accession? 
 What are the implications of the political shift of the Serbian Progressive 
Party for Serbia’s accession strategy? 
Drawing on this, three more questions were developed to examine and analyse 
Serbian government strategy vis-à-vis European integration using a theoretical 
framework, which will be explored in depth in both the Literature Review and 
Methodology chapters.  
 
 Is the Serbian government’s accession strategy guided by a rationalist 
cost-benefit argument, based on material incentives arising from 
                                                          
3 This is relevant even today with the Serbian Progressive Party-led government despite 
its efforts to normalise relations with Kosovo as the case study on Kosovo will argue.  
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accession as opposed to the constructivist approach where EU norms are 
the drivers of change? 
 Drawing on the two analytical frameworks of rationalism and 
constructivism, can the complexity of Serbian government strategy 
additionally be explained by a third approach to EU integration, one related 
to national as well as the political, party interest of the Serbian Progressive 
Party as posited by statecraft theory? 
 
The recent scholarship on Serbia’s EU integration process has attributed the 
political shift of the Serbian Progressive Party to rational choice institutionalism 
where the decisions and actions of the party and its leaders were guided by the 
material incentives EU accession would bring to Serbia (Ejdus 2014; Ejdus and 
Subotić 2014; Kostovicova 2014b; Bieber 2015; Economides and Ker-Lindsay 
2015) . Given the nationalist background of the Progressives, the thesis will argue 
that the rationalist approach seems more appropriate in the Serbian case, as the 
expectation would be that Serbian national interests would predominate. This is in 
opposition to the constructivist argument where EU norms and values are the 
drivers of policy change. However, the complexities and contradictions of Serbian 
government policy vis-à-vis EU integration cannot solely be determined using 
rationalist theory; therefore, the research aims to contribute to the existing field of 
scholarship, by positing that electoral considerations based on Jim Bulpitt’s (1986) 
concept of statecraft, were the main drivers of the pro-EU policy shift of the Serbian 
Progressive Party. The thesis will employ a case study approach in order to 
analyse the Serbian government strategy towards EU accession through forms of 
compliance (genuine, fake, partial, imposed, non-compliance) to EU conditionality 
in the areas of Kosovo and freedom of the media.  
 The two cases were chosen due to the presence of different external and 
internal actors where Kosovo as an area of foreign policy is expected to have 
numerous external actors (i.e. the EU, Kosovo, the international community), 
which would be expected to make non-compliance difficult to hide. Freedom of 
expression, on the other hand, is an internal issue and thus, the EU’s capacity to 
enforce compliance with media freedom conditionality is limited. As a result, the 
presence of different internal and external actors in the two case studies are 
expected to produce different forms of compliance in each policy area. Arguably, 
the EU has placed both issues on top of its agenda, particularly with regard to 
Serbia’s compliance with Kosovo conditionality as a precursor to regional stability. 
However, by analysing Serbian compliance to media freedom conditions, the 
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thesis will examine whether the EU has traded democracy for regional stability, 
thereby diminishing the rule of law in the Western Balkans and allowing applicant 
countries such as Serbia to join without adopting EU norms and values that are 
the building blocks of a consolidated democracy. As a starting point in examining 
the compliance patterns of the Progressives towards EU conditionality, the thesis 
attempts to analyse the trajectory of the former Radicals using Marko Stojić’s 
(2013, 2014) theoretical framework of party attitudes towards the EU and Serbia’s 
accession. 
 
1.4 Theoretical framework: A study of party attitudes towards the EU and 
Serbia’s EU membership 
 
The following section presents an overview of Marko Stojić’s (2013, 2014) 
conceptual framework for classifying Serbian political parties’ position on Europe 
since 2000. He splits these into four categories: Hard Eurosceptic, Soft 
Eurosceptic, Hard Euroenthusiast and Soft Euroenthusiast. The parties that 
support Serbia’s EU membership and the EU are characterised as Hard 
Euroenthusiasts, while parties that expressed a negative stance or attitude on both 
issues are categorised as Hard Eurosceptics. Parties which support Serbian EU 
membership but have a neutral position on the EU itself, or combine both positive 
and negative stances (on the EU), or have critical but not opposing attitudes 
towards the EU are termed Soft Euroenthusiasts, while those with similar attitudes 
towards the EU but who are opposed to Serbian EU membership are classified as 
Soft Eurosceptics (Stojić 2013, p. 137). Stojić’s conceptual framework also aims 
to address whether parties’ positions on Europe are ideologically- or strategically-
driven. According to Stojić (2013), Hard Euroenthusiast and Hard Eurosceptic 
parties are primarily ideologically driven (p. 137). Drawing on this, Stojić (2014) 
further posits that “these parties are not likely to compromise on this issue and 
moderate their stances, even if the logic of party competition or an overwhelmingly 
pro-EU electorate creates incentives to do so. They are therefore not expected to 
change their negative position on Europe over time, although they may sometimes 
moderate rhetoric for strategic electoral reasons” (p. 62). However, in this case, 
Stojić does not take account of Bulpitt’s (1986) statecraft theory where parties that 
are ideologically-driven may desire power, and are therefore likely to abandon 
party positions altogether or water down the party’s principled ideology in 
exchange for popular support. 
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On the other side of the spectrum, the attitudes of parties that are Soft 
Eurosceptic and Soft Euroenthusiast have primarily been pragmatically formed, 
meaning that these parties are guided by strategic, electoral considerations rather 
than ideological principles. Stojić (2013) argues “that this has been evidenced by 
the fact that they have fundamentally changed positions on Serbian EU 
membership in the past decade in an attempt to gain political power” which is 
elucidated by the concept of statecraft (p. 138). Soft Euroenthusiasts do not have 
a firm ideological view on European integration and thus they will assess Serbia’s 
membership of the EU positively because they see it as profitable for their country 
or electorally desirable, meaning they would gain enough votes to secure their 
power and position in Parliament. The following table 1.1 presents an overview of 
Marko Stojić’s conceptual framework for analysing political party positions in 
Serbia. 
 
Table 1.1 Serbian Party Positions on the EU and Serbian Accession                     
Hard 
Euroenthusiasm: 
Principled pro-
accession and 
support for EU 
Soft 
Euroenthusiasm: 
Contingent pro-
accession; 
neutral/moderate 
towards EU 
Soft 
Euroscepticism: 
Contingent anti-
accession; 
sceptical towards 
EU 
Hard 
Euroscepticism:  
Principled 
opposition to the 
EU and Serbian 
accession 
Democratic Party 
(DS) 
G17+ 
Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) 
Serbian Progressive 
Party (SNS) 
Socialist Party of 
Serbia (SPS) 
Democratic Party 
of Serbia (DSS) 
New Serbia (NS) 
Serbian Radical 
Party (SRS) 
Dveri 
 
(Source: Stojić 2014, p. 65). 
 
For the purpose of the research, two parties: the Serbian Radical Party and 
the Serbian Progressive Party will be analysed. The Serbian Progressive Party is 
a relatively new party that entered the political scene when it was first formed in 
September 2008, and is the focus of this research as it is the current government 
under the Progressive Party leadership that is spearheading Serbia’s European 
integration. The formation of this party, which had developed from a schism in the 
far right, nationalist Serbian Radical Party is crucial to understanding the 
significance of former Radicals that are currently leading Serbia’s EU integration 
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process. A significant portion4 of the Serbian Radical Party had shifted from being 
both against EU membership and the EU in general to developing a positive 
stance on the EU as well as Serbia’s membership. This shift can be classified as 
moving from an ideological to a strategic position. The following sections provide 
a trajectory of the formation of the Serbian Progressive Party beginning with the 
schism of the Serbian Radical Party in 2008, and focuses on the political 
reorientation of the Serbian Progressive Party until the present day (i.e. 2017).  
 
1.5 The Serbian Radical Party  
 
1.5.1 Introduction 
 
During the Wars of Yugoslav Secession from 1990-1999, the Serbian 
Radical Party (SRS, which was founded in 1991), advocated policies of extreme 
nationalism, including projects of carving out a Greater Serbia from the former 
Yugoslav republics, and advocating paramilitary operations of ethnic cleansing in 
Croatia, the Serb province of Vojvodina, Bosnia and Kosovo.  Shortly after the 
wars and the NATO campaign in Kosovo in 1999, the Serbian Radical Party 
continued its nationalist tendencies even after its leader and president Dr. Vojislav 
Šešelj surrendered to The Hague to answer for war crimes/crimes against 
humanity for his actions in the Balkan War. The SRS, although never able to form 
a coalition government, had been part of the opposition and the largest party, 
which was strongly against EU policies and conditionality of cooperating with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which included 
the extradition of war criminals. It was not until 2008 when a few dissident 
Radicals, including Aleksandar Vučić and Tomislav Nikolić left the party to form 
the new Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) that they began advocating Serbian EU 
membership. Initially, the Progressives were unable to claim victory in the May 
2008 elections in which President Boris Tadić and the Democratic Party (DS) won. 
However, four years later, the former Radicals ousted Tadić and the Democrats in 
the May 2012 elections. Although with the Progressives, “many expected a 
slowdown in European integration, complication of relations with Priština and a 
potential U-turn towards Russia,” the Serbian Progressive Party soon found 
themselves to be in the driver’s seat of Serbia’s European integration process, 
leading to the start of negotiations and the opening of eight chapters (Ejdus 2014, 
                                                          
4 Twenty of its members, including Vučić and Nikolić, had left to form the SNS in 2008. 
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p. 3). In the following section, we will use Marko Stojić’s conceptual framework to 
present a brief analysis of the policies and orientation of the Serbian Radical Party. 
 
1.5.2 Categorisation of the Serbian Radical Party according to Stojić’s conceptual 
framework 
 
 It is difficult to categorise the Serbian Radical Party due to the intra-party 
power struggles which led to different, sometimes opposing attitudes towards the 
EU including Serbia’s membership among the Radicals. Stojić (2013) argues that 
although the Radical Party’s attitude towards the EU was largely absent from the 
party documents and public rhetoric prior to 2008, the party has always expressed 
firm opposition to Serbian integration into the EU, despite occasional moderation 
of its discourse in the mid-2000s, which would make it a Hard Eurosceptic party 
(p. 139). This represents an apparent contradiction. We argue that the moderated 
discourse of Serbia’s membership of the EU occurred following the extradition of 
the party leader, Vojislav Šešelj to the ICTY when the party deputy president, 
Tomislav Nikolić and the secretary-general Aleksandar Vučić took over the party 
leadership. Both Nikolić and Vučić were pragmatic nationalists, and their attitudes 
towards both the EU and Serbia’s EU integration can be described as strategic, 
due to concerns for electoral gains. It was under their leadership that in the 2003, 
2007, and 2008 elections, the Radicals became the largest party in the parliament, 
securing up to 29% of the total votes (Stojić 2013, p. 140).  
The winning of elections by the Radicals under the Nikolić and Vučić 
leadership was primarily due to a moderated nationalist rhetoric that emphasised 
socioeconomic issues (i.e. unemployment, privatisation and corruption) instead of 
ethnic nationalism, in addition to the party’s decision to tone down its opposition 
to Serbian EU accession (Stojić 2013, p. 140). Nikolić even declared in the 2003 
presidential election that “he and his party will provide a full contribution to Serbian 
accession to all European institutions and organisations, particularly the EU, but 
by preserving the Serbian identity, national pride, honour and dignity” (Komšić 
2007, p. 15). Stojić (2013) additionally argued that the “strategic nature of the 
Radicals’ rhetorical shift was, however, visible at times when electoral concerns 
were less important, that is in the period immediately after the elections” (p. 142). 
For example, with regard to Serbia’s EU accession, Nikolić, as temporary speaker 
of the parliament in May 2007 argued that, Serbia should seek closer ties with 
Russia and not the West, and stated that Russia would bring together “nations that 
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will stand up against the hegemony of America and the European Union” (Radio 
Free Europe Radio Liberty 2007).  
According to Stojić’s conceptual framework, Hard Eurosceptic parties have 
negative positions towards Serbia’s EU membership as well towards the EU. With 
regard to the Radical Party’s attitude towards the EU, Stojić (2013) argues that the 
“absence of specifically anti-EU discourse can be explained by the fact that the 
essence of European integration was unknown to the Serbian public and voters, 
and therefore criticism of the EU could not bring considerable political gains, unlike 
a strong party objection to the EU’s policy towards Serbia” (pp. 139-140). It had 
not been until the 2008 financial crisis when the Radicals began to think of the EU 
as a “failed experiment” that would only benefit the largest exporters. According to 
a Radical MP who had also joined the Progressive Party, Igor Mirović (2011), “the 
EU is only useful for western European members, while it is absolutely useless for 
Eastern Europe. The very evidence of the EU is the result of the interests of the 
largest exporters and in any case it is not in the interest of small nations” (cited in 
Stojić 2013, p. 140). Mirović posits that Serbia would fall into the nations that would 
not benefit from EU membership. 
We have demonstrated the difficulty in firmly categorising the Radical Party 
into either Hard Eurosceptic or even Soft Eurosceptic due to the intra-party 
struggles and different attitudes of the leaders towards both the EU and Serbia’s 
EU membership. However, we argue that the party’s original leader Šešelj was a 
Hard Eurosceptic whose ideology was firmly rooted in nationalist, anti-Western 
principles while some of the other more dissident members like Vučić and Nikolić 
were more concerned with electoral gains and thus, their attitudes and decisions 
were based on strategic and not firm ideological reasons. Thus, although a good 
starting point, Stojić’s framework does not take account that parties may shift their 
initial positions based on political pragmatism arising from a desire for power. It 
was strategic reasons that had led to the split of the Radicals in which some of the 
more dissident members of the party left to form the more pragmatic, pro-EU 
Serbian Progressive Party. This seems to suggest that the dissidents left to form 
a new party because the Radicals were Hard Eurosceptics who were ideologically-
driven and therefore, not amenable to change. 
 
1.6 The Schism of the Serbian Radical Party, 2008 
 
 The circumstances of the split between some of the more pragmatic 
Radicals (such as Nikolić and Vučić) and the Serbian Radical Party are crucial to 
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the understanding of this political shift of the SRS and the subsequent formation 
of the Serbian Progressive Party. The signing of the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement with the EU was not the main reason for the split of the Radicals, but 
it had nevertheless been the catalyst (Gačevičovà 2014, p. 28). Nikolić, one of the 
more pragmatic Radicals, had promised the then ruling coalition that the Radicals 
would vote in favour of the SAA in 2008, with the amendment that included a 
clause emphasising that Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia.5 Despite the 
approval of this amendment, Šešelj decided instead to not vote for the Agreement, 
causing discord among Nikolić and some of the dissident members of the Radical 
Party. Vučić had not been as outspoken as Nikolić regarding the signing of the 
SAA and subsequent split of the Radicals and remained in the middle between the 
SRS and Nikolić’s “Forward Serbia” bloc. Nonetheless, he had decided to join 
“Forward Serbia” which would later become the Serbian Progressive Party. Even 
though Nikolić and the dissident Radicals who had joined the Forward Serbia bloc 
had decided not to vote for the SAA in the end, their initial position to support the 
signing of the SAA, suggests the beginnings of the party’s shift towards a pro-EU 
policy.  
 Shortly after the formation of the Serbian Progressive Party in October 
2008, the Progressives began advocating Serbian EU membership: “the party 
supports the European integration process aimed at institutional and economic 
strengthening of Serbia, and it believes that Serbian EU accession is in the best, 
long-term interests of all citizens” (Srpska Napredna Stranka 2011, p. 40). In 
relation to Kosovo, “[the Serbian Progressive Party’s] initial programmatic 
principles declared that Serbia could only join the EU as a whole state, with 
Kosovo as its integral part” (cited in Stojić 2013, p. 147). However, the reference 
to Kosovo in relation to EU accession was later excluded from the party’s 
programme and was also excluded from the 2013 party statute, which means that 
the party put priority on Serbia’s integration into the EU and did not focus so much 
on keeping Kosovo as a part of Serbia. It had been a part of the EU’s conditionality 
to resolve the Kosovo issue prior to accession and that Kosovo could no longer 
remain an integral part of Serbia, hence the party’s focus and priority being on the 
EU.  
 However, the SNS did emphasise and repeatedly state in its rhetoric that 
recognition of Kosovo was not and would not be a condition for Serbia’s EU 
                                                          
5 Nikolić was one of the dissident, more pragmatic Radicals who had left the SRS in 2008. 
Unlike Šešelj and the other non-dissidents, his policies were more strategically driven, and 
therefore, he was more amenable to change. 
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membership and if the EU ever put such conditionality on Serbia, the citizens 
should then be able to vote in a referendum on this EU decision (Srpska Napredna 
Stranka 2010a). This seems to represent a paradox as Serbian’s non-recognition 
of Kosovo policy is the same as its declaration of accession to the EU as a whole 
state with Kosovo as its integral part. The omission of Kosovo in relation to 
Serbia’s EU accession in the SNS party programme while at the same time 
repetitive claims that recognition of Kosovo would not be a condition for Serbia’s 
EU membership demonstrates a strategy of pragmatic nationalism. In this regard, 
the Serbian Progressive Party is trying to appease both the EU and its nationalist 
constituency at home. This multilevel games strategy with regard to Kosovo has 
been the Progressive strategy since their entering into government following the 
May 2012 parliamentary elections, and will be examined in greater depth in the 
Kosovo case study chapter.   
 
1.7 The Serbian Progressive Party, May 2012-2017 
  
In this section, we analyse the period following the election of the former 
Serbian Radicals in May 2012 that ousted the democratic/European coalition. 
Leader of the Democrats and Serb President Boris Tadić6 ruled the government 
under the “For A European Serbia” coalition, which won the parliamentary 
elections in May 2008, a major breakthrough in Serbian politics. Tadić’s 
government was able to accomplish cooperation with the ICTY-part of the EU’s 
conditionality-by arresting and extraditing the two remaining war criminals at large: 
Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić. In March 2012, Serbia was granted 
candidate status, another major step towards membership that had mainly been 
advocated by the EU to offer further democratic support towards Tadić and his 
government “as the only hope for a reasonable, pro-western, pro-EU government 
for Serbia” (Vachudova 2014, p. 130). However, Tadić and his pro-EU government 
failed to convince the public why they should stay in power (Radeljić 2014, p. 
244).7 Despite warnings from the EU of the repercussions of nationalists coming 
into power, the Serbian Progressive Party had managed to win the parliamentary 
and presidential elections in May 2012, thus paving the way for a new government 
in which Nikolić became President of Serbia while Vučić became the leader of the 
                                                          
6 Boris Tadić was Serbian President from 2004-2012. 
7 Tadić’s government was unsuccessful in resolving the country’s economic decline; 
coupled with this, the intra-party struggles between members of the DS resulted in the 
overall party’s failure to secure electoral votes in the May 2012 general elections.  
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Progressives. They entered into a coalition government with the Socialist Party of 
Serbia, New Serbia and G17+ while the Democrats became the opposition party 
(Stojić 2014, p. 14). 
 Shortly following the election of the Progressives, the new government 
remained committed to the continuation of Tadić’s European policy, which is 
evidenced through both Nikolić’s first official foreign visit to Brussels and the 
signing of the Brussels Agreement. The President of the European Commission 
at the time, Jose Manuel Barosso, indicated that Nikolić’s visit was “a clear sign of 
the priority the President and Serbia attach to their European reform agenda” 
(European Commission 2012). The most significant step in the SNS’s EU policy 
alignment was the signing of the Brussels Agreement on 19 April 2013 on the 
normalisation of relations with Kosovo, a key step for Serbia’s membership 
prospects, signed between both the Kosovan and Serb governments under the 
auspices of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Catherine Ashton. 
This decision allowed the EU to open accession negotiations with Serbia on 21 
January 2014, leading to the opening up of the first two chapters: Chapter 32 on 
Financial Control and Chapter 35 on Kosovo (Poznatov 2015). It was also in 2014 
when Aleksandar Vučić became prime minister in a snap election he called to 
boost legitimacy to carry out necessary reforms, which were mainly related to the 
EU and Serbia’s economy (Poznatov 2014). His decision in carrying out a snap 
election was also a move to cement his power and diminish the power of the leader 
of the Socialist Party of Serbia, Ivica Dačić who had been Prime Minister at the 
time and became the Foreign Minister following the snap elections. 
The political shift of the former Serbian Radicals to advocates of European 
integration can be described through the prism of rationalism and statecraft where 
their decision to reorient themselves towards the EU is mainly a result of their 
interest-driven motives in gaining political power. Statecraft posits that politicians 
are rational actors driven by self-interest and their perception of what national 
interests are, in order to demonstrate their governing competence to gain and then 
maintain power through winning elections. The support for the EU prior to the 
election of the Progressives as demonstrated in Figure 1.2 suggests that the newly 
formed party realised that adopting a pro-EU policy was the only hope in gaining 
electoral votes. Therefore, their trajectory was not a reflection of an “identity 
match” with the EU in the constructivist sense, where EU norms resonated with 
domestic policy and rhetoric; rather the political shift of the Progressives was solely 
based on pragmatism of the best way to attain power. The EU integration process 
became a means to achieve material economic benefits as was reflected in the 
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SNS’s party programme in addition to protecting Serbian national interests vis-à-
vis Kosovo.  
 
Figure 1.2 Support for Serbian Accession to the EU 
 
(Source: Government of Serbia, Ministry for European Integration 2007-2017). 
 
Figure 1.2 depicts the high support for Serbia’s EU accession prior to the 
Progressives coming to power in the May 2012 elections. Even following the 
elections and the formation of the Progressive-led party government post 2012, 
nearly half the population still supported Serbia’s EU membership. Therefore, 
electoral considerations of choosing to support Serbia’s EU integration and 
developing a pro-EU policy because Serbian EU accession was supported by half 
of the population was part of the winning electoral strategy that Progressives like 
Vučić and Nikolić advocated in order to win the May 2012 elections and 
consequently gain power. Both Vučić and Nikolić came to the realisation that the 
Serbian Radical Party had never been able to form a coalition in government, due 
to their anti-EU, hardline nationalist stance. Considering this, they realised long 
ago, after having left the party in 2008, that the only way to raise their popularity 
was to appeal to the electorate and they could not do so until they had abandoned 
the Radical anti-EU rhetoric. Nikolić also did not hide this fact when he stated that 
the SNS was a “pro-European party” and “if we stand against the EU, we will never 
be able to win the elections in Serbia” (cited in Stojić 2013, p. 147). Therefore, the 
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Serbian Progressive Party government led by Vučić promised not only to improve 
the economic situation but made promises towards strengthening Serbian ties with 
the EU and increasing the pace for Serbia’s EU accession. According to Stojić 
(2013), their position on the EU was both neutral and negative while Serbia’s 
membership was seen as positive and a primary goal of the government. The goal 
of EU accession is emphasised in the Serbian Progressive Party’s programme 
titled, The White Book: Programme to Change: “the Serbian Progressive Party 
supports the process of European integration for the objective of institutional and 
economic strengthening of Serbia, believing that it is in the best, long-term interest 
of all our citizens” (Srpska Napredna Stranka 2011, p. 41).  
 The goal of EU membership was linked to economic prosperity, where in                                                                                                                                                    
his inaugural speech, Nikolić mentioned that the European path represents the 
“path of the future, and the path of economic prosperity” (cited in Gačevičovà 2014, 
p. 32). A significant portion of the population in Serbia supported the EU integration 
process and believed it would lead to a better life, employment opportunities and 
economic benefits. Therefore, the policy shift of the Progressives towards a 
collective goal of Serbian EU membership can be seen from a rationalist 
perspective, where Nikolić, Vučić and the new government saw the potential 
material incentives (i.e. economic benefits) of EU membership as outweighing the 
costs of being left out of the EU in the long term. As Ivan Krastev (2011) stated,  
“the [2008] crisis in the EU has convinced Balkan publics that Brussels is 
not the Eden they hoped it would be, but at the same time the crisis made 
it more obvious than ever that the small and dysfunctional Balkan states 
cannot hope for a better future outside the European project… For the 
citizens of the Balkans it is clear that if they have any realistic hope of a 
better life and political stability, it is related to their countries’ EU prospects” 
(Krastev 2011, p. 17).  
 
This view was also reflected in a statement by Aleksandar Vučić who stressed the 
significance of accession to the EU: 
“I ask those who are against the EU today - because it was normal to be 
against Europeans at times when they were beating and killing our country 
- what will we do if they withdrew cross-border loans? What and whose 
money are we going to use to rebuild the economy? How are we going to 
open new factories? If someone tells me that all of this is possible without 
Europe, I congratulate him and give him power. […] I personally think that 
is impossible. We need Europe more than it needs us” (Srpska Napredna 
Stranka 2010b). 
 
In line with the statecraft argument, SNS leaders saw the collective goal, economic 
prosperity, as best achieved through Serbia’s membership of the EU, as it would 
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benefit the country and citizens and in turn, would potentially facilitate their re-
election.  
 Referring once more back to Stojić’s categorisation of the SNS as a Soft 
Euroenthusiast Party, part of the explanation for the trajectory of the Progressives 
was due to the pragmatic view of how to accomplish preconceived nationalist 
goals through EU membership. Such objectives could include the economic 
benefits accession would bring to a small and dysfunctional Balkan state like 
Serbia, where Serbia sees the EU as an important economic partner (Gačevičova 
2014, p. 19). However, other goals of the Progressive Party are more strictly 
related to nation-building policies and protection of national interests (Srpska 
Napredna Stranka 2011, p. 3). For example, in the party programme, the SNS 
acknowledges that “its relations with other countries and international 
organisations directly depends on the success in the struggle for the realisation of 
their vital state and national interests in almost all fields” (Srpska Napredna 
Stranka 2011, p. 40). Accession to the EU, which is listed as a primary goal of the 
Progressive Party, would help the party to realise and protect their nationalist 
interests, predominantly when it came to the question of Kosovo.  
 The preservation of Kosovo remains vital to Serbian national interests, and 
has clashed on many occasions with Serbia’s membership aspirations, resulting 
in the hindering and even freezing of EU negotiations in the past. Stojić (2014) 
argues that “the Serbian Progressive Party was not fully ideologically profiled” and 
that “its programme was not a reflection of any clear ideological concept” (p. 109). 
Furthermore, he posited that the shift of the political trajectory of the SNS 
represented a fundamental ideological transformation from being former 
nationalists and Eurosceptics to advocates of European integration. This would 
seem to suggest that the party is devoid of any deeply rooted nationalist ideology. 
This thesis argues that the SNS’s uncompromising non-recognition policy of 
Kosovo coupled with using the EU integration process to protect Serbian national 
interests in Kosovo, indicates that nationalism still remains grounded in the 
Progressives’ ideology.  
The type of Serbian ethnic nationalism vis-à-vis Kosovo can best be 
attributed to Hobsbawm’s (1983) definition of a nation as an “invented tradition” 
that establishes continuity with a suitable past and “uses history as a legitimator 
of action and cement of group cohesion” (cited in Őzkirimli 2010 p. 94). In this 
regard, the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, central to Serbian nation-building aspirations, 
has been used repeatedly throughout history to legitimise Serbia’s claim over its 
southern province. Serbian national identity is encompassed by the Kosovo myth, 
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as the case study chapter on Kosovo and methodological chapter will examine. 
This myth alludes to the sacrifice and victimisation of the Serbian people under 
the Kosovan Albanians. Armstrong (1982) argues that myths, which imbue a 
nation with its identity, “are usually more persistent than purely material factors” in 
ethnic nationalisms and argues that these myths can be transferred for political 
purposes” (cited in Őzkirimli 2010, pp. 146-147). Since Milošević, the Kosovo myth 
has been evoked by each consecutive Serbian government to justify domestic 
policy with regard to Kosovo, including control over the North where there 
remained a Serb majority. Serbian ethnologist Ivan Čolović (2002), remarks that 
“the use of symbols in politics is not just a means for achieving and maintaining 
political power” but rather that “the power over the use of symbols is an integral 
part of political struggle” (cited in Vujačić 2003, p. 95). This type of nationalism 
embodied by the Kosovo myth is still present in the Progressives’ ideology and 
domestic policy vis-à-vis Kosovo. However, the thesis argues that with the 
increasing EU demands to normalise relations with Kosovo, it became imperative 
for the Progressives to find a way to manage both tensions in order to appease 
both the EU and progress forwards in the accession negotiations while at the same 
time satisfying their nationalist constituency at home.  
The 2013 Brussels Agreement, which both the Serbian and Kosovan 
governments signed under the auspices of the EU, was an example of protecting 
Serbian national interests through international mediation. According to Ejdus 
(2014), through this Agreement, the Serbian government under the Progressives 
not only avoided recognition of Kosovo as the Brussels Agreement maintains the 
notion that Kosovo is status neutral, but also “Serbia effectively used political 
dialogue to the benefit of Kosovo Serbs” (Ejdus 2014, p. 6). The objective of the 
Brussels Agreement was to normalise relations between both Kosovo and Serbia 
in a way that would resolve the issue of the North, an area where there is a 
dominant Serbian majority and where Serbs have clashed with Kosovar 
Albanians. The cornerstone of the Brussels Agreement was the establishment of 
the Association of Serbian Municipalities, whose aim was to protect Serbian 
interests in Kosovo. Therefore, the Serbian Progressive Party’s orientation to that 
of a Soft Euroenthusiast party as elucidated by Stojić, seems to suggest that this 
political shift from Hard Eurosceptism to Soft Euroenthusiasm is not incompatible 
with nationalism. The Progressives see Serbia’s membership as a means to 
achieve preconceived nationalist goals, primarily the protection of Serbian 
interests in Kosovo, which would also include the continuation of Serbia’s non-
recognition policy on Kosovo. Kuzio (2000) defines pragmatic nationalists as 
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“nationalists who prioritise sovereignty and seek to defend by all means state and 
national interests” (Kuzio 2000, p. 83). Although Light (1996) has pointed out that 
“pragmatic nationalists represent the standard view one might expect the foreign 
policy elite to hold in any country,” this particular brand of nationalism can lead to 
ethnic hostilities especially if a country like Serbia perceives its national interests 
vis-à-vis Kosovo as threatened by another state or nation such as the Kosovan 
Albanians in the central government in Priština (cited in Kuzio 2000).  
The Serbian government had also successfully used the Brussels 
Agreement to open accession negotiations in 2014; however, despite the initial 
success, the Agreement still did not entail recognition of Kosovo’s independence 
by Serbia and there are some ambiguities in the formal text that could be wilfully 
misinterpreted by both sides. This means that the ambiguity of the agreement 
allowed for both sides to interpret what they have signed in starkly different ways 
and in line with their own preferences as will be examined in the chapter on 
Kosovo.  This is a consequence of the EU’s own constructive ambiguity in which 
the EU prompted both Serbia and Kosovo to normalise relations in a way that 
would ensure lasting political stability, good neighbourly relations and regional 
cooperation, but avoiding the status issue entirely. Such a deliberate attempt on 
the EU to fudge this issue allowed Serbia to continue to officially not recognise 
Kosovo as a state in addition to allowing both sides to come to different 
interpretations which would have consequences later in the accession 
negotiations. According to Subotić (2014) “Kosovo interpreted the agreement as 
Serbia’s de facto acceptance of Kosovo’s sovereignty” while  “Serbia, however, 
understood the agreement as the continuation of the status quo, allowing Serbia 
more control within Kosovo” (p. 18). The reaction to the Brussels Agreement was 
therefore, an example of this pragmatic nationalism on behalf of the Progressives 
where the Agreement allowed for the Serbian government to protect their national 
interest through EU integration.  
To sum up, the thesis will argue that the pro-EU reorientation of the Serbian 
Progressive Party can best be explained by rationalism where the Progressives 
see the economic and social benefits tied with EU accession as greater than the 
costs of being left out of the EU entirely. Therefore, the interest in the material 
incentives, that is the economic prosperity of Serbia vis-a-vis EU accession, was 
a principal motive for the adoption of a pro-EU policy. Economic prosperity became 
linked to national interest in addition to the question over Kosovo. The Serbian 
elites viewed EU integration as a means of achieving a collective goal of protecting 
their interests in Kosovo, including their non-recognition policy as they managed 
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to realise through the Brussels Agreement. The pro-EU policy shift was thus not a 
means to Europeanise Serbia in the constructivist sense where EU norms and 
patterns of behaviour would be adopted and internalised into society and political 
elites’ attitudes would be transformed into a European way of thinking, but instead, 
focused on Serbia’s EU membership according to a careful cost-benefit analysis 
as rationalism posits. This is evidenced in a statement regarding the EU by 
Progressive Party leader Aleksandar Vučić: “I do not care for them. I just respect 
them. I neither love them nor are they particularly dear to me, but we, as 
responsible people, have to take care of our country” (Srpska Napredna Stranka 
2010b). He also added that, “we need a rational, realistic and serious approach to 
national politics in order to get the most we could for the country and lose the least” 
(Srpska Napredna Stranka 2010b). The logic of appropriateness, related to 
constructivist theory, assumed that political actions are influenced and determined 
by the identities, norms, values and rules that make up the EU. March and Olsen 
(1989) argue that “the actions of the agents are determined by a rule-based search 
for legitimate or appropriate behaviour in a particular situation and the role that the 
agent fulfils” (cited in Gačevičova 2014, p. 11). This was not the case in Serbia 
where, instead, the Progressives’ motivations were driven by the logic of 
consequences, in the calculation of benefits and losses resulting from EU 
membership.  
However, the analysis can be developed on another level to argue that 
statecraft complements rationalist theory in explaining the policy shift of the 
Progressives. The Radical Party remained in the opposition because of their 
radical ideology and hardline nationalism, which included an anti-EU stance at a 
time when there was a majority support for Serbia’s EU integration. This had 
originally prompted some of the more dissident Radicals to leave the party and 
abandon the Radical rhetoric for a more pro-EU policy, thus cementing their victory 
in the May 2012 Serbian parliamentary and presidential elections. Serbia’s EU 
integration also became a policy tool by which to achieve not only the long term 
goal of membership, but was also used as a means to protect national interests in 
Kosovo. Therefore, we argue that the Progressives are pragmatic nationalists who 
saw a pro-EU campaign as part of a strategy that would raise their popularity and 
allow to them to win elections and maintain their power, as the statecraft argument 
would posit. As a consequence, the political shift of the Progressives did not 
represent a real ideological change and thus, represent a paradox of former 
Radicals spearheading Serbia’s EU integration. Rather, as Stojić (2018) argues, 
the political shift of the Radicals to start advocating Serbian accession to the EU, 
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can be primarily interpreted as “the result of electoral tactics to come to power, 
secure political future and obtain ‘European legitimacy’” (p. 78). The government’s 
goal to achieve European legitimacy represents a paradox especially given the 
declining media environment in Serbia where the Progressives’ and Vučić’s 
autocratic control over the media outlets and continuous attacks on journalists 
seems to suggest that EU norms and values were not being accepted or adopted. 
The Progressives were instead focused on the implications of obtaining EU 
membership for a small and economically dysfunctional country like Serbia and 
the subsequent benefits arising out of accession in terms of maintaining power 
and enjoying popular support. Hence, their motives did not follow the logic of 
appropriateness where their actions and decisions were guided by the influential 
power of EU norms and values but rather the rationalist logic of consequences in 
maximising benefits in terms of power or EU rewards (i.e. economic benefits).  
Returning to Stojić’s four categories of party attitudes towards the EU and 
EU integration, the Progressives’ stance and change in attitude and party 
orientation was primarily strategically-driven based on rationalist cost-benefit 
calculations of what would help them realise their nationalist goals and achieve 
power. Stojić even goes on to term the Progressives as “Unproven Europeans.” 
This is because “the party has never articulated attitudes towards the EU, since 
its focus was on Serbia’s EU membership” (Stojić 2013, p. 146). He further argues 
that, “one cannot expect any reflection on the principles of European integration 
given that it is a new, pragmatic party, whose politics towards the EU is devoid of 
principled positions on the desirable form of a community that brings together 
European nations” (Stojić 2013, p. 146). “Its Euroenthusiasm was therefore 
instrumental, and there was no evidence that the EU had any intrinsic value for 
the party” nor did the positive identification with the EU mean that Serbian identity 
was being transformed to reflect EU norms and values (Stojić 2014, p. 142). The 
presence of the Kosovo issue in Serbian domestic policy and discourse is 
testament that Serbian identity was still based on ethnic nationalism rather than 
democratic civic norms with regard to freedom of expression. However, this type 
of nationalism had been radically transformed from being the destructive, hardline 
nationalism evoked by the Serbian Radical Party to becoming more pragmatic, 
where EU integration was used as a policy tool by the dissident Radicals to 
achieve preconceived nationalist goals vis-à-vis Kosovo.   
Additionally, evidence of the party’s concern for electoral gains as the 
primary motivation for their political shift and adoption of a pro-EU policy is 
reflected in its objective of accommodating both nationalists as well as pro-EU 
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voters. Stojić argues that for this reason the Serbian Progressive Party can be 
classified as a “catch-all” party, “driven to reach out to Eurosceptic and pro-
Russian segments of the electorate in order to maximise its electoral gains. (Stojić 
2016). The desire to appeal to both the nationalist segments of the population and 
their pro-EU electorate is also visible in its policies on Kosovo as we will examine 
in the case study chapter on Kosovo. The next section presents the outline of the 
chapters. 
 
1.8 Chapter Outline 
  
This thesis is divided into two major parts. The first part constitutes the 
introductory chapter, the literature review where we present the theoretical 
framework that will be used for the main case study chapters and the methodology 
where we develop and introduce the hypotheses that will be tested. The second 
part includes the two main case studies of Kosovo and media freedom, and the 
concluding chapter. The case study chapters constitute the application of the 
theoretical framework and the testing of the hypotheses. The entire research study 
is based on Serbian government patterns of compliance to EU conditionality with 
regard to Chapter 35 on Kosovo and media freedom as outlined in Chapter 23 on 
Justice and Fundamental Rights.  
In this introductory chapter, the research identified the aims, focus and 
central arguments based on the research questions the thesis will explore. The 
second part of the introduction analysed the trajectory of the Serbian Radical Party 
to the Serbian Progressive Party which developed as a result of schism in the 
Radical Party. We examined this trajectory using Stojić’s (2013, 2014) theoretical 
framework for classifying party positions on Europe in order to explain the shift 
from the Hard Euroscepticism of the Radicals to the Soft Euroenthusiasm of the 
Progressive Party. Additionally, we explain this political shift through the prism of 
rationalist and statecraft theory where the reorientation of the former Radicals to 
support for the EU and Serbia’s accession was mainly due to strategic reasons 
resulting from electoral concerns and the desire to come to power because EU 
membership was supported by more than half the population. EU integration 
leading to accession was also seen as a mechanism by the Progressives to protect 
national interests such as those with regard to Kosovo, thus, accession to the EU 
was not incompatible with nationalism. This raises questions over whether this 
political reorientation really represented a paradox of former Radicals 
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spearheading Serbia’s EU integration or whether this was just pragmatic 
nationalism at best.  
The second chapter is divided into two parts, the first part laying out the 
analytical framework with the second part focusing on the literature around 
Serbia’s European integration process. The first part will review the existing 
literature and attempt, through this, to explain EU integration and 
state/government actions and strategies in relation to Europeanisation. It will do 
so by looking at the literature on democratisation and Europeanisation; 
compliance with the EU’s conditionality (fake, genuine, imposed, partial or non- 
compliance) as well looking into the theoretical literature on European integration 
theory (constructivist-rationalist argument) in order to develop and test 
hypotheses. Additionally, because theories of European integration and patterns 
of compliance are insufficient in explaining Serbian governments’ strategies 
towards EU integration and compliance to EU conditions, the thesis also examines 
a third approach related to Jim Bulpitt’s (1986) concept of statecraft. The second 
part of the literature review chapter will additionally analyse the recent, existing 
literature on the Serbian Progressive Party’s strategies towards European 
integration.  Then it will address the gaps in the current state of research on 
Serbia’s EU integration, and how the thesis aims to contribute to the existing 
literature through the application of additional theories to explain the complexities 
and contradictions of Serbian government strategy vis-à-vis EU integration. 
Chapter Three will deal with the methodology of the research. It will 
establish the approach of using two similar case studies of Kosovo and media 
freedom in order to test the initial hypotheses. Both cases are similar because, 
according to Mill’s (1843) method of difference, a most similar systems design 
seeks to identify the key features that are different among similar case studies and 
which account for the observed outcome (Esser and Vliegenthard 2017, p. 6). The 
methodology also seeks to identify the different variables used in the study, 
including the explanatory variables that are expected to cause the different 
outcomes (i.e. forms of compliance) in both cases. Semi-structured interviews as 
well as primary and secondary sources ranging from journal and scholarly articles, 
press reports, EU documents, newspapers, government progress reports and 
Action Plans will be used in order to test the hypotheses. An in depth discussion 
on the use of content analysis will also be provided as the methodological 
approach used for analysing interviews and primary as well as secondary 
documents. 
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Chapter Four will then go on to offer analysis of the first case study, on 
Kosovo. In this chapter, we provide an analysis of the Brussels dialogue on the 
comprehensive normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, which 
forms much of the interim benchmarks for Chapter 35 in the accession 
negotiations. We will test for the type of compliance through comparing these 
benchmarks, (EU conditionality), alongside EU progress reports and both 
Kosovan and Serbian government progress reports. A number of additional 
evidence to support our findings will also be analysed which include data gathered 
from semi-structured interviews with representatives from the Kosovan 
government, NGO members and officials from the European Commission, EULEX 
and the European External Action Service, in addition to press releases from the 
European Union. We will also apply our theoretical framework from the literature 
review to offer an explanation for Serbian government strategy vis-à-vis Kosovo.   
Chapter Five will analyse media freedom in Serbia. In this chapter, the 
focus will be more on issues related to transparency of the media (including in 
ownership and financing) and government interference in media outlets. This 
chapter will examine the latest media laws adopted by the Serbian government in 
2014 and the government Action Plan for their implementation. It will compare and 
contrast the EU conditionality stemming from Chapter 23 on Justice and 
Fundamental Rights with the government’s Action Plan in order to test for the type 
of compliance the Serbian Progressive-led government is practicing, including the 
political reasoning behind such a strategy. A variety of reports from journalists’ 
organisations and interviews conducted with media analysts and journalists will be 
analysed to support the findings in this policy area.  
 The conclusion, Chapter 6, will analyse how the research fit into the wider 
scholarship and debate on the EU’s conditionality-driven approach using Serbia 
as an examination of this issue and the problems this may cause for the EU in the 
long term. It will summarise the findings and provide a discussion on the current 
state of Europeanisation in Serbia, including the sustainability of its position on 
Kosovo. Finally, the thesis will discuss future directions for research, with a focus 
on examining how the single case study on Serbia can be applied to other 
applicant states that are also illiberal democracies, thus questioning the EU’s 
legitimacy as a normative power. 
 
 
25 
 
Chapter 2: A Review of the Literature 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 In the last chapter, we presented a historical overview and background on 
the Serbian Progressive Party and their ambition and strategy in positioning 
themselves as a pro-European party and one that has achieved the most when it 
comes to EU integration as opposed to all of the other previous ruling parties in 
Serbia since 2001. The focus of this chapter will be a review of the existing 
literature and through this, we examine EU integration and state/government 
actions and strategies in order to develop a theoretical framework for our case 
studies. We begin by explaining the process of and defining the term 
Europeanisation, where the EU acts as an exporter of values, policies and norms 
which acceding countries and even those not pursuing membership, will adopt and 
implement into their own national government structures. In the following section, 
theories of European integration are provided to explain this process of 
Europeanisation as well as to analyse the EU integration process in relation to 
state/government actions and strategies. In other words, this section will address 
why states/governments react or comply with conditionality imposed on their 
countries’ individual processes of EU integration. Here we look at European 
integration theories of neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, constructivism, 
neorealism, rationalism and discursive institutionalism and decide which ones are 
a best fit for our theoretical framework and dismiss those which are not. Because 
some theories of EU integration are insufficient when examining Serbian 
government strategy, we also examine a third approach related to Bulpitt’s (1986) 
concept of statecraft.  
The next section will analyse how states use different strategies (patterns 
of compliance) to comply with the EU’s accession conditions based on the 
socialisation and conditionality models (which are related to the rationalist and 
constructivist theories). Here, we examine and offer an analysis of the different 
types of compliance patterns and explain how certain actors will comply with EU 
conditionality based on rationalist decisions (cost-benefit analysis) and/or 
constructivist decisions based on legitimacy of the EU conditions. The final section 
will provide an analysis of the literature on Serbia, the gaps in the literature, and 
how the research study seeks to fulfil the existing gaps. 
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2.2 Europeanisation and Democratisation 
 
 The processes of Europeanisation and democratisation often go hand in 
hand. The term democratisation via Europeanisation is a term that describes the 
process whereby states will democratise by adopting the EU’s distinctive 
structures of governance. Bacarani and Di Quirico (2005) consider “the 
interdependence between Europeanisation and democratisation, more precisely, 
the role the Europeanisation process plays in the consolidation and orientation 
toward the EU model of democracy of the newly admitted and neighbouring 
countries” (p. 11). According to this analysis, third countries and those aspiring to 
join will democratise by adopting the EU’s distinctive structures of governance and 
these can take many forms: “political, legal, and social institutions; norms, 
guidelines, discourses; policy networks specialised in rule creation and 
enforcement toward the EU model of democracy of the newly admitted and 
neighbouring countries” (Bacarani and Di Quirico 2005, p. 11). Pridham (2010) 
argues that there is a strong relationship between conditionality stemming from 
the EU and post-communist democratisation, which started with the Central and 
East European countries (CEECs) in the 1990s after the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
ultimately, communism. It is a potentially reinforcing process because 
conditionality and Europeanisation reinforces the drive and will of the accession 
countries to democratise and consolidate their democracies because of a desire 
to join “Europe” and be “one of them.” Thus, they will submit themselves to a wide 
range of EU conditionality albeit with some compulsion as will be discussed at 
length further in the chapter. Furthermore, according to Pridham (2010), political 
or democratic conditionality and democracy promotion became significant in the 
post-Cold War period and there is a growing literature to support this argument (p. 
447).  
 There are many different definitions of Europeanisation and what this may 
entail. According to Radaelli (2003), it is defined as: 
“processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) implementation of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of 
doing things,’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of 
domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (p. 
30).  
 
Since the EU has always been seen as the centre of the debate around this 
dynamic process, it has often been termed as “EU-isation” (Anastasakis 2005, p. 
78). Furthermore, Tanja Börzel (2003) states that Europeanisation is a two-way 
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process: the bottom up approach, which she also terms as uploading, is about 
constructing the EU system of governance and focuses on the role of national 
governments and to what extent they shape or take policies. The second approach 
is the top down approach, which she termed as downloading, which is about the 
domestic impact of EU policy. According to Pridham (2010), the EU seeks to 
impose Western norms on newly democratising societies irrespective of whether 
they are suitable (p. 447). In this way, the EU is coercing the states to adopt EU 
policies or to comply with conditionality and other demands. However, there is a 
third way or dimension of Europeanisation, where political actors will choose to 
make a move towards the EU to demonstrate governing competence which is 
related to Jim Bulpitt’s (1986) concept of statecraft that will be discussed towards 
the end of the chapter.  
Olsen (2002) describes five different processes of Europeanisation which 
include: “changes in external boundaries,” “developing institutions at the European 
level,” “central penetration of national systems of governance,” “exporting forms of 
political organisation” and “political unification project” (pp. 923-924). “Changes in 
external boundaries” is taken to mean the extension of policies, rules, institutional 
arrangements, and values in the new member states. An example of this would be 
the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and the last enlargement process 
with Croatia acceding in 2013, where the EU policies were extended to the new 
member states. “Developing institutions at the European level relates to the idea 
of central governance capacity in the EU, with its implications of constraints and 
opportunities for actors at the domestic level” (Bulmer 2007, p. 47). “Central 
penetration of national systems of governance is the core usage of 
Europeanisation and covers adjustment processes in respect of institutional 
structure, policy, patterns of behaviour, etc. at lower levels of the multilevel EU 
political system” (Bulmer 2007, p. 47). This means the ability of member states to 
adopt the EU’s policies and “adjust” their national institutions in order to 
accommodate EU rules and patterns of behaviour. “Exporting forms of political 
organisation” is defined as the EU seeking to export its values and norms to 
countries not seeking membership through means and policies such as the 
European Neighbourhood Policy for example and other association agreements. 
“Political unification project” refers to how “the degree to which Europe is becoming 
a more unified and stronger political entity is related both to territorial space, 
centre-building, domestic adaptation, and how European developments impact 
and are impacted by systems of governance and events outside the European 
continent” (Olsen 2002, p. 924). All five of these elements relate to the 
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Europeanisation process and explain how the EU extends its norms and policies 
to acceding and non-acceding countries and how in turn, the applicant/non-
applicant countries adopt and adjust to the EU’s rules and policies. For the 
purpose of our research, we focus on Europeanisation as the impact of the EU on 
applicant states in the formal accession process. In this regard, this implies how 
applicant states with a ‘European perspective’ adopt and employ strategies 
towards EU integration. This concept of Europeanisation alludes to the fact that 
the EU employs its carrot-and-stick conditionality approach to pressure applicant 
states into compliance with EU demands. However, while conditionality forms a 
significant aspect of the accession negotiation process, it does not necessarily 
equate to Europeanisation as a process “centred around the gradual adoption of 
European norms and values and of basing decisions on, and taking decisions in, 
a ‘European way’” (Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015, p. 1030).    
 Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015) make the distinction between 
Europeanisation as a process versus Europeanisation as a policy. They note the 
already growing body of literature that defines Europeanisation as a process, and 
according to Radaelli (2003) “it is a process of change that transcends the 
conventional legal and political transformations that occur through the technical 
process of integration centred on the acquis communautaire” (cited in Economides 
and Ker-Lindsay 2015, p. 1029). The growing literature has also led to the 
development of the notion of Europeanisation via enlargement. However, as 
Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015) argue, there is an increasing danger in 
equating enlargement with Europeanisation as the latter will then lose its original 
and distinctive meaning [of Europeanisation] as a process about the general 
adoption of European norms and values (p. 1030). They further posit that “it is no 
longer necessarily about convergence, or adaptation, or socialisation, or 
absorption, or about ‘the adoption of EU norms on a given issue ... for the purposes 
of EU integration’” (Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015 p. 1030). Instead, 
Europeanisation in this regard is viewed as the act of fulfilling conditions required 
for membership as laid down by the EU. Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015) 
argue that “Europeanisation is thus a conscious policy, relying on external 
incentives of the carrot-and-stick variety (conditionality) which are based on a 
cost–benefit calculation” and which follows the rationalist institutionalist approach 
based on the ‘credible external incentives underpinning EU conditionality’” (pp. 
1030-1031). Börzel and Risse (2011) posit that this suggests that, “candidate 
countries have to Europeanise as a condition and not a consequence of 
membership” (cited in Economides and Ker-Lindsay, p. 1031). We argue that this 
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type of rational institutionalist Europeanisation has been evident in the growing 
literature pertaining to the Central and Eastern Countries and is also applicable to 
the Western Balkans, in particular for our research on Serbia.   
Börzel and Risse (2003) discuss the three different degrees of domestic 
change of politics, polity and policies in response to Europeanisation: absorption, 
accommodation and transformation. In the process of absorption, member states 
absorb policies and ideas into their domestic structures without modifying existing 
processes, policies and institutions and therefore, the degree of domestic change 
is low. In terms of accommodation, they may adapt existing processes, policies 
and institutions, in which the degree of domestic change is modest. Finally, 
transformation occurs when they alter existing processes, policies and institutions 
or even entirely replace them, in which the degree of domestic change is high 
(cited in Obradović-Wochnik and Wochnik 2012, p. 1161). As Börzel and Risse 
(2003) argue, in transformation, the member states or candidate countries may 
succumb to the pressures of Europeanisation (cited in Obradović-Wochnik and 
Wochnik 2012, p. 1161). Such countries have not only implemented policies but 
have adopted the EU values as well as norms and policies into their own national 
government structures. They have complied with the EU conditionality in addition 
to having adopted the patterns of behaviour and values that make up the EU. We 
will seek to argue that absorption and accommodation of EU policies are the norm 
in Serbia because the degree of domestic change in response to EU conditionality 
in Serbia is low or modest depending on the policy area (i.e. Kosovo versus media 
freedom). In the next section, we examine the EU’s external governance model 
underpinning conditionality.  
 
2.3 The EU’s ‘Governance through Conditionality’ Approach 
 
 Enlargement has often been claimed as the EU’s most successful foreign 
policy tool, contributing towards “democratic consolidation, respect for human 
rights, minority protection, conflict resolution, and stability” (Schimmelfennig 2008, 
p. 918). This has been particularly evident in the case of the Central and Eastern 
European countries that began their individual integration and accession process 
shortly following the fall of communism in 1989, and that had joined the EU in the 
2004 and 2007 enlargements respectively. The EU’s political accession 
conditionality has been viewed as being the pillar of this success, bringing about 
domestic change in candidates and encouraging the alignment of their interests 
with EU reforms as posited by Grabbe (2001) and Vachudova (2001) (cited in 
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Noutcheva 2012, p. 18). The scholarship on Europeanisation relates the EU’s 
conditionality-driven approach with that of the EU’s external governance model 
associated with rule transfer to applicant or third countries vis-à-vis conditionality. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) posit that “the dominant logic 
underpinning EU conditionality is a bargaining strategy of reinforcement by 
reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a target government 
to comply with its conditions” (p. 662). In this regard, the EU sets demands or rules 
in the form of conditions applicant states have to comply with in order to receive 
the expected reward. Noutcheva (2012) posits that the EU can also withhold 
rewards or benefits rather than punish applicants for non-compliance which some 
scholars (Sedelmeier et al. 2006) have referred to as “reactive reinforcement” (p. 
22). Such rewards could include the access to the EU’s structural funds, the 
opening and closing of chapters in the accession negotiations leading towards 
membership, and other institutional and assistance ties ranging from trade to co-
operation agreements via association agreements.  
 Given the fact that applicant states wishing to join the EU are rationalist 
actors who are interested in the maximisation of their own power and welfare as 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) argue, they will only comply with EU 
conditions if the benefits of EU rewards exceed domestic adoption costs (pp. 663-
664). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) further posit that the effectiveness 
of rule transfer depends on the determinacy of conditions, the size and speed of 
rewards, the credibility of threats and promises and the size of adoption costs (p. 
664). Determinacy generally refers to both the clarity and formality of a rule where 
applicant countries are more likely to adopt conditions if they are clear on what 
they exactly are and what they have to do in order to receive the intended rewards. 
Also, if the EU conditions have a legal basis, the target governments are more 
likely to adopt them. Regarding the size and speed of rewards, applicant countries 
are more likely to adopt rules if they lead to large rewards such as the promise of 
eventual accession as opposed to an association agreement. In addition, target 
governments may be less likely to adopt the conditions quickly if the timescale of 
delivering the rewards is significant. Generally speaking, a country is more likely 
to comply with EU conditionality closer to membership. In terms of the credibility 
of conditionality, the EU must be able to withhold the rewards in the case of non-
compliance as well as being capable of paying the rewards for compliance 
otherwise the target governments may be unlikely to adopt the rules. Finally, veto 
players and adoption costs can also have an impact on the effectiveness of rule 
transfer. Adoption costs can relate to anything from foregoing alternative rewards 
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offered by adopting rules other than EU ones to welfare and reputational costs for 
political actors which will be discussed in more detail in the section on rational 
choice institutionalism. Although these costs can be balanced by EU rewards such 
as the promise of accession, veto players (or “actors whose agreement is 
necessary for a change in the status quo”) can choose not to comply with EU 
conditionality if they deem the costs as being too high. Therefore, Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier (2004) posit that “the likelihood of rule adoption decreases with 
the number of veto players incurring net adoption costs” (p. 667).  
Although applicant states may comply with EU rules if they are persuaded 
by their legitimacy and the “appropriateness” of their adoption according to the 
social learning and lesson drawing models, Schimmelfennig (2008) argues that 
these models are generally insufficient “to overcome domestic resistance against 
the adoption of democratic and human rights norms” (p. 920). Thus, the EU’s 
carrot-and-stick conditionality approach has proven to be far more successful 
when it comes to rule adoption by applicant countries. This has been particularly 
evident in the case of the CEECs and the Western Balkan candidates and member 
states whose motives for domestic change were driven by the external incentives 
underpinning EU conditionality rather than any social learning or lesson drawing 
models where norms and values were considered to be  the drivers of domestic 
change. In the next section, we examine theories of European integration, to 
explain why applicant states will employ strategies and make decisions to 
integrate.  
 
2.4 Theories of European Integration  
 
2.4.1 Neofunctionalist and Intergovernmentalist theories 
 
 Neofunctionalism is an attempt to theorise the strategies of the founding 
elites of post-war European unity and the subsequent development of the EU 
(Rosamund 2000, p. 51). Neofunctionalist theory primarily focuses on deepening 
the EU with regard to economic integration and spillover: the integration of 
economic sectors in areas of low politics such as coal and steel, for example would 
lead to further integration or a spillover effect in other economic sectors. 
Furthermore, a supranational organisation such as the EU is created and 
appointed to oversee this integration process. Moravcsik (an intergovernmentalist) 
coined, neofunctionalist theory as “supranationalist institutionalism” (Rosamund 
2000, p. 142). The theory began as an attempt to explain post-war Europe when 
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the founding fathers of the European Community (EC), Jean Monnet and Robert 
Schuman, came up with a way to reconcile Germany and France by pooling their 
coal and steel sectors, thus ensuring peace and political stability. Franco-German 
reconciliation and the development of a European Coal and Steel Community was 
an example of this type of spillover according to which integration would deepen 
from economic to political and the result would be a union of states or the 
European Community.  
The EMU or European Monetary Union is a perfect example of 
neofunctionalism and especially spillover. The idea of an EMU had been 
discussed as far back as 1956 in the negotiations on the Treaty of Rome but it was 
the Maastricht Treaty (1992), which set out the plan for economic and monetary 
union (Hix 1999, p. 282). The plan was split up into three stages which included 
establishment of free capital movement and the beginning of macroeconomic 
coordination between member state governments in the first stage; reform of the 
Treaties and the establishment of a European System of Central Banks overseen 
by the European Council and Parliament in the second stage, the fixing of 
exchange rates as well as the establishment of the European Central Bank with 
the goal of maintaining price stability in the third stage (Hix 1999, p. 283). In the 
final stage, the single currency, the “euro”, was established. States integrated and 
ceded power as well as some degree of control over their own economies and 
national currencies in order to gain economic security. This was a primary example 
of economic integration and spillover as member states sought to integrate their 
economies and currencies into the EMU. Moreover, the Copenhagen Criteria also 
established as a condition a participation of a minimum of two years in the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) in which candidate countries 
demonstrate economic convergence by maintaining limited deviation from their 
target rate against the Euro. Furthermore, there is also a spillover into social policy 
as well, as states coordinate their own domestic, social policies with the EU. 
However, social policies are still mainly in the hands of the member states but 
there are some directives in employment rights made by the EU. Although social 
and labour market policies are generally in the hands of the member states, they 
are constrained by the EMU. Social policies could include welfare, pensions, 
education and even employment/unemployment.  
Geographic spillover is another type of process in relation to 
neonfunctionalist theory where blocs and supranational organisations such as the 
EU create centripetal forces that draw in other states as they create public goods 
that are too attractive to resist (for example, free trade, security, movement of 
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persons, etc.) However, this also seems to suggest that states passively accept 
such forces and do not elaborate their own strategies in line with their interests for 
joining/not joining, hence, a geographic spillover. This relates to the theory of 
public goods. According to Moravcsik, “geographic spillover only applies when 
closer cooperation causes negative externalities for outsiders. In the case of 
positive externalities, the threat of exclusion is bound to become powerless” (cited 
in Kolliker 2006, p. 38). That is to say, if some states integrate, then those outside 
the ‘club’ will seek integration if they are negatively affected by the formation of an 
integrated bloc – i.e. geographic spillover will occur. If, on the other hand, they 
benefit from being outside of the bloc, then any threat of exclusion from the 
bloc/club is meaningless, so there will be no rationale to integrate – i.e. no 
geographic spillover.  
Neofunctionalism is a supranationalist theory, focusing mainly on 
economic integration, and spillover into other policy areas, of EU member states 
and applicant countries. It does explain why applicant countries would join but not 
the strategies that they would employ in order to do so because it assumes a 
passive acceptance of conditions, and not, potentially, any attempt to subvert or 
tailor these conditions to self-interest. Therefore, this theory does not provide a 
useful framework for a study that is focused on the strategies of the applicant state, 
and can be dismissed for the purpose of our research. 
 Intergovernmentalism developed as a theory to critique neofunctionalism 
and regards states as the primary drivers of European integration, not the 
institutions of the EU. Hoffman (1964, 1966) was one of the first 
intergovernmentalists who “provided an argument about the continued centrality 
of nation-states in-as well as in spite of-the post-war European experiment with 
integration” (Rosamund 2000, p. 76). His claim was also consistent with 
neorealism where states are the basic units in world politics (Rosamund 2000, p. 
76). Hoffman also “emphasised the importance of national interests in the post-
war international politics of Europe” (Rosamund 2000, p. 76). Furthermore, he 
emphasised the distinction between high and low politics “to explain why 
integration was possible in certain technocratic and uncontroversial areas and why 
it was likely to generate conflict in matters where the autonomy of governments or 
components of national identity were at stake” (Rosamund 2000, p. 77). Hansen 
(1969) also contributed to the debate and criticised the neofunctionalists. He 
argued that “neofunctionalism could explain low politics, but it could not say 
anything of substance about high politics. Nor could it generate productive ideas 
about the interaction between high and low politics” (cited in Rosamund 2000, p. 
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80). According to Hansen (1966), political integration was most likely to be the 
consequence of deliberate political decisions and not the logical corollary of 
economic restructuring (cited in Rosamund 2000, p. 80). Therefore, 
intergovernmentalism does not completely reject the idea of spillover but sees it 
as a result of intergovernmental bargaining. Policy outcomes and Treaties are the 
result of intergovernmental bargaining in which states act according to their own 
perceived interests. This theory tends to focus on the wider EU and interstate 
bargaining. However, it can be argued that there is a certain degree of 
membership bargaining that occurs between applicant or candidate countries and 
the EU in the accession and pre-accession negotiations. This type of bargaining 
can be seen in side payments. Side payments refer to when the EU makes 
concessions or offers certain rewards in order to persuade candidate countries to 
comply with certain conditionality they would otherwise be reluctant to comply with.  
 Intergovernmentalist theory focuses on the bargaining relationship 
between member states or even between an applicant country and the member 
states of the EU. Our study examines one side of this bargaining relationship in 
order to understand how accession/conditionality is mediated by government 
action in a “difficult case” such as Serbia. In other words, the bargaining 
relationship between the applicant country and the EU is not the focus of the study 
but state (Serbian) strategies are and the former can therefore be dismissed for 
the purpose of the research.  
 
2.4.2 Constructivism 
  
 Constructivism is mainly a theory concerning the construction of the EU 
and idea of Europe. It pertains to the construction of norms and values of Europe 
through interaction with and among member states and therefore, how these 
norms and values are not only constructed, but exported to other non-EU 
countries. Therefore, according to Wendt (1992), one of the leading theorists in 
constructivism, identities and interests are not given as the neorealists would 
argue, they are created through interaction: it is the very interaction with others 
that “create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than 
another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process” (p. 394). 
Wendt also points out that material power and state interests are formed by ideas 
and social interaction between states. Thus, states do not seek the use of force or 
military means to threaten other states or cause war because social interaction 
and cooperation can lead to more friendly outcomes and relationships between 
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states (Jackson and Sorensen 2006, p.169). This social interaction and 
cooperation between states also leads to norm diffusion as states are able to 
export their values and norms through processes of learning and lesson drawing.   
 Finnemore (2003) agrees with Wendt emphasising that state behaviour is 
defined by identity and interest. Identity and interests are defined by international 
actors and organisations that is, by the norms of behaviour that are embedded in 
international society (Jackson and Sorensen 2006, p. 169). The EU is one such 
type of organisation that believes in exporting its values of peace, democracy, 
security, and human rights to the rest of the world, most significantly to EU member 
states and potential and candidate countries like Serbia who have a desire to join. 
However, Finnemore’s argument shows that constructivism has its limitations 
because although states can be influenced by international norms, they can also 
create and act in accordance with their own interests.  
 According to constructivism “social interaction is the mechanism for 
reproduction of structures” (Rosamund 2000, p. 172). These structures are the 
rules, norms and patterns of behaviour that are subject to change if and when the 
practice of actors changes but they can also be reproduced or exported by 
international organisations such as the EU. The process of EU integration can 
shape applicant states’ identities and interests where “socialisation and social 
learning leads to the internalisation of new norms and development of new 
identities as a result of interaction with EU institutions and representatives” 
(Noutcheva 2012, p. 18). Socialisation or the social learning model is a different 
approach to the conditionality approach, and is also one based on learning and 
lesson-drawing through processes of interaction and greater exposure to the EU 
way of governance. This is how actors’ identities and interests are transformed or 
change gradually over time to develop new, more European ways of thinking and 
behaving. Schimmelfennig (2001) argues that “socialisation also has a non-
coercive ‘logic of appropriateness’ to it with domestic change taking place due to 
persuasion and the internalisation of a code of conduct universally recognised as 
the norm in Europe” (cited in Noutcheva 2012, p. 18). Sedelmeier (2011) further 
argues that “if a candidate country – elites and publics – positively identifies with 
the EU, or holds it in high regard, the government is more likely to be open to 
persuasion and to consider the rules that the EU promotes as legitimate and 
appropriate” (p. 16). In this respect, Sedelmeier (2011) posits that this positive 
identification with the EU can be a consequence of a “‘cultural match’ or 
[normative] ‘resonance’ between EU demands and domestic rules and political 
discourses, or at least an absence of countervailing norms, due to the ‘novelty’ of 
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a sector and previous policy failure” (p. 16). Thus, an applicant country will adopt 
and even internalise EU norms and values if it perceives them to be in line with 
their own values and political interests.  
 Constructivism can also explain spillover or economic, social and political 
integration. For example, Stahl (2013) mentions two different types of accessions: 
idealistic and strategic. An idealistic accession refers to accession based on the 
constructivist argument of norms and identity and joining out of a sense of cultural 
belonging, while a strategic accession is related to a rationalist agenda of joining 
for reasons of economic prosperity and political security. Stahl (2013) provides a 
distinguishable analysis between the two. He argues that the idealistic accession 
process is: 
“driven by intrinsically motivated elites (former dissidents) which perceive 
accession as the result of a far-reaching domestic transformation. 
Consequently, the candidates have adopted both the acquis 
communautaire and the acquis politique in its entirety and qualify 
themselves for membership based upon their own endeavours. The efforts 
of alignment therefore take place prior to accession and - according to the 
theory of sociological institutionalism – correspond to an ‘exclusive 
strategy of community-building’” (p. 451).  
 
Moreover, the applicant country shares the idealistic idea of European integration 
similar to the Franco-German partnership, which refers to conciliation and 
solidarity. EU values, rules and norms have not only been adapted and accepted 
but have been internalised as well (Stahl 2013, p. 6). They have been 
“Europeanised,” which means not only complying with the EU’s acquis but also 
becoming very much “European” through the adoption and internalisation of the 
EU’s rules, norms and values.  
A strategic accession goes against the constructivist theory. A strategic 
accession has several facets. One of these is that states simply join because 
others have done so. It is out of an economic or political necessity that they do not 
wish to become marginalised (Stahl 2013, p. 5). This also relates to the process 
of spillover as mentioned before, where states integrate in a number of sectors 
including economy, social policy as well as political integration. As will be 
discussed further on in the research study, Serbia’s accession to the EU is 
important for its survival. The EU acts as a sort of “paymaster,” which refers to the 
side payments and concessions it gives to Serbia and other applicant countries to 
persuade them to comply with certain strict conditionality they would otherwise be 
reluctant to adopt. The second facet refers to states joining for security and political 
stability purposes and this is obvious in Serbia’s case, which had been once 
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plagued by bloody wars and genocide. Stahl (2013) argues that the efforts of 
alignment in the pre-accession process in a strategic accession are kept to a 
minimum (this is known as “fake or partial compliance” which will be discussed 
further on in the section on patterns of compliance.) In addition, a strategic 
accession is related to the theories of neorealism and rationalism where states act 
out of self-interest, which is the topic of the discussion in the following two sections. 
 
2.4.3 Neorealism 
 
 Neorealism is a theory derived from classical realism, with roots in 
international relations theory (IR). The theory is about the “interaction of self-
interested actors (states) in an essentially anarchic environment-a situation where 
there is no overarching authority to provide order on a global scale” (Rosamund 
2000, p. 131). Furthermore, the theory tends to put emphasis on states being 
rational, unitary actors who derive their interests based on a careful evaluation of 
their position in the system of states (Rosamund 2000, p. 131). It is a competitive, 
self-help system where states are the most important actors, looking for their own 
security and survival in such a system where competition is high (Keohane 1986, 
pp. 164-166). Mearsheimer (2001) and Kissinger (1957) argue that security is 
obtained by maximising power in order to be able to eliminate or neutralise all 
potential rivals and establish hegemony over one’s region (cited in Hyde-Price 
2006, p. 221). It is about states strengthening their position relative to others so 
they can do better in an increasingly anarchic system of world politics. As Keohane 
(1986), one of the leading neorealists emphasised, “states seek power (both the 
ability to influence others and resources that can be used to exercise influence); 
and they calculate their interests in terms of power, whether as an end or as a 
necessary means to a variety of ends” (p. 165).  
In neorealism, states are concerned with relative gains and will only 
engage in cooperation if they benefit as much or more than the other major 
powers. However, cooperation is limited due to states often seeing others as rivals 
or enemies. The anarchic environment can not only be highly competitive but there 
is also a prevailing sense of uncertainty where states do not know the intentions 
of others and also fear being cheated by others, which limits their will and ability 
to cooperate. This can be explained by the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a component of 
game theory, where each state actor has the interest to not cooperate with the 
other while hoping the other will cooperate (Osborne 2002, pp. 12-19). The inability 
to cooperate by one actor is due to the lack of trust and lack of information about 
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the other actor’s intentions. Neorealism offers a very pessimistic view of 
international politics while other theories such as constructivism offer a more 
positive or optimistic view. Neorealists tend to focus on power and security-based 
interests, but more so on power than anything else. In an anarchic system, the 
distribution of capabilities across states is significant because it reflects how much 
power they have relative to other states. These capabilities could entail military 
capabilities or power, economic power (this could entail how rich a country is in 
terms of GDP and growth as well as trade), social welfare, etc. When they see 
threats or adversaries in the international environment, they can use force and 
coercive means to achieve their benefits or relative gains. Whatever the strategy 
for advancing their relative capabilities, states are always seeking to maximise 
these capabilities in relation to others in the anarchic system of international 
politics.  
 In sum, neorealist critics such as Grieco (1988) argue that the major goal 
of states in any relationship is not to attain the highest possible individual gain or 
payoff as neoliberalists such as Robert Keohane would suggest. “Instead, the 
fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving 
advances in their relative capabilities” (Grieco 1988, p. 488).  Thus, states seek to 
prevent increases in others’ relative capabilities because they fear that their 
partners will achieve relatively greater gains that may endanger their own 
individual power and capabilities. As a result, cooperation is limited due to fear of 
cheating, uncertainty of the other states’ intentions, as well as concern over the 
other states’ gaining more in terms of their capabilities. In neorealism, competition 
is also high as states are constantly seeking means to advance their capabilities 
with regard to other states in the international arena. Conflict prevails when states 
feel threatened by the power of other competing states. Thus, this not only 
becomes a power struggle but a question over security and protecting one’s 
interests. Moreover, as Grieco (1988) notes, “states in anarchy are preoccupied 
with power and security, are predisposed towards conflict and competition, and 
often fail to cooperate even in the face of common interests” (p. 488). We argue 
that neorealist theory cannot be entirely dismissed for the purpose of our study 
because although an applicant state like Serbia is seeking greater cooperation 
through EU membership, Serbia can certainly be seen to be advancing its own 
interests/capabilities through this process, which is also in line with neorealist 
thought. Such interests/capabilities for Serbia would include defending and 
protecting its interests in Kosovo.  
Serbian government strategy towards Kosovo cannot only be explained by 
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the significance of Kosovo to Serbian national identity but also as a security issue 
for the Serbian majority residing in the North and southern enclaves. As a 
consequence of the Kosovo issue being the cause of decades long struggle and 
limited cooperation-something which can still be seen today in some areas of the 
Brussels Agreements between Priština and Belgrade-neorealism as a theory to 
explain Serbian government strategy cannot be entirely dismissed. However, we 
also will seek to argue in our study that despite efforts to not cooperate in some 
areas of the Brussels Agreement, there have been areas of cooperation between 
Serbia and Kosovo which can be explained by rationalist institutionalism. In 
addition, neorealism is argued to be under the theoretical umbrella of rationalism, 
therefore, because the two theories are interlinked, we cannot dismiss neorealism 
in its entirety.  
 
2.4.4 Rationalism or Rationalist Institutionalism 
  
 Rationalism or rationalist institutionalism is a theory based on the 
theoretical assumptions of both neorealism and neoliberalism (Sisodia 2012, p. 8). 
Like neorealism, it has a focus on the power and interests of states. Also, like 
neorealist theory, states are the major actors and are unitary-rational agents. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002) note that institutions share the same type 
of qualities and characteristics of materialism, egoism, instrumentalism and 
individualism that are the basis for neorealism (p. 509). The difference between 
neorealism and rationalism or rationalist institutionalism is that there is more 
cooperation in rationalism. There is an overarching authority (an institutional 
organisation such as the EU) that uses soft power instruments (diplomatic 
persuasion, negotiation and compromise (Hyde-Price 2011, p. 227) instead of 
hard power (use of force or coercive instruments), to intervene between actors’ 
material interests and the material environment as well as the outcome. While 
neorealism appears to place emphasis on the sovereignty of states in an anarchic 
order, rationalism argues that institutions such as the European Union makes the 
system less anarchic than it would appear and as a result, encourages cooperation 
among states.  
 International organisations, according to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
(2002), “render collective action more efficient, for example, by providing stable 
negotiating forums, pooling activities, elaborating norms, and acting as a neutral 
information provider, trustee, allocator, or arbiter” (p. 509). Swisa (2011) refers to 
rationalism/rationalist institutionalism, as neoliberal institutionalism or simply, 
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institutionalism. She argues that while realism tends to focus on the hard power 
capabilities of states and states’ distribution of power within the anarchic system, 
“institutionalism focuses on the role that institutions play in affecting states’ 
behaviour within the anarchic international system” (Swisa 2011, p. 130). Swisa 
also (2011) argues that institutions matter because they advocate democratic 
peace through the promotion of democracy, and interdependence or cooperation 
in areas of trade and other similar policy areas. She tends to focus on the trade 
aspect and how economic interdependence is about states liberalising trade 
markets and cooperating because they gain more: economic interdependence 
leads to increased benefits (p. 131). Therefore, states are rational actors because 
they calculate their interests in terms of costs/benefits. Furthermore, according to 
Snyder and Diesing (1977), “each actor attempts to maximise expected value 
across a given set of consistently ordered objectives, given the information actually 
available to the actor or which he could reasonably acquire in the time available 
for decision” (cited in Keohane 1986, p. 175). Thus, the argument here is that 
states are rational actors because they choose their actions consistently with 
regard to qualitative restriction. This means that states do not necessarily choose 
an action according to the nature of their likes and dislikes, but choose them 
rationally according to which action will give them the best maximum value. In this 
regard, political actors may adopt difficult policies, which they otherwise may not 
favour, if the policy will grant them the best possible outcome. This could be 
anything from securing victory in elections as posited by the statecraft argument, 
which will be discussed further on, to securing economic benefits for the state 
through membership of an international organisation such as the EU.  
 Grieco (1988) even argues that “although anarchy constrains the 
willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can 
do so with the aid of international institutions” (p. 486) He also goes on to argue 
that it is more beneficial for states to cooperate. Institutions can enforce 
cooperation and mitigate cheating through conditional cooperation. According to 
Rosamund (2000), “institutions offer ‘information-rich’ venues where transparency 
prevails and where trust is high” (p. 114). Institutions build up trust through the 
constant exchange and negotiations between the institutions themselves and 
member states or applicant countries. However, we argue that this is not always 
the case. The case of Great Britain leaving the EU, coined effectively as “Brexit”, 
demonstrates the lack of trust and confidence between the EU as a whole and 
member states such as the United Kingdom, especially in light of the Eurozone 
crisis. Additionally, the economic crisis has eroded confidence and trust in more 
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member states and applicant countries, particularly those “that have been hit the 
hardest by the [2007] great recession and the consequent EU and IMF imposed 
austerity measures” such as Portugal, Romania, Latvia, and Greece to name a 
few (Armingeon and Ceka 2014, pp. 92-93).  
 The institutions of the EU also “act as intervening variables between actor 
preferences and policy outcomes” (Rosamund 2000, p. 114). In this regard, the 
EU institutions have an impact on policy outcomes because they shape the 
behaviour of political actors and influence the formation of their preferences and 
the pursuit of their interests (Chryssochoou 2009, p. 65). However, we argue that 
applicant countries like Serbia can also use the accession process for EU-related 
gains as can be seen through negotiations and decisions on certain domestic 
policies, or side payments/concessions.  
 In a rationalist approach, actors or states in this case, elaborate strategies 
and engage in actions they perceive to be in line with their interests, or maximise 
their interests, on a costs/benefits analysis. Rationalism focuses on a cost/benefit 
analysis where: “expected individual costs and benefits determine the applicants’ 
and the member states’ enlargement preferences. States favour the kind and 
degree of horizontal institutionalisation that maximises their net benefits” 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, p. 510). Horizontal institutionalism, in this 
case, means integration or accession to an institution or organisation such as the 
EU. If states such as Serbia wish to join an international organisation like the EU, 
they then will do so under conditions that will reap positive net benefits and these 
benefits therefore exceed the costs or other benefits arising from another 
alternative, such as joining another organisation or staying out of the EU club 
entirely. Benefits reaped from membership could include anything from 
participating in important EU decisions that could affect accession countries like 
Serbia as a whole, participating in the EU club goods or having the opportunity for 
their goods to be traded on the market on a competitive basis with other EU 
member states. Cooperation will occur between states if the net benefits exceed 
the potential costs, and if it is in their line of interest to do so.  
 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002) discuss different categories of 
costs and benefits, all of which can overlap. Transaction costs entail costs of 
communication, co-ordination and supervision between the EU, member states 
and applicant states. Such costs are more than likely to affect the member states 
as well as the applicant states who would have to reorganise their internal 
structure and services to be able to take on new member states. Part of the 
accession process for applicant states is reporting on progress in implementing 
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the acquis, which are then published as annual progress reports by the EU 
Commission. In order to report the progress states have made towards 
implementing the acquis, administrative posts/units would have to be created to 
oversee and report on progress made and this could result in a transaction cost.  
 Policy costs again deal with the EU and member states as a whole but 
states aspiring to join such as Serbia could benefit from being able to participate 
in club goods. However, this could also be a type of cost for accession countries 
because their governments would have to adjust some of their domestic policies 
to adhere to EU rules and conditionality in order to join. The EU has stated as early 
as the 1993 Copenhagen European Council Summit that adoption of the 
Community’s formal rules and procedures or EU law/acquis communautaire is a 
precondition for membership. The conditionality can sometimes coincide with the 
accession country’s national interest and domestic policy, mainly in dealing with 
the acquis communautaire. 
 Autonomy costs relate to the third cost which deals with states’ loss of 
policy-making autonomy when joining the EU. However, as Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier (2002) argue, it can be balanced by benefits where new states would 
be able to participate in EU decision-making as well as the EU providing protection 
of the states’ autonomy. Some accession countries, such as Serbia, as will be 
examined later on in the research, have their very own policy agenda which may 
be quite sensitive and the loss of its own ability to make domestic policies could 
upset the general population. It is important to note that all three costs mentioned 
and discussed by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier relate to one another and 
converge. Transaction costs can relate to policy costs because of the restructuring 
and reorganisation of internal institutions. Autonomy costs correlate with policy 
costs because of loss of decision-making.   
 For the purpose of our research, we identify a fourth cost, the reputational 
cost, related to statecraft. Reputational costs refer to costs in which governments 
of applicant countries or even member states will lose popular support if they 
comply with a certain EU demand or condition of membership if it is perceived to 
be illegitimate. Reputational costs can also refer to the loss of popular support if a 
government failed to gain EU membership if this was supported by a majority of 
the population. This is in line with Bulpitt’s (1986) theory of statecraft where parties 
and/or individuals will seek to gain and then maintain positions of power by 
employing strategies and making decisions that will demonstrate their governing 
competence and cement their victory in the elections. 
Overall, the EU is seen by many non-member states as a vessel of 
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security, stability and peace that prevents future conflicts from arising. The EU has 
recently taken on Croatia in July 2013 as the second member state to join after 
Slovenia from the Former Yugoslavia. Croatia’s accession also greatly influenced 
Serbia’s aspiration to accelerate its EU integration process (Tolksdorf no date). 
However, the country’s accession would also affect Serbia’s relations with Croatia 
regarding a number of unresolved disputes that go back to the Balkan War of the 
1990s and relate to “missing persons (Serbs and Croats), return of refugees and 
their rights, borders, war crime proceedings and genocide lawsuits” (B92 2013). 
Nonetheless, we argue that both Slovenia’s and Croatia’s accession made it 
pertinent for Serbia to not be left out of the EU.  
Thus far, we have discussed theories of European integration, which aids 
in explaining why applicant states would join the EU, focusing on the theory of 
rationalism which argues that political actors employ a careful cost-benefit analysis 
when considering EU accession. In this regard, rationalism argues that politicians 
are self-interested actors driven by what will grant them the best possible outcome. 
The majority of scholarship focusing on the accession of the Central and East 
European countries (CEECs) employed a constructivist or rationalist approach 
where either norms or material benefits are the drivers of policy change. As 
emphasised in the introductory chapter, while the thesis does not seek to entirely 
undermine the constructivist argument, it aims to argue that the decisions of 
political actors are mainly driven by material concerns arising out of EU 
membership as accession did not lead to the internalisation of EU norms and 
values in many of the CEECs in the post-accession phase. This was the case in 
member states such as Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and even Hungary. However, 
the thesis argues that rationalism is insufficient to describe a “difficult case” like 
Serbia and Serbian government strategies towards EU integration because of the 
contradictions in their policy towards EU integration. Thus, we turn to another 
theory focused on the power of discourse to effect institutional change where the 
explanation for its causal power is centred on agents rather than on norms as in 
constructivism or incentives and structures as in rational institutionalism.  
 
2.4.5 Discursive Institutionalism 
  
 Discursive institutionalism is an alternative to both the theories and 
concepts of constructivism and rationalist institutionalism. Kostovicova (2014b) 
argues that it is about the power of discourse to effect domestic change “while the 
explanation of its causal power is centred on agents [or state actors], rather than 
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on structures and incentives as in rational institutionalism or norms as in 
sociological institutionalism” (Kostovicova 2014b, p. 70).  In this regard, the 
discursive institutionalist approach [DI] employed by state actors is used ‘to 
persuade others of the necessity and/or appropriateness of a given course of 
action’” they may take (cited in Kostovicova 2014b, p. 70). With regard to EU 
integration, discourse becomes a means which political elites legitimise or justify 
compliance or non-compliance to EU conditionality. The premise of normative 
congruence between discourse and policy outcome refers to the concept that 
legitimation of discourse by actors will be favourable to policies advancing 
adaptation in line with EU rules and norms, and vice versa.  
Kostovicova (2014b) does agree with the notion that compliance to EU 
conditionality can occur with legitimising discourse or it will not occur which is also 
known as non-compliance. However, Kostovicova (2014b) criticises the notion of 
normative congruence between discourse and policy change. She challenges this 
notion with normative incongruence-“policy convergence coexists with its 
discursive negation, including the rejection of European integration, which results 
in uneven Europeanisation between discourse and policy domains” (Kostovicova 
2014b, p. 69). In other words, compliance could also occur despite discursive 
denial of this compliance.  
While rational cost–benefit calculation by actors, are reliable predictors of 
the full scope of the domestic adjustment, the discursive institutionalist perspective 
provides an analytical tool to capture the incoherence and complexity of domestic 
adaptation in different domains of Europeanisation (Kostovicova 2014b, p. 68). 
Therefore, the discursive institutionalist approach provides a useful framework for 
our research study because it relates to the legitimisation of compliance/non-
compliance, and/or a means of examining how compliance/non-compliance is 
masked to hide reputational costs, both strategies which the Serbian government 
has employed.  
Thus far, we have outlined the different theories of EU integration and 
chose rational institutionalism in addition to discursive institutionalism as the basis 
for our theoretical framework when explaining Serbian government strategy 
towards EU integration. While theories of EU integration—namely the rational 
institutionalist approach--may account for a partial explanation as to why political 
actors in Serbia will engage in a certain type of compliance, this theory is 
insufficient in accounting for the complexities of Serbian government policy 
towards EU integration. This is because the theories of state action discussed 
above (rationalism, discursive institutionalism) neglect the fact that democratic 
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governments are also constrained by the need to win elections by appealing to the 
electorate, thus a third approach, based on Bulpitt’s (1986) theory of statecraft, is 
needed for a full analysis of Serbian accession strategy. In this regard, the thesis 
attempts to employ Bulpitt’s (1986) concept of statecraft in conjunction with 
rationalist theory, which the following section will examine. Moreover, the thesis 
argues how statecraft is also related to the discursive institutionalist approach of 
using discourse as a means to mask non-compliance/compliance to avoid 
reputational costs for governing elites.  
 
2.5  The Statecraft Approach 
 
 The following section analyses and explains another approach as to why 
states and elites in government may want to Europeanise or move in the direction 
of the EU that also relates to rationalist theory mentioned earlier in the chapter. 
This concept of “statecraft” was first introduced by Bulpitt (1986) and is about 
political actors making decisions and acting in accordance with certain strategies 
in order to maximise perceived benefits and their own interests, which may or may 
not be the same as national interests. Such interests and goals of politicians can 
include acting or basing decisions in a way that would demonstrate their governing 
competence in order to gain power and maintain it (i.e. through winning elections). 
This concept is especially pertinent to the case study of Serbia, where compliance 
to EU conditionality has not always been genuine and cannot always be explained 
by mere rational choice institutionalism. We will now discuss this concept in more 
detail. 
 James (2012) posits that the statecraft approach “is the claim that an inner 
core of politicians in the central state (who Bulpitt terms the “Court” or “Centre”) 
will seek to follow their own interests and maintain power through winning 
elections” (p. 66). “The Court” or “Centre” is defined as…”the formal Chief 
Executive plus his/her political friends and advisors” (Bulpitt 1995, p. 518). 
According to James (2012), Bulpitt makes several assumptions on the statecraft 
approach. First, “Bulpitt assumes that the Court will act as a unitary actor-through 
fear, greed, ambition or party pressures” (James 2012, p. 67). Second and 
controversially, Bulpitt (1988) argues that politicians are self-interested and act out 
of self-interest: “this ruling party elite will prefer their own interests and these may 
not be the same as the national interest or the interests of powerful domestic and 
external groups” (cited in James 2012, p. 68). However, we argue that political 
actors may govern in what their perception of what national interests are if this will 
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lead to their victory in the next election cycle. In this case, politicians are self-
interested actors concerned with “winning and winning again” (James 2013, p. 10). 
 Bulpitt (1986) also outlined five major elements of statecraft, or in other 
words, methods in which statecraft is to be achieved which include party 
management, a winning electoral strategy, political argument hegemony, 
governing competence and another winning electoral strategy. All of these five 
elements demonstrate a government’s or a political actor’s decisions to gain and 
maintain power.  
 ‘Party management’ includes management of parliamentary 
backbenchers, party bureaucracy, constituency associations and support 
pressure groups. This can be a problem for party leaders as it can involve them in 
sometimes difficult situations and relationships with the various components of the 
party. Effective management would ensure party unity and control and increase 
the need for party competition during elections, ensuring the party’s victory. 
 ‘A winning electoral strategy’ is about the manufacturing of a party policy 
package and image capable of being sold successfully to the electorate and 
stimulate members’ belief that the party can win an election as well as govern 
effectively. This is also related to governing competence as political actors will 
make a decision or act according to a certain strategy in order to demonstrate their 
governing competence to win elections and thus, gain power. 
 ‘Political argument hegemony’ entails a “predominance of the elite debate 
regarding political problems, policies and the general stance of government” 
(Bulpitt 1986, pp. 21-22). This means winning because either the framework of the 
party’s arguments becomes generally acceptable or because its solutions to an 
important political problem seem more plausible than its opponents. 
 ‘Governing competence’ refers to the concept that government is about 
more than just policies but about creating a sense of competence. This can be 
related to policy choice or selection. Here, the government or a political actor will 
not only positively adopt a certain policy, but also choose which policies to reject 
or avoid. This may be a result of ideology but also implementation as parties in 
government may not necessarily adopt policies they are unable to implement.  
 Finally, ‘another winning electoral strategy’ demonstrates that statecraft is 
a continuous cycle. In this respect, the cycle begins with the party in opposition, 
winning an election, demonstrating their governing competence and then winning 
another one (Bulpitt, 1986, p. 22). 
 As mentioned previously, the statecraft approach can be related to the 
IR/EU integration theory of rationalism where states and political actors make 
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rational choices according to their own interests which may or may not necessarily 
be related to national interests, especially if they want to gain and maintain power 
once having won elections. They can calculate their interests in terms of a 
cost/benefit analysis where they act according to what will give them the best, 
maximum benefits.  In relation to EU integration, should membership be desired 
by the general populace, the governing party may use their statecraft to appear to 
be adhering to EU conditionality and favouring EU membership as a way of 
increasing their sense of governing competence in order to win elections or stay 
in power once winning. Additionally, the governing party may reject EU integration 
and accession if it is not supported by the general population.  
 Given that the Serbian government has to satisfy both the general 
populace as well as the EU in order to progress forwards in the EU negotiations 
while not losing domestic support, it can be argued that they are constrained by 
both the EU and their nationalist constituency at home. In this regard, Serbian 
politicians are thus “doubly constrained by both what is negotiable internationally 
and what is acceptable domestically” (Noutcheva 2006, p. 5). This concept relates 
to Robert Putnam’s (1988) logic of two-level games where “any key player at the 
international table who is dissatisfied with the outcome may upset the game board, 
and conversely, any leader who fails to satisfy his fellow players at the domestic 
table risks being evicted from his seat” (p. 434). The Progressive Party and Vučić 
risk losing popular support which could also lead to their defeat in the next election 
cycle if they fail to act according to national interest. Similarly, if the EU becomes 
dissatisfied with the lack of Serbian compliance, it could sanction Serbia or 
withhold certain incentives such as the access to structural funds or the opening 
and closing of chapters in the accession negotiations. The thesis will seek to argue 
that Serbian politicians seek EU accession as this reaps economic and social 
benefits, while simultaneously addressing compliance issues according to what 
will satisfy their domestic constituency so as not to lose power. Thus, it is 
imperative to consider and apply Putnam’s (1988) concept of two-level games in 
line with Bulpitt’s (1986) statecraft theory when examining Serbian government 
strategy towards EU accession.  
 The research argues that theories of European integration (i.e. rationalism 
and discursive institutionalism) are inadequate to explain elite/government 
strategies vis-a-vis EU integration because neither rationalism nor discursive 
institutionalism take into account the desire for power. Both rationalism and 
discursive institutionalism do not take into account the fact that governments are 
also constrained by the need to win elections and appeal to the electorate; thus 
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this thesis also employs statecraft theory for a full examination of Serbian 
government strategy in terms of compliance to EU conditionality. In the next 
section, we use Noutcheva’s (2006; 2012) analytical framework for discussing the 
different forms of compliance to EU conditions an applicant state may employ.  
 
2.6 Patterns of Compliance 
 
 In a study by Noutcheva (2006, 2012), four types of compliance are 
established: genuine compliance, legitimacy-based or socialisation-driven 
compliance, rationality-based or conditionality-driven compliance, and non-
compliance. In relation to the EU’s coercive power in influencing compliance, there 
is also fake and imposed compliance to take into account.  
 Genuine compliance occurs when political actors comply with 
conditionality because the benefits are sufficient enough to compensate short-
term compliance costs and the degree of legitimacy of EU conditionality is high 
(Noutcheva 2012, p. 30). In genuine compliance, elites carry out a transformation 
process of domestic structures to bring them up to European standards and 
sustain this transformation over time. Additionally, elites are open to constant 
exchange and interaction between their European peers and are therefore 
exposed to the “European” way of governance (Noutcheva 2012, p. 30).  
Noutcheva (2012) argues that “in these instances, socialisation and conditionality 
reinforce each other” (p. 30). However, we argue that genuine compliance can 
also occur when only one of these conditions -either benefits outweighing the costs 
or legitimacy of EU conditions being high- is in place. Rationalism would posit that 
genuine compliance can occur even when legitimacy is low because the saliency 
of EU conditionality can override the perceived illegitimacy of EU conditionality. As 
Grabbe (2006) argues, the likelihood of rule adoption increases when the EU pays 
increased attention to a given area subject to conditionality. 
 Socialisation-driven compliance is interchangeable with genuine 
compliance as actors view EU conditionality to be highly legitimate despite the 
costs of compliance. As in genuine compliance, actors’ preferences and interests 
become defined by EU standards and norms. Compliance by acceding countries’ 
governments is driven by the logic of appropriateness where the EU conditions 
are not challenged as lacking in legitimacy. Noutcheva (2006) posits that “if no 
political formation allows itself to challenge the EU demands and publicly 
campaign against them, then one can assume that there is no case against the 
“appropriateness” of EU conditions, hence, their legitimacy is high” (p. 11). 
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Noutcheva (2012) argues that conditionality-driven/rational-based 
compliance occurs when political actors see the benefits as outweighing the costs 
and identify their interests with the EU-demanded reforms but they do not view 
with EU conditionality as legitimate (Noutcheva 2006, p. 10; 2012, p. 30). This ties 
in with the rational choice model. We argue that conditionality-driven compliance 
can be genuine, fake or even partial. With partial compliance, benefits are seen 
as attractive enough to compensate for ruling elites’ losses, but compliance is not 
substantial, may be unstable and subject to change.  
In fake compliance, political leaders will simulate compliance because 
they believe that membership would bring benefits, including to themselves as 
national leaders, but are not prepared to pay the costs of genuine compliance or 
do not accept the legitimacy of the conditionality. By practicing fake compliance, 
they avoid the costs of genuine compliance with EU conditionality but also avoid 
the even higher costs of blatant confrontation, total refusal to comply and denial of 
a membership prospect (Noutcheva 2006, p. 11). In fake compliance, the EU is 
inconsistent or reluctant in putting pressure on political elites to comply with 
conditionality (Noutcheva 2012, p. 31). Additionally, when engaging in fake 
compliance, political leaders do not initiate and carry out a thorough transformation 
of domestic structures in order to bring them up to European standards with the 
firm intention of sustaining the initiated reform momentum as in genuine 
compliance (Noutcheva 2006, p. 11). Political actors are thus not open to 
socialisation by their European peers into the European way of governing and do 
not adopt the European model of values and norms. According to Noutcheva 
(2006), “fake compliance is cheaper than non-compliance because the costs of 
non-compliance are higher than the costs of simulating EU-compliant change in 
the short run while seeking ways of reversing that change and maximising profits 
in the long run” (p. 11).  
Fake and partial compliance can often seem blurred, particularly in the 
Serbian case, where the EU has used its coercive power to attempt to produce 
compliance, thus it is important to note the difference between the two. We argue 
that costs can outweigh the benefits in either fake or partial compliance. Therefore, 
when seeking EU accession, compliance then depends on visibility and saliency 
of a given policy area. For example, in highly visible areas where there is an 
increased presence of external actors monitoring compliance and where the EU 
pays increased attention, partial compliance could occur. In areas of low visibility, 
there is a decrease in the presence of external actors such as with an internal 
issue, fake compliance is more likely to occur. We discuss this concept in more 
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detail in the methodological chapter.   
Political actors will engage in non-compliance when compliance has a 
high short-term price where the costs exceed the benefits and which the long-term 
payoff is unable to offset, and the degree of legitimacy for EU demands is low 
(Noutcheva 2012, p. 30). This is when political elites refuse to comply with EU 
conditionality because it goes against their national interests, which they will use 
to challenge the EU’s demands and to remain popular within their domestic 
sphere.  
There is a third way that deals with other forms of compliance, which the 
EU uses to persuade countries when they are not complying. This is the EU’s 
coercive mechanism, or “compliance through imposition.” This is where the EU 
intervenes in the domestic affairs of accession countries in order to coerce them 
to comply with conditions and demands and instigate reform of domestic 
structures. The outcome then is imposed compliance. Moreover, “imposed 
compliance is possible in the context of power asymmetry with external tutelage 
in protectorates and semi-protectorates reflecting the subordinate position of 
incumbents. It necessitates continued external pressure to sustain the compliant 
outcome” (Noutcheva 2012, p. 31).  
The following table as developed by Noutcheva helps to explain how actors 
will comply with the EU’s conditionality according to their legitimacy and rationality 
(i.e. cost-benefits). 
 
Table 2.1 Explaining the compliance behaviour of EU Accession States 
                     
    High legitimacy  Low legitimacy 
  
Benefits>costs 
 
  
  
   
   
Costs>benefits 
           
(Source: Noutcheva 2012). 
 
Noutcheva argues the only way to differentiate between fake and genuine 
compliance is to look at the implementation of certain legislation and policy areas. 
For example, if political elites pass legislation that complies with EU demands but 
there is no enforcement of the legislation and problems of a technical nature are 
not obvious, then it can be said that this is fake compliance as there is no political 
 
Genuine compliance 
Rationality-
based/conditionality-
driven compliance, 
genuine compliance, 
partial compliance 
Legitimacy-
based/socialisation-driven 
compliance 
 
Non-compliance, fake 
compliance, partial 
compliance 
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will to initiate genuine reforms. Also, if the political actors set up institutions in 
response to EU conditionality, but these institutions remain empty shells and exist 
more in theory and on paper than in actuality, this can also be fake compliance 
(Noutcheva 2006, p. 11). For the purpose of this study, policies and legislation 
along with EU and Serbian governmental progress reports and Action Plans will 
be carefully analysed to examine whether or not they are correctly adopted as well 
as implemented over time to establish the type of compliance Serbian politicians 
are employing. 
 The final section of this chapter will deal with the current literature and state 
of research on Serbia and its European integration process, explaining the gaps 
in the literature and how this study will seek to fill in those particular gaps in order 
to contribute to the existing field of research.  
 
2.7 The Serbian case 
 
  The more recent scholarship following the election of the Progressives 
spearheading Serbia’s EU integration process assumes a rational-institutionalist 
approach whereby the Serbian government saw accession to the EU as linked 
with economic and social benefits such as trade, access to EU funds, better 
employment opportunities, etc. (Ejdus 2014; Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015; 
Bieber 2015). Additionally, the process of EU integration led to many EU 
concessions or rewards for compliance, therefore, fostering Serbian domestic 
reforms in key policy areas that would bring them up to European standards. 
Kosovo became one of these major policy areas and a source of contention, for 
years at odds with Serbia’s EU membership prospects. Leaving aside the crucial 
question of status of Kosovo, which unilaterally declared independence in 
February 2008, the EU sought to use its carrot-and-stick conditionality to pressure 
Serbia to normalise its relations with Kosovo in a way that promoted regional 
stability and ensured peace and regional cooperation. Following the election of the 
Progressive Party, there has been a political shift with regard to Serbia’s EU 
accession prospects and its Kosovo policy in the signing of the 2013 Brussels 
Agreement which became the first step towards regional cooperation between 
both governments.  
There has been an increase in the literature on Serbia-Kosovo relations, 
especially in light of Serbia’s recent policy change under the new SNS leadership. 
Furthermore, according to Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015), “in view of the 
major transformation that occurred in Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo, there has 
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been a growing interest in both the academic and policy communities in 
understanding and explaining the factors underpinning this policy change” (p. 
1028).  However, although much of the scholarship (Ejdus 2014; Economides and 
Ker-Lindsay 2015; Bieber 2015; Beha 2015 and Kostovicova 2014b) would argue 
that there has been a shift in Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo, the authors seem to 
agree that this change has not lead to transformation in the thinking and decision-
making process of Serbian political elites that can be attributed to Europeanisation.  
Ejdus (2014) implies a rationalist approach that is focused more on Serbian 
interests, positing that the Serbian government under the Progressive Party had 
managed to protect Serbia’s national interests vis-à-vis the Brussels Agreement 
in addition to accelerating its EU integration process. This approach, we argue, 
relates to the concept of pragmatic nationalism whereby the Serbian government 
is seeking ways to protect their national interests in Kosovo through EU 
integration. Therefore, the dual strategy of protection of Serbia’s interests in 
Kosovo and accession to the EU form part of a rationalist argument of maximising 
benefits—including economic and social benefits EU membership would bring in 
addition to achieving nationalist goals through European integration. Ejdus’ (2014) 
research examines the policy outcomes of Serbian government strategy rather 
than the actual strategy itself. In fact, aside from Economides and Ker-Lindsay’s 
research (2015), the majority of these studies focus on the policy outcomes of 
Serbia’s strategy towards EU integration, primarily with regard to the benefits 
Serbia had gained in the accession process (i.e. opening up of Chapters, 
improving Serbia’s international standing, avoiding recognition of Kosovo and 
protecting Serbian national interest). Our research instead focuses on Serbian 
government strategy perceived as a two-level game where Serbian political 
leaders are players at two tables- the EU and the domestic (electorate)– and are 
thus doubly constrained by both what is negotiable internationally and what is 
acceptable domestically (cited in Noutcheva 2006, p. 5). Because the domestic 
constituency can potentially constrain and even hinder Serbian government policy, 
the accession process could become problematic for the EU, therefore raising 
questions over the sustainability of Serbian policy over time, even following 
accession as the post-accession phases of some of the CEECs (Bulgaria, 
Romania and Hungary) have demonstrated.  
 Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015) focus on the rationalist approach of 
material incentives arising out of EU accession, rather than protection of national 
interests vis-à-vis EU integration as Ejdus (2014) had argued. They also argue 
that the change in Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo “is based on pragmatism and 
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political opportunism, rather than absorption, adaptation and convergence or 
identity formation” (Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015, p. 1027). Material 
incentives related to economic benefits were the main driving force for the Serbian 
policy shift toward Kosovo as they realised EU accession would not be possible 
unless Serbia engaged in a dialogue of normalisation with Kosovo as the German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel had made in a statement during an official visit to 
Belgrade in 2011.  
 Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015) argue that the “discussions over 
Kosovo coincided with a significant economic downturn in Serbia” (p. 1036). The 
World Bank (2013) noted that Serbia had been struggling to recover from the 
international economic and financial crisis which led to an increase in both poverty 
and unemployment (cited in Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015, p. 1037). As was 
also mentioned in the introductory chapter, the EU was seen as the key to 
economic growth by both the Serbian government and the general populace. 
Moreover, as Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015) stipulate, like all other Balkan 
countries, Serbia receives a significant amount of funds from the EU through the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) (p. 1037). Therefore, the EU integration 
process under the Progressives did not reflect their decisions as being based on 
core European values, nor of processes of adaptation or socialisation as 
constructivism would argue. Nor did they suggest that Serbian identity was being 
transformed (Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015, p. 1037). Instead, with pressure 
from the EU, the Serbian government under the Progressive Party addressed an 
explosive issue of national interest in a way that would normalise relations to 
ensure regional stability, for the sake of material gain. Vachudova (2012) further 
argues that the EU’s intervention had a democratising effect and was thus 
successful in making Serbia’s Kosovo policy more EU-compatible (cited in 
Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015, p. 1038).  
 In his analysis on the Brussels dialogue, Bieber (2015) emphasises the 
constructive ambiguity of the agreements and argues that the normalisation 
process between Serbia and Kosovo would not have been possible without the 
EU’s intervention and the offer of credible incentives. Like Ejdus (2014) and 
Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015), this approach can also be attributed to 
rationalist institutionalism where the EU used its carrot-and-stick conditionality to 
boost reforms in both Serbia and Kosovo that would bring both sides to a gradual 
process of normalisation without Kosovo’s formal recognition by Serbia. However, 
Bieber (2015) argues that the ultimate incentive of EU accession “alone does not 
suffice for the success of the dialogue” (p. 312). Instead, he argues “the success 
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of the dialogue “was identifying shared--or separate, yet compatible—interests 
that could be addressed in the agreement. While Kosovo’s interests in the north 
was primarily about formally placing it under government control, Serbia sought to 
retain its influence in the north and ensure that it would retain a dominant position 
over Kosovan Serbs” (Bieber 2015, p. 312). Such a process led to the gradual 
normalisation of relations with the EU providing leverage and a framework for the 
negotiations. Thus, it can be argued that this was a case of pragmatic nationalism 
by which the Serbian government under the Progressive Party used the dialogue 
to its own benefit—to protect Serbian national interests in Kosovo by retaining 
control of the North and the Serb population there. Bieber (2015), like Ejdus (2014) 
examines the outcomes of Serbian government strategy but his focus is more 
reliant upon the EU’s use of mediation to achieve outcomes, rather than domestic 
[Serbian] strategy. In this regard, he argues that it was a result of the EU’s 
constructive ambiguity approach that had led to the signing of the historic Brussels 
Agreement.  
 Bieber (2015) argues that this constructive ambiguity was a key feature of 
the entire dialogue, with both sides “promoting a very different understanding of 
the agreement” (p. 306). He claims that “this allowed both parties to present the 
outcomes in very different ways with the Serbian government arguing that the 
agreement did not imply any recognition of Kosovo by Serbia, whereas in Kosovo, 
normalisation of relations was seen more as a step toward full recognition” (Bieber 
2015, p. 314). Other authors (Prelec, M. 2013, Beha 2015, Reljić 2015) also 
examine the Brussels dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia as a case of the EU’s 
constructive ambiguity. Although Beha (2015) does not use the term constructive 
ambiguity explicitly, he argues how even in Kosovo the agreement was interpreted 
in different, opposing ways by both the Kosovan government and the opposition 
parties in Kosovo. Through this agreement the Kosovan government viewed 
Serbia as de facto recognising the Republic of Kosovo while “the second reaction 
is accompanied by other groups in Kosovo, which argue that the agreement 
legitimises the partition of Kosovo, legalises parallel structures, and paves the way 
for the creation of a Bosnian type of “Republika Srpska” in Kosovo” (Beha 2015, 
p. 103).  
The consequence of this was the ambiguity in the EU’s own member 
states, where some states do not accept Kosovo’s recognition while others, in 
particular Germany, made it clear that eventual accession would require full 
recognition. Serbia viewed this ambiguity among some of the EU member states 
as an advantage and therefore, used the dialogue for its own purposes to 
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maximise its own interests in Kosovo. However, “the constructive ambiguity of the 
mediation extended beyond not addressing the international status of Kosovo both 
in content and in form” (Bieber 2015, p. 314). Prelec (2013) noted that the 
normalisation process was all about committing publicly to agreements while filling 
in the content later in a very non-transparent manner. “The advantage of such an 
approach,” he argues, “lies in making possible agreements that would be politically 
dead if spelled out in black and white” (Prelec 2013). The absence of reaching 
clearly articulated agreements enabled both sides to promote conflicting and 
divergent interpretations of the agreement, and allowed Serbia to maintain the 
fiction of retaining Kosovo. However, Bieber (2015) also posits that this approach 
could risk a complete breakdown in the implementation phase and raises 
questions over the sustainability of the mediation process. He points to future 
directions for research including the impact of fake compliance with EU conditions 
practiced by the Serbian government. Our research will take the study further to 
examine the possibilities of either fake, partial or genuine compliance as a strategy 
of the Serbian government regarding Serbia’s policy on Kosovo.  
We have examined the rational-institutionalist approach with regard to 
Serbia’s policy change towards Kosovo that was a reflection of its desire for EU 
membership, based on material incentives accession would bring. However, other 
authors (Kostovicova 2014b, Ejdus and Subotić 2014) discuss additional 
approaches that can be used to explain the policy shift of the Serbian government. 
Kostovicova (2014b) employs rational institutionalism as a “jumping-off point” for 
discursive institutionalism (DI), arguing that rationalism could only “partially 
account for policy adjustment given the interest of the then Serbian leadership8 in 
progressing towards the EU and the prohibitive costs of its Kosovo policy” (p. 83). 
She argues that discursive institutionalism “explains the paradox of Serbia’s 
domestic adaptation in the course of approximation to the EU: deepening of the 
contractual relationship with the EU, including appropriate policy adoption, 
coexists with discursive confrontation with the EU, especially on the Kosovo issue” 
(p. 83). Although her focus is solely on the Democratic Party under Tadić prior to 
2012 and not on the current Serbian government led by the Progressives, 
Kostovicova (2014b) posits that “the same explanation applies to the policy 
pursued by the new Serbian leadership following the 2012 parliamentary and 
presidential elections,” referring to the Progressive Party leadership (p. 83).  
                                                          
8 Democratic Party and” For A European Serbia” coalition led by President Boris Tadić 
from 2008-2012. 
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Even now, Kosovo represents both a national cost and a reputational one 
as our research will seek to examine, and while the Progressives are concerned 
with the economic gains stemming from EU accession, statecraft would posit that 
they are equally concerned with protecting national interest in Kosovo out of 
electoral concerns. Moreover, Kosovo represents the cradle of Serbian national 
identity and loss of Kosovo would be an emotional blow to the Serbian political 
elites as well as to the general populace. Therefore, their policy shift can be 
explained through the prism of discursive institutionalism where discursive denial 
was a strategy the Serbian government used to mask their policy shift vis-à-vis 
Kosovo to avoid reputational costs. 
 While their focus is on Serbian policy towards Kosovo since 1999 under 
the various governments, Ejdus and Subotić (2014) also posit that the strategy of 
discursive denial is applicable to the current Progressive-led government 
especially regarding the signing of the Brussels Agreement in 2013 with Kosovo 
and under the auspices of the EU. This agreement had been met with great 
political protest by the Serbian Orthodox Church and nationalist opposition parties 
and right-wing groups who accused the Serbian leaders of treason because they 
had relinquished territorial control over Kosovo (Ejdus and Subotić 2014, pp. 177-
178). We argue that Ejdus and Subotić (2014) allude to the concept of statecraft 
where the Serbian elites had to find a way to “convincingly present the agreement 
to the restless and sceptical public” in order to “minimise the significance of 
Serbian concessions” (pp. 177-178). Thus, the authors posit that “the [Serbian] 
government used an arsenal of various rhetorical tools to discursively deny the 
actual policy change” (Ejdus and Subotić 2014). For example, the Serbian 
President at the time, Tomislav Nikolić argued that “we would never cut our wrists 
and commit suicide by recognising Kosovo” while the deputy prime minister at the 
time, Ivica Dačić and leader of the Socialists, remarked that all Serbia signed was 
an agreement not to block Kosovo from membership in international organisations 
(Ejdus and Subotić 2014, p. 178). According to Ejdus and Subotić (2014), this was 
“a pedantic twist on a major territorial loss” (p. 178).  
  To conclude, a variety of authors have examined Serbia’s policy shift under 
the Progressives with regard to Kosovo, assuming rationalism as an explanation 
for the recent shift. However, aside from Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015), the 
majority of authors examined in the literature, focus on the outcomes of the policy 
shift, rather than analysing actual Serbian government strategy under the 
Progressive Party. A lot of the scholarship also tended to focus on one side of the 
bargaining relationship-the EU’s constructive ambiguity approach- but the thesis 
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argues that domestic policy must also be taken into account in order to provide for 
a comprehensive analysis of Serbian government strategy in light of the recent 
policy shift, especially given the prohibitive costs of Kosovo. While the rationalist 
argument provides a useful analytical tool to explain Serbian strategies towards 
compliance to EU conditionality, it is inadequate. To account for this obvious gap, 
Kostovicova (2014b) applies the discursive institutionalist approach to explain how 
compliance was “enabled by discursive denial of the extent of actual policy 
adaptation” (p. 78). However, her focus is primarily on the ruling coalition under 
the Democratic Party prior to the Progressives’ victory in 2012, though she does 
suggest that the approach can be applied to the current government. Neither 
Kostovicova (2014b) nor Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015) take desire for 
power into consideration. Therefore, our research seeks to address this gap by 
applying Bulpitt’s (1986) statecraft theory, in conjunction with rationalist and 
discursive institutionalist approaches, as part of the overall explanation for Serbian 
government strategy.  
While other authors focus on Serbia’s policy regarding Kosovo, our 
research also seeks to argue that it is necessary to examine and analyse two 
policy areas (Kosovo and media freedom) in order to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of Serbian government strategy towards EU integration. There 
exists little in terms of scholarship on media freedom in Serbia outside of reports 
published by journalists’ associations and news articles, but our research argues 
that freedom of expression is equally important to examine alongside Serbian 
government strategy vis-à-vis Kosovo, especially since it raises questions about 
the EU’s capacity to export its values and norms to applicant countries.  
 
2.7.1 Gaps in the literature 
 
 As we have examined, there is a growing scholarship with regard to 
Serbia’s EU policy towards Kosovo under the Progressive-led government elected 
in May 2012. There exists very little scholarship with regard to media freedom 
outside of journalistic reports from the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network and 
the Anti-Corruption Council, and journalists’ associations (i.e. Independent 
Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina, Independent Journalists’ Association of 
Serbia, and Journalists’ Association of Serbia). The journalists’ reports moreover 
do not provide a useful theoretical framework for analysing the media environment 
in Serbia and Serbian government policy towards media freedom, which points to 
an obvious gap in the literature on media freedom in Serbia and Serbian EU policy 
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towards media freedom under the new leadership of the Serbian Progressive 
Party. Barlovac (2015) examines the financial relationship between the Serbian 
government and the media with a focus on the field of advertising and project co-
financing. Kisić (2015) also analyses Serbian government strategy towards media 
freedom under the new media laws, focusing on political interference in the media. 
However, the focus of these two authors is solely on Serbian government strategy 
towards media freedom, rather than analysing more than one policy area (i.e. such 
as those of both media freedom and Kosovo), which would be expected to provide 
a more nuanced view of Serbian EU integration strategy. Additionally, there is a 
significant gap in the literature regarding the EU’s position on the media landscape 
in Serbia and Serbian policy towards the media other than the obvious annual EU 
progress reports and monitoring reports.   
Additionally, the authors discussed previously focused on a highly visible 
area (Kosovo) but have neglected a low visible area (media freedom).  We argue 
that this is inadequate when explaining Serbian government strategy towards EU 
integration, and therefore, as mentioned previously, our research seeks to analyse 
Serbian government strategy towards media freedom in conjunction with Serbia’s 
policy regarding Kosovo. Media freedom constitutes an area of low visibility 
because the EU’s capacity to regulate media freedom legislation is limited, given 
that this is an internal issue in the hands of member states’ and applicants’ national 
governments. Kosovo, on the other hand, is an area of high visibility due to the 
increased presence in external actors as the Serbian government is expected to 
cooperate with the Kosovan political elites who monitor compliance and report to 
the EU. In addition, the salience the EU placed on Kosovo conditionality would 
also be expected to make non-compliance difficult to hide. The thesis seeks to 
argue that both case studies are imminently crucial to examine for a 
comprehensive view regarding Serbian integration strategy as a two-level game. 
We argue that European integration is a two-way process or a multilevel game, 
therefore, it is significant to examine domestic policy or how political actors 
respond to and download EU conditionality and adapt them into their domestic 
structures. Aside from Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015), none of the authors 
discussed previously focus on the domestic side of European integration or 
Serbian government strategy towards EU integration, but focus on the outcomes. 
Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015) also do not take account of media freedom, 
but examine solely Kosovo. Our research, on the other hand, looks at Serbian 
government strategy, in two policy areas, as a two level-game where political 
actors are constrained by both the EU and their domestic constituency. Therefore, 
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the thesis seeks to argue how this could potentially cause the accession process 
as whole to become problematic for the EU and even raise questions about the 
EU’s ability to export its values and norms post-accession as has been the case 
with Bulgaria and Romania and even Hungary in the years succeeding their 
membership.  
 To sum up, rationalist institutionalism based on costs and benefits incurring 
from EU membership provides a useful theoretical framework in the explanation 
of Serbian government strategy under the Progressive Party with regard to both 
case studies of Kosovo and media freedom as the Serbian government goal has 
been EU membership, emphasised through various statements and party 
documents of the Progressives. Much research has pointed to the shift in Serbian 
government policy being a result of the material incentives of EU integration such 
as the access to EU funds, better opportunities for employment, access for Serbia 
to participate in the EU market and the chance to participate in the EU decision-
making process. However, the compliance costs to EU conditionality has posited 
the need for the Serbian government to protect its national interests vis-à-vis 
Kosovo so as not to lose popular support, thus further complicating their strategy 
towards Kosovo and EU integration. While providing a useful theoretical 
framework, rationalist institutionalism cannot suffice in explaining Serbian 
Progressive Party strategy towards Kosovo, nor can it say anything about Serbian 
compliance towards EU conditionality on media freedom. Statecraft, when applied 
to the Serbian case, complements rationalist theory, positing that electoral 
considerations rather than solely material incentives arising out of accession, can 
account for Serbian government strategy towards EU integration in both policy 
areas. Additionally, because of the reputational costs of compliance to both 
Kosovo and media freedom conditionality, discursive institutionalism, which is 
about the use of discourse as a means of examining how compliance/non-
compliance is masked to hide reputational costs, can help to make sense of the 
apparent complexities and contradictions of Serbian EU policy in terms of 
statecraft. The research employed a case study approach where an examination 
of both policy areas was required for a full comprehensive explanation of Serbian 
government strategy towards EU integration. In the following methodological 
chapter, we will present our research questions and hypotheses and the 
theoretical framework for examining them.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
___________________________________ 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we examined the theoretical literature, focusing on the 
theories of European integration and patterns of compliance to EU conditionality. 
Additionally, we have examined a third approach that could explain why political 
elites would engage in a certain strategy towards EU integration, related to the 
desire for power through garnering popular support and winning of elections. In 
the methodological chapter, we will present the research questions and the 
analytical framework for examining them based on some of the theories we have 
presented in the literature review. From there, we will generate testable 
hypotheses to explain the political shift of the Radicals and the implications of this 
shift for Serbia’s accession strategy, including adherence to EU norms, and the 
desire for EU membership out of material as well as electoral concerns. The 
research will use a case study approach, examining both cases of Kosovo and 
media freedom, explaining the rationale for their selection and the variables that 
are expected to remain constant across both cases, in addition to the explanatory 
or intervening variable expected to cause the different outcomes in compliance.  
 
3.2 Research Questions 
 
The central research question for this study was: how can we explain 
Serbian government strategy, under the Progressive Party, towards EU 
accession? This central question informs both the research questions below, and 
the hypotheses that will be tested. The three specific research questions were:  
1. What are the implications of the political shift of the Serbian 
Progressive Party for Serbia’s accession strategy?  
 
2. How does the Serbian government’s accession strategy follow the 
rationalist cost-benefit argument, based on material incentives arising 
from accession rather than being guided by a constructivist approach 
to Europe, based on adherence to EU norms? 
 
3.  Drawing on these two analytical frameworks of rationalism and      
constructivism, can the complexity of Serbian government strategy 
additionally be explained by a third approach to EU integration, one 
related to national as well as the political, party interest of the Serbian 
Progressive Party as posited by statecraft theory? Each of these 
questions will be the focus throughout our study.  
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3.3 Literature and Methodology  
 
 This thesis is a qualitative analysis, which explores Serbian government 
strategy toward EU accession through forms of compliance to EU conditionality. 
Drawing primarily from International Relations (IR) theory, this research seeks to 
examine how Serbian government strategies under the Serbian Progressive Party 
can be viewed through the prism of rationalist institutionalism based on material 
incentives as the drivers of policy change rather than following the logic of 
appropriateness based on norms and identities accounting for policy change. Both 
of these approaches have attempted to tackle the puzzle of the EU’s limited and 
differential transformative power in the Western Balkans, particularly in Serbia, 
with all of the authors examined in the literature review assuming the rational 
institutionalist approach to explain the recent policy shift of the Serbian 
government following the 2012 elections. As we have analysed in the literature 
review, rationalist institutionalism posits that political actors are driven by material 
interests of what EU accession would bring, and thus their reason for 
compliance/non-compliance to EU conditionality is based on a careful cost-benefit 
calculation. Thus, given the nationalist background of governing elites, the 
rationalist rather than constructivist approach seems more appropriate in the 
Serbian case, as the expectation would be that Serbian national interests would 
predominate.  
However, many authors have overlooked the multilevel games aspect of 
Serbian integration strategy vis-à-vis the EU, where Serbian political elites are 
players at two tables-the international and domestic, thus “they are doubly 
constrained by both what is negotiable internationally and what is acceptable 
domestically” (Noutcheva 2006, p. 5).  In this regard and by adding the statecraft 
dimension, the thesis seeks to argue that Serbian politicians are pragmatic 
nationalists who are aiming to use EU accession as a means of keeping their grip 
on power. Accession therefore becomes a means through which to gain significant 
material benefits (i.e. EU structural funds, opening Chapters) while defending 
national interests in Kosovo. We argue that this contradiction between seeking EU 
membership for economic benefits while at the same time using the accession 
process to protect national interest has been overlooked by previous scholarship 
and raises questions about the sustainability of such a policy in the long term.  
Kosovo represents a reputational cost; any loss of Kosovo, particularly 
through recognition, would be expected to contribute to a decline in popular 
support for the Progressive Party. Therefore, discursive institutionalism can be 
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used in conjunction with both rationalist and statecraft theories to explain the 
complex strategies of the Serbian government related to the Progressives’ desire 
to maintain their position of power. The legitimisation of a policy choice or even its 
discursive denial would allow the Serbian government to deal with high 
reputational costs of compliance or even non-compliance.  
 Compliance to EU conditionality can take various forms as discussed in 
the literature review, according to what is seen as being in the party and national 
interest. National and party interest in this case are seen to be congruent, as 
serving the national interest would be expected to keep the party in power. The 
research study will argue that Serbian government strategy towards EU integration 
is two-fold because both EU accession and retaining Kosovo are considered to be 
of national interest for Serbian political elites. Thus the research will argue that the 
Serbian government’s strategy when it came to managing these two tensions was 
guided by a rational cost-benefit analysis when addressing compliance issues. In 
this regard, material concerns arising out of EU accession can only partially 
account for Serbian government strategy towards EU integration while electoral 
considerations are seen to be the primary driver for Serbian elite strategy, taking 
precedence over conformity with European values. Drawing on this argument, 
three hypotheses were developed which will be tested throughout the research 
study.  
 
3.4 Hypotheses 
  
1. Serbian elites will seek EU accession as this reaps electoral benefits (in addition 
to the economic and social benefits for Serbia). Compliance to EU conditionality 
is an intrinsic part of the accession process and the form of compliance Serbian 
elites will engage in depends on rational cost-benefit calculations and the visibility 
of actions in a given policy area.  
 
2. The costs of compliance to Kosovo conditionality are expected to be ones 
pertaining to the national interest of losing control over Kosovo, which also feed 
into reputational costs whereby loss of Kosovo would be expected to lead to a 
decline in popular support for the leading party. Thus, we developed the following 
hypothesis: Thereby, if the costs of accession are greater than the benefits, and 
Serbian political elites cannot hide non-compliance because Kosovo is a highly 
visible policy area due to the presence of multiple external actors monitoring 
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compliance, it could be expected that Serbian politicians will engage in compliance 
that is fake or partial.  
 
3. The costs of compliance to media freedom conditionality are expected to be 
electoral costs where the Serbian government’s inability to control the media and 
therefore influence public opinion, could lead to a defeat in the next election cycle. 
In addition to this, the EU lacks capacity when it comes to regulating and enforcing 
media freedom in both member states and applicants such as Serbia. Thus, we 
come to the following hypothesis: the electoral costs of compliance in a less visible 
policy area such as media freedom is expected to lead to a Serbian government 
strategy of fake compliance.  
 
 Examining Serbian compliance to EU conditionality in two different policy 
areas, media freedom and Kosovo, where one is expected to be more visible than 
the other, would account for a more nuanced view of Serbian integration strategy. 
Kosovo is not only a domestic policy issue but also pertains to foreign policy as 
well, where the presence of external actors (i.e. representatives in central 
government in Pristina, EU, international community) is greater than with regards 
to an internal issue such as media freedom. Given the fact that media freedom 
legislation is in the hands of member states’ and applicants’ national governments, 
the EU lacks the capacity to enforce and regulate media freedom, making it a less 
visible area where applicant states can hide non-compliance or simulate EU-
compliant change to convince the EU that they are responding to conditionality on 
the surface (i.e. fake compliance). 
 
3.5 Rationale for case studies 
 
 The two case studies chosen are Kosovo and media freedom, both policy 
areas which represent fundamental questions for the European Union with regard 
to democracy, stability and peacebuilding. The jurisdictional conflict over Kosovo 
has hindered Serbia’s membership prospects since the ousting of the Milošević 
regime by the Democratic Opposition parties, while creating a non-sustainable 
environment for peacebuilding processes which would lead to a better life for both 
Serbian and Kosovar Albanians in the region. Representing the key to regional 
stability in the Western Balkans, the EU has put normalising relations with Kosovo 
on the top of its agenda regarding Serbia’s integration process, with conditionality 
arising from the Brussels Agreement, constituting Chapter 35 in the accession 
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negotiations, which would be monitored throughout and have implications for 
every other chapter. Media freedom, although not explicitly mentioned in the 
Copenhagen political criteria, nonetheless embodies the rule of law and human 
and minority rights-core values the EU seeks to export to both member states and 
acceding countries. Given the declining state of media freedom in some of the 
EU’s own member states, particularly with regard to the Central and Eastern bloc 
countries such as Poland and Hungary, the EU’s capacity to export its values and 
norms is being called into question, thus undermining its legitimacy as a normative 
power. The research will argue that an internal issue, such as that of media 
freedom, is a less visible area in terms of compliance to conditionality and is 
therefore, more difficult to monitor given the fact that media freedom legislation is 
in the hands of national governments. Kosovo, on the other hand, represents not 
only a domestic issue but also a highly visible foreign policy area where the 
presence of external actors (Kosovan government, EU) to monitor compliance is 
greater than with media freedom as the hypotheses seek to test. By looking at one 
highly visible area and one that is less visible, the research seeks to analyse how 
the two fundamental policy areas are expected to produce different outcomes in 
terms of compliance to EU conditionality, in order to elucidate Serbian government 
strategy vis-à-vis EU integration.  
 
3.6 Case Studies  
 
 For the purpose of the research, a case study approach will be used. The 
two case studies of Kosovo and media freedom will be discussed and analysed in 
order to test the hypotheses. However, first we must define what a case study is. 
Feagin et. al define the case study as an “in-depth, multifaceted investigation, 
using qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon” (Feagin et. al 
2000, p. 2). This definition seems rather narrow and ambiguous, especially since 
case studies can use both qualitative and quantitative research methods. A 
phenomenon can be anything from a group of people, role, city, role-occupants, 
etc. (Feagin et. al 2000, p. 2). Furthermore, Gillham (2000) defines a case study 
as: “one which investigates the above (individual, community, group, etc.) to 
answer specific research questions (that may be loose to begin with) and which 
seek a range of different kinds of evidence, evidence which is there in the case 
setting, and which has to be abstracted and collated to get the best possible 
answers to the research questions” (pp. 1-2). Furthermore, Gillham (2000) argues 
that, “no one kind or source of evidence is likely to be sufficient (or sufficiently 
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valid) on its own. The use of multiple sources of evidence, each with its strengths 
and weaknesses, is a key characteristic of case study research” (p. 2). For 
example, in the Serbian case, the evidence will be sought from the data in the 
interviews conducted for the research as well as through documentary analysis 
from a number of other primary and secondary sources ranging from scholarly 
articles, press and news reports, EU and Serbian government reports, EU 
legislation, journalists’ association reports, etc. 
 In this particular study, we will test the nature of compliance in both case 
studies of Kosovo and media freedom by examining the variables across the two 
case studies. Both cases were also chosen because on the surface, they appear 
to be similar cases where the costs are expected to be the same across both policy 
areas of media freedom and Kosovo. However, the visibility of compliance to 
conditionality is expected to be different in a policy area of low visibility such as 
media freedom given that this is an internal issue where the EU lacks competence, 
as opposed to an area of high visibility such as Kosovo where compliance 
becomes more difficult to mask given the increased presence of external actors. 
Therefore this would be expected to cause the different outcomes of fake 
compliance in media freedom and partial compliance in Kosovo. Hence, we use 
Mill’s (1843) method of difference which seeks to identify the key features that are 
different among similar case studies and which account for the observed outcome 
(Esser and Vliegenthart 2017, p. 6). In the following sections, we provide an 
overview of the contextual variable-benefits of EU accession, which is significant 
in understanding why Serbian political elites will seek accession. Then we briefly 
analyse the costs across both cases which are expected to remain constant, 
followed by the explanatory factors/intervening variables of visibility of compliance 
which are expected to be different across both policy areas of media freedom and 
Kosovo.  
 
3.6.1 Benefits of EU accession 
   
In terms of benefits, accession to the EU would bring tangible economic 
and social benefits to Serbia and its citizens. These benefits are extremely 
significant for a country like Serbia where in the third quarter of 2015, the 
unemployment rate for people aged 15-64 was 17.3% (Statistical Office of the 
Republic of Serbia 2015). Those who were at risk of poverty make up 25.6 % of 
the country’s total population (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 2015). 
According to Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015), “both publicly and privately, the 
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EU has come to be seen by officials as the key to national economic growth” and 
is thus tied to the Progressive Party’s programme (p. 1037). The former President 
of Serbia: Tomislav Nikolić had declared to a Serbian audience as far back as 
2012 when he had been elected that “we want to get into the EU, because it has 
projects, jobs and investments for us” (AlJazeera 2012). The Prime Minister in 
2012, now the country’s Foreign Minister, Ivica Dačić had also emphasised that: 
“our aim is to get into the EU and consolidate the economic system as soon as 
possible” (cited in Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015, p. 1037).  
According to our findings, “one of the most important benefits for Serbia 
would be getting a place at the EU negotiating table” which would “ensure that 
Serbian national  interests would be heard and protected” (Government of Serbia, 
Ministry for European Integration Official C 2015). The same official from the 
Serbian Ministry for European Integration also remarked that “the EU is our major 
political partner, but currently decisions that would affect Serbia directly or 
indirectly are made in Brussels and we are not taking part in their formation. By 
joining the EU, Serbia would be part of the system and not a third country like it is 
today” (Government of Serbia, Ministry for European Integration Official C 2015). 
Moreover, he mentions EU accession as being of great importance for Serbia’s 
citizens in addition to the EU being “the main economic partner of Serbia and 
therefore, the access to a 500-million-people market will be a significant boost for 
the domestic economy” (Government of Serbia, Ministry for European Integration 
Official C 2015). Furthermore, “the freedom of movement for the purpose of 
employment, education or to set up a business,” “the access to structural funds” 
and the “creation of new jobs” are also important benefits Serbian citizens would 
receive with EU accession (Government of Serbia, Ministry for European 
Integration Official C 2015). Other benefits we gathered from our interview data 
that Serbia and its citizens would receive are “improvement of infrastructure,” 
“improvement of the judiciary and performance of administration,” in addition to 
using EU funds to “make the agricultural sector more effective and competitive” 
(Government of Serbia, Ministry for European Integration Official A 2015).  
Serbia is also the biggest receiver of EU structural funds when compared 
with the other Western Balkan states, having been allocated €1.5 billion for the 
period 2014-2020 through the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA), which is more 
than the other Balkan countries were allocated for that same period (European 
Commission 2016c). Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015) argue that non-
compliance to EU conditionality, such as through “perpetuation of a strong 
campaign to maintain Kosovo,” would delay EU integration and could also “delay 
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the speed with which Serbia could gain access to the funds made available to 
countries engaged in the accession process” (p. 1037). Additionally, Serbia’s trade 
relies on the EU; in 2015, just over two thirds of all exports from Serbia were 
destined for the EU-28 (Eurostat 2016). According to the World Trade 
Organisation, this is approximately 66%, whereas 63% of imports to Serbia 
originated from the EU in 2015 (World Trade Organisation 2015). Serbia’s 
neighbouring countries have all experienced an increase in exports and 
subsequent growth rate following accession. In the first six months of 2015, 
Croatia was among a group of EU countries9 with the highest, two-digit export 
growth rates. Total exports rose to 12% in the first half of the year, while exports 
to other EU member states have increased in the first half of the year by 16% 
(Government of the Republic of Croatia 2015). Hungary, which began accession 
talks in 1998 and joined the bloc in 2004, saw their merchandise exports increase 
threefold as trade increased significantly with their new EU partners (Ayyub 2014). 
Joining the EU would help boost Serbia’s economy, leading to an increase in 
exports as well as attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). (Ayyub 2014).  
Additionally, opinion poll research by the Serbian Ministry for European 
Integration lists “path towards a better future for young people,” “more employment 
opportunities” and “possibility to travel” as the top three general positions of 
Serbian citizens towards the EU (Government of Serbia, Ministry for European 
Integration). Thus, the EU also provides citizens with more employment and study 
opportunities within the bloc, which would improve life for Serbia’s younger 
population.  
Despite the growing economic debt in the EU, Serbia has no real 
alternative outside EU membership according to our interview findings from an 
official from the Serbian Ministry for European Integration in Belgrade. According 
to the official, “for Serbia, EU membership is a valid strategic goal even in the face 
of the largest EU crisis” (Government of Serbia, Ministry for European Integration 
Official D 2017). This, he argues, is due to the EU funds Serbia receives through 
the IPA which are “currently the only concrete and ‘healthy’ part of the whole 
process in Serbia, because with the help of these funds, one can get a feel of what 
EU standards mean on the ‘ground.’  
“For example, if the IPA funds are used to finance the renovation of 
hospitals in the city of Vranje, and for the purchase of medical equipment, 
then the man who lives in southern Serbia and has a need for medical care 
can concretely develop a sense of what it means to join the EU and which 
                                                          
9 The list is led by Cyprus whose exports rose by 28%. Cyprus is followed by Ireland and 
Malta with 19% and 16% growth rates respectively. 
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benefits accession brings” (Government of Serbia, Ministry for European 
Integration Official D 2017).  
 
Thus, EU structural funds, which would be even higher once Serbia joins 
the EU, would greatly assist in the development and strengthening of institutions, 
rural and regional development.  
 
3.6.2 Compliance costs 
 
 Compliance costs are also expected to remain constant throughout the 
research study, and across both cases of Kosovo and media freedom. Kosovo 
represents a national question for both the Serbian government and the Serbian 
polity, therefore the loss of jurisdiction over Kosovo feeds into a reputational cost 
for the Serbian political elites as this lack of control would be expected to lead to 
a decline in popular support and defeat in the next election cycle. The withdrawal 
of the state from the Serbian media also feeds into the notion of reputational costs 
for the leading political party as the media oftentimes serve as powerful PR in 
promoting positive coverage of the leading political party and its policies. Since 
both cases are expected to have costs of compliance, these costs constitute part 
of the determining factor with regard to the form of compliance the Serbian 
government will employ in both case studies.  
 The question over Kosovo has for years led to Serbia’s reluctance in 
complying with EU conditions in this policy area. The Kosovo issue makes Serbia 
a unique case study as unlike its Balkan neighbours, Serbia is the only EU 
candidate that has a predominant territorial dispute, one that has additionally 
hindered the country’s membership aspirations since the ousting of the Milošević 
regime in late 2000. Kosovo has been the primary focus of the EU’s conditionality 
towards Serbia where the EU has linked Serbia’s accession with resolution of 
Kosovo, withholding the opening of accession negotiations until Serbia made 
efforts to improve relations with its southern province. While Slovenia joined the 
EU in the 2004 enlargement and Croatia in July 2013, Serbia has remained 
persistently behind, burdened by its reluctance to cede control over Kosovo.  
The political elites’ unwillingness to change their policy towards Kosovo 
dates back to the myth of Kosovo, central to Serbian national identity. Of the 
modern theorists of nationalism, John Breuilly (1996) argues that “politicians seize 
upon myths and symbols inherited from the past and weave these into arguments 
designed to promote national identity and justify national claims” (cited in cited in 
Őzkirimli 2010, pp. 161). He further posits that nationalists “invent myths or they 
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ignore those which cut across their purposes” (cited in Őzkirimli 2010, pp. 161). 
Such ‘myth transference for political purposes’ as posited by Armstrong (1982) is 
at the core of Serbian ethno-nationalism and has been used to justify Serbian 
claims over Kosovo. While Bieber (2002) claims that many of the facts pertaining 
to the myth- particularly ones attributed to the battle of Kosovo- cannot be verified 
or have been dismissed, the historical evolution of the myth has nonetheless 
contributed to Serbian nation-building aspirations while simultaneously being a 
tool for serving the interests of political elites in Serbia (p. 96). Bulpitt’s (1986) 
theory of statecraft is pertinent in this case, as the various Serbian governing 
parties, including the Progressives, have frequently evoked the myth to appeal to 
the electorate in order to gain popular support.  
The Kosovo myth itself dates back to 1389 during the Battle of Kosovo, 
which occurred when Serbian Christian forces and Ottoman Turks met on a field 
named Kosovo (meaning “blackbirds” in English). The Serbs were defeated, and 
it led to the loss of state sovereignty and 500 years of Turkish rule. Central to this 
myth of Kosovo being sacred in Serbian national autobiography, is the myth of 
sacrifice:  
“According to the legend promoted by the Serbian Orthodox Church, on 
the eve of the battle, a holy prophet offered Serbian prince Lazar a choice: 
an empire in heaven or an empire on earth. Lazar chose a “heavenly 
empire”—which would secure Serbian loss in battle, but eternal life in 
heaven for the Serbian people. By sacrificing himself and his troops, Lazar 
turned military defeat into a spiritual victory. The Kosovo myth, therefore, 
entails the moment when “the Serb nation chose righteousness and truth 
over earthly power.” It made Kosovo the place of this ultimate spiritual 
sacrifice and, as such, sacred and untouchable. The Kosovo battle is 
remembered in Serbia as a moment of national theophany when Serbs 
were offered collective redemption. Kosovo thus became Serbia’s Holy 
Land, while the Kosovo battle became Serbia’s Imitiatio Christi” (Ejdus and 
Subotić 2014, p. 164). 
 
Through the instrumentalisation of this myth, Kostovicova (2005) argues that, 
“Kosovo became the center of ethnic “Serbianness,” defended passionately by the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, which exercised, according to Ejdus and Subotić 
(2014), pastoral power over the Serbian population preserving Serbian national 
identity (pp. 164-165). Thus, throughout Serbian history, Kosovo was used as an 
instrument of nationalist mobilisation, beginning with Milošević, to justify Serbia’s 
ambitions in preserving its territorial integrity at the expense of Kosovan Albanians, 
which make up the majority population in Kosovo.  
 By analysing Serbian government strategy towards conditionality 
stemming from the Brussels Agreement,  the research seeks to examine how the 
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government’s efforts to preserve the territorial integrity of Serbia, evident in its 
ongoing jurisdictional conflict with Kosovo, feeds into the notion of Kosovo as a 
reputational cost and therefore is expected to lead to a strategy of partial or fake 
compliance. Any move towards ceding authority to Kosovo, particularly in the 
North where there is a Serb majority, and failure to protect Serbian interests, can 
be expected to contribute to loss of public support for the Serbian government and 
defeat in the next election cycle. Although recognition is not yet a red line for the 
EU, many voices in the EU, particularly from Germany, are calling for Serbia’s 
recognition prior to membership (European Western Balkans 2016a). A political 
analyst from Belgrade claimed that “recognition of Kosovo would be a historical 
and political disgrace for which the Serbs will not forgive anyone; more precisely 
the one who recognises Kosovo would be politically punished in the elections” 
(Political analyst from Belgrade 2017). There are very few political parties in Serbia 
that advocate Kosovo’s recognition, and they are in the opposition, with very little 
influence over Serbian politics. Such parties would include the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) and the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (LSV), both with 
four seats in the National Assembly and part of the Alliance for a Better Serbia 
coalition. According to the political analyst, “both parties have little impact in the 
Assembly, and would not be able to be part of the Assembly on their own” (Political 
analyst from Belgrade 2017). However, given the fact that recognition of Kosovo 
is not yet a condition for Serbia’s EU membership, the Serbian government can 
use this as a margin for manoeuvre as they have done with the Brussels 
Agreement where recognition of Kosovo had been avoided entirely.  
 The case study on media freedom in Serbia will argue that the Serbian 
Progressive-led government uses the media to influence public opinion. As a 
result, the loss of control over the media outlets in Serbia could be expected to be 
a reputational cost for the Serbian government as the Progressives would be 
unable to influence public opinion in a way that would guarantee their public 
support and cement their victory in the next elections. Political control and 
interference in the media, and non-transparency, as the case study on the media 
will argue, are still remnants of the Milošević regime and are defining features of 
the current media landscape under the Progressive government led by Aleksandar 
Vučić. The media in Serbia serves as a PR mechanism for powerful political elites, 
namely Vučić, and is used for a positive representation and promotion of the 
government and its policies vis-à-vis the EU. In order to reform the Serbia media 
landscape and prepare the country for accession, the Serbian government 
adopted a set of media laws in 2014. The research will examine how the media 
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laws, and the Serbian government’s Action Plan for their implementation, feed into 
the notion of a reputational cost regarding compliance to media freedom 
conditionality, and is therefore expected to cause the outcome of fake compliance 
as the hypothesis will test.  
 
3.6.3 EU competence and visibility of compliance 
 
 The competences of the EU are defined in the EU Treaties, more 
specifically Articles 2-6 on the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) (European Union Citizens’ Initiative 2018b). Moreover, acts that are legally 
binding are EU regulations, directives, and decisions while recommendations, 
resolutions and opinions constitute non-binding acts. For the purpose of our 
research, we focus on the binding documents and competences the EU has with 
regard to media freedom and Kosovo which we outline in this section, and will be 
the source of our analysis in the two case study chapters. 
 The second variable of visibility pertains to visibility of compliance by 
applicant states such as Serbia. We define visibility in relation to compliance to 
EU conditionality; thus the more visible a policy area in terms of external actors 
monitoring compliance, the more difficult it would be for the accession country to 
hide non-compliance. For the purpose of our study, we argue that Kosovo is a 
highly visible policy area as Serbian political elites are expected to cooperate with 
an external actor (the Kosovan government) to normalise relations in a manner 
which promotes regional stability and contributes to peacebuilding processes and 
multi-ethnic coexistence. This raises the visibility of Serbian compliance as the 
Kosovan government monitors compliance/non-compliance through government 
progress reports, which are reported to the EU who has the ultimate decision in 
the withholding or the offering of rewards. Media freedom, on the other hand, is an 
internal issue, thus decreasing the presence of external actors and visibility of 
compliance. Moreover, the EU’s competences in this policy are severely limited, 
making it possible for Serbian political elites to hide/mask non-compliance.  
According to Harris (2013) “across the European Union, media regulation 
is left to the member states to implement, leading to significant variations in the 
form and level of media regulation” (Harris 2013, p. 15). Member states’ models 
of media regulation vary significantly, from models of self-regulation to statutory 
regulation. Harris (2013) further posits that, “these models of regulation can impact 
negatively on freedom of expression through the application of unnecessary 
sanctions, the regulator’s lack of independence from politicians and laws that 
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create a burdensome environment for online media” (p. 15). A primary example of 
this is Hungary where the government’s appointment of its own representatives 
into the Media Council and Media Authority has led to the party’s colonisation of 
the media, thereby restricting media freedoms (Bajomi-Lázár 2013, pp. 81-84). 
Given that media freedom is an internal issue, the EU’s control over the regulation 
of media pluralism and media freedom is limited as the EU does not have 
directives in these areas, especially pertaining to state intervention including in 
state ownership, and transparency of the media.  
The only areas which the EU regulates are electronic communications, 
aspects of the audio-visual sector, technical aspects of information services and 
electronic commerce and rights related to data protection and copyright (Brogi and 
Parçu 2014, p. 256). Media legislation pertaining to independence and pluralism 
of the media (especially with regard to transparency and state intervention, 
including ownership) is in the hands of the member states’ national governments. 
The EU acquis, which all applicant states are required to legally conform to, 
aligning their own legislation with those of the acquis, does not provide for such 
far-reaching requirements such as media ownership and financial transparency 
and therefore these areas are subject to ambiguity. This would make the EU’s 
capacity in enforcing media legislation with regard to pluralism and independence, 
particularly in ownership and transparency, much more difficult and thus, be 
expected to create room for manoeuvre for the Serbian government who can take 
advantage of this ambiguity and lack of regulation. The accession requirements 
outlined in the chapters that constitute part of the negotiation process, are, 
however, tailored to each country with their own set of interim benchmarks a 
country must adopt prior to membership. In the case study on media freedom, we 
will explore these requirements in more depth and compare them with the 
government’s Action Plan for their implementation to test for fake compliance. 
Every applicant state wishing to accede must also comply with the EU’s 
Copenhagen criteria. For the Western Balkans, the EU had developed the 
Stabilisation and Association Process which also included additional conditionality 
of regional cooperation, good neighbourly relations and commitment to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). The accession phase 
constituted the chapters of the acquis and as mentioned previously, were tailored 
to each applicant country. Chapter 35 regarding “other issues” for Serbia meant 
the comprehensive normalisation of relations with Kosovo. The conditionality 
stemming from this chapter constitutes compliance with the conditionality set forth 
in the Brussels Agreement. Therefore, the EU’s competences in this area were far 
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more reaching and extensive than in the policy area of media freedom, particularly 
since the EU claimed that progress made with regards to Chapter 35 was linked 
with advancement in the accession negotiations and the opening/closing of other 
chapters.  
 The thesis will seek to argue that intervening variables of EU competences 
and visibility of conditionality are expected to cause the outcomes of fake and/or 
partial compliance in each case, respectively. We argue that an area of high 
visibility and of salience to the EU is expected to enforce some level of compliance 
by the Serbian government as opposed to an area of low visibility where the 
presence of external actors is decreased as is the case in internal issues such as 
media freedom. An examination of both cases contribute to the hypotheses 
developed earlier in the chapter where these are two cases which appear similar 
on the surface (both have costs) but where the explanatory or intervening variables 
of visibility and competency are expected to cause the outcomes of fake and 
partial compliance in each case respectively.  
 
3.7 Sources of Data 
 
3.7.1. Interviews 
 
 The main subject of the research is to examine the strategies (fake, 
genuine, partial and non-compliance) of the former Serbian Radicals currently in 
power pursuing European integration through an analysis of two key policy areas: 
the case studies mentioned above of Kosovo and media freedom. In order to test 
the type of compliance Serbian elites in government are practicing in regards to 
EU conditionality, a set of semi-structured interviews with government and EU 
officials, journalists and media analysts, along with primary and secondary 
documents, will be used. Interviews, particularly the semi-structured interview, 
have been chosen as one of the qualitative research methods used for the case 
studies. However, a definition of what the interview is and why interviews were 
chosen for the study must first be provided.  
Arksey and Knight (1999) define interviewing in social science research 
as: “not a research method but a family of research approaches that have only 
one thing in common-conversation between two people in which one person has 
the role of researcher” (p. 2). Furthermore, they argue that, “we understand 
‘research’ to be ‘systematic enquiry’” (Arksey and Knight 1999, p. 2).  This 
systematic enquiry is about the act of asking for information and/or conducting an 
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official investigation. Hence, this is why “interviewing has a lot in common with 
questionnaire-based methods” (Arksey and Knight 1999, p. 2).  
There are several reasons why a qualitative interview was chosen as the 
appropriate research method for the case study. One such reason was that 
interviewing lets the researcher find out what is in or on a person’s mind, to find 
out their perspective, information that we cannot directly observe (Patton 1990, p. 
278). Furthermore, Rubin and Rubin (1995) argue that “qualitative interviewing is 
a way of uncovering and exploring the meanings that underpin people’s lives, 
routines, behaviours, feelings, etc.” (cited in Arksey and Knight 1999, p. 32).  The 
use of qualitative interviewing allows for understanding and meaning to be 
explored in depth as well as being helpful in making things that had once been 
implicit to become explicit (Arksey and Knight 1999, p. 32).  
The case studies of Kosovo and media freedom that were chosen for the 
research study are complex and dynamic cases that require an in-depth 
understanding that can be derived not only just from a range of primary and 
secondary sources (i.e. news and press reports, scholarly articles, EU documents 
and Serbian government documents) but also require further analysis derived from 
interviewing politicians and EU officials, media analysts/investigators and 
journalists. By interviewing a number of government and EU officials as well as 
journalists and media analysts, one can obtain their motives and strategies which 
are qualitative and cannot be gathered through other methods that are quantitative 
such as opinion polls and surveys for example. Furthermore, with Kosovo and 
media freedom, there is much that is being written and implied in press reports 
and media reports but it is useful to crosscheck what is being written with what is 
being said explicitly by the politicians and journalists that are directly being 
interviewed and have official knowledge in regards to these two case studies. 
Furthermore, journalists and media analysts can provide a better understanding 
of what is happening with regard to the media as politicians in Serbia may withhold 
information, provide false information or be hesitant to respond to sensitive 
questions regarding media freedom and Kosovo that may be critical towards the 
government. Through interviewing journalists and media analysts, we aimed to 
provide an analysis of the extent of the government’s interference in the media 
sector and issues pertaining to transparency (including in ownership and financial 
transparency) government officials would be otherwise reluctant to provide. 
Interviewing officials from the EU institutions such as the Commission and 
European External Action Service in addition to members of NGOs and political 
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analysts would help in explaining Serbian policy vis-à-vis Kosovo, which was also 
another highly sensitive and controversial area.  
There are three types of interviews that can be used: structured, semi-
structured and unstructured. For the purpose of this research study, a semi-
structured interview was chosen. The semi-structured, in-depth interview was 
chosen because here “the interviewer asks certain, major questions the same way 
each time, but is free to alter their sequence and to probe for more information. 
The interviewer is thus able to adapt the research instrument to the level of 
comprehension and articulacy of the respondent, and to handle the fact that in 
responding to a question, people often also provide answers to questions we were 
going to ask later” (Fielding 1993, p. 136). Furthermore, DiCicco-Bloom and 
Crabtree (2006) argue that:  
“semi-structured interviews are usually scheduled in advance at a 
designated time and location outside of everyday events. They are 
generally organised around a set of predetermined open-ended questions, 
with other questions emerging from  the dialogue between interviewer 
and interviewee ⁄ s. Semi-structured in-depth interviews are the most 
widely used interviewing format for qualitative research and can occur 
either with an individual or in groups” (p. 315).  
 
That is to say, that the semi-structured interview is less formal than a structured 
interview and thus, “interviewers are free to follow up ideas, probe responses and 
ask for clarification or further elaboration” from the interviewee/respondent (Arksey 
and Knight 1999, p. 7). This was the most appropriate type of interview chosen for 
the research study as it allows for an in-depth discussion on the cases of Kosovo 
and media freedom where the interviewer can probe for more details on a question 
that might provide the answer they are looking for. Moreover, they can come up 
with additional questions the interviewer may or may not have wanted to ask later 
that might also provide additional, useful information in regards to the case studies. 
In addition, the interviewer may find new information that has not been found or 
given anywhere else such as through scholarly articles, news reports, etc. The 
respondent or interviewee may also provide clarification and meaning to complex 
questions with regard to the case studies of Kosovo and media freedom.  
The author undertook a total of thirty-eight interviews through Skype, email 
communication and in person. For the media case study, a total of sixteen 
interviews were conducted with six respondents (media analysts and journalists), 
with three being face-to-face semi-structured interviews, one on Skype, and twelve 
being via email communication. The Skype and email communication interviews 
were conducted after the author took a trip to Belgrade and Novi Sad in June 2015 
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as additional information was needed which included interviews with journalists 
from the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) and the Anti-Corruption 
Agency (see Appendix). The author undertook two separate trips to Brussels  (14 
April and 25 June 2015) where six face-to-face, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with five respondents (one was repeated) with officials from the 
European Commission and the European External Action Service. Additionally, 
three more officials were interviewed in person in Belgrade from the Serbian 
Ministry for European Integration (formerly the Serbian European Integration 
Office) on 22nd and 23rd June 2015. Finally, specifically for the Kosovo case study, 
the author conducted additional interviews via email and Skype with the following 
officials: 
 Former member of Centar za Praktičnu Politiku (Policy Centre)10  
 Professor from Novi Sad who also worked in the Regional 
Assembly of Novi Sad between 2000-2005 
 Former journalist from Serbian daily, Politika 
 Political analyst from Belgrade (repeated twice) 
  A former municipal assembly member from Leposavić in North 
Kosovo 
 Politician from the Democratic Party of Kosovo in the Kosovo 
Assembly 
  Additional official from the Serbian Ministry for European 
Integration 
 EULEX Official from Kosovo North 
 Former NGO member from NGOAktiv (repeated twice) 
 NGO member from the Advocacy Centre for Democratic Culture  
 Former member of Balkan Policy Research Group 
The interviews were conducted on a confidential basis and therefore, as 
requested, interviewees’ anonymity has been respected in the study. The snowball 
effect has also been a useful feature in enlarging the initial list of interviewees. The 
face-to-face and Skype interviews were taken in the form of recordings11 based on 
a semi-structured questionnaire and subsequently subjected to a qualitative 
content analysis in relation to the questions and propositions outlined in the study. 
                                                          
10 A think tank organisation that deals with regional stability, protection of human rights 
and civil reform in the Western Balkans. 
11 The majority of interviews the author undertook were recorded except one questionnaire 
filled out via email by an SEIO official and one from the EU Commission responsible for 
Serbia’s enlargement who requested not to be recorded.  
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The officials from Brussels and the Serbian Ministry for European Integration were 
presented with questions that deal with both case studies of media freedom and 
Kosovo. The journalists/media analysts from Serbia were chosen specifically for 
the media freedom case study and were provided with questions dealing with the 
media environment in Serbia.  
 
3.7.2 Ethical Considerations 
  
 There are significant ethical considerations to take into mind when 
considering elite interviewing. Webster et al. (2014) define five key elements to 
consider involving ethics in qualitative research which include: (i) that research 
should be worthwhile without unreasonable demands on the participants; (ii) the 
idea of informed consent; (iii) participation in research should be voluntary; (iv) 
research should be free from harm and any risks identified; and (v) the respect for 
confidentiality and anonymity (p. 78). 
 The author submitted an ethical approval form that had gone through an 
ethics committee, which had then approved the said form. In terms of semi-
structured elite interviews, the author had devised a consent form explaining the 
nature of the research, the approximate time length of the interview, the manner 
in which the interview will be conducted, that the participant’s name and any 
identifying features will remain anonymous throughout the typed interview and 
thesis; and that their participation is voluntary. Contact information of the author 
was also provided in the consent form should the respondents wish to contact her 
for any additional queries. It was imperative to protect the identity of the 
respondents, particularly due to the sensitivity of some of the topics covered (i.e. 
any questions pertaining to the case study of Kosovo in addition to the 
government’s control of the press). Therefore, the author took great care in making 
sure all the respondents could not be identified in any way throughout the thesis 
to avoid any disagreements in the future. When requested, the author did, 
however, show a list of the interviewees to the main examining board, provided 
that they would remain anonymous when it came to the actual publication of the 
text.  
 
3.7.3  Primary and secondary documents 
 
 In addition to semi-structured interviews, a range of primary and secondary 
sources was used to provide a thorough and detailed examination of the 
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hypotheses and research questions through triangulation: qualitative content 
analysis of additional primary sources was used to crosscheck and compare and 
contrast the data extracted from the interviews. Weber (1990) defines content 
analysis as “a research method that uses a set of procedures to make valid 
inferences from text” (p. 9). He further posits that “the rules of this inferential 
process vary with the theoretical and substantive interests of the investigator” (p. 
9). This means that it is up to the researcher to determine what texts to analyse 
and what is implied by them according to where the researcher’s interest lies, 
using their own analytical framework.  
 The Kosovan government and EU Progress Reports between 2014-2017; 
the EU Commission’s Common Positions (for Chapters 23 and 35), Serbian 
government Action Plans for the Adoption of the Acquis along with Serbian 
domestic laws were used as data on the extent of rule of adoption by the Serbian 
government in accordance with the EU’s body of law. Media reports published by 
the Agency for the Fight Against Corruption, Balkan Investigative Reporting 
Network (BIRN Serbia), and the Association of Independent Electronic Media 
(ANEM) were taken into account and contrasted with the Serbian Media Strategy 
and Serbian domestic media laws in order to assess the extent of change and 
relate this back to the hypotheses on the patterns of compliance practiced by the 
Serbian government in the case of media freedom. Finally, both English and 
Serbian-written newspapers, scholarly articles and published books, Opinion Polls 
published by the Serbian Ministry for European Integration and news web portals 
(Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, BalkanInsight, B92, Euractiv, European 
Western Balkans, etc.) and scholarly blogs (London School of Economics) were 
all taken into consideration.  
 
3.7.4 Limitations in data collection 
 
The author encountered two main limitations in her effort to collect the 
relevant data: access to some key actors, and obtaining information on issues that 
were deemed as controversial and sensitive by the Serbian populace. Both 
problems relate to the barriers raised in the process of elite interviewing. With 
regard to the first issue on gaining access to key actors for the Kosovo case study, 
the author experienced difficulties in obtaining interviews from officials from the 
Kosovo Office in Belgrade as well as the main political party: the Serbian 
Progressive Party. Several attempts were made vis-à-vis email communication, 
telephone and written mail to officials but no response was received. Thus, the 
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interviewer’s main respondents consisted of officials from the Serbian Ministry for 
European Integration and the EU Commission and External Action Service in 
Brussels and, in relation to the second case study on media freedom, journalists 
and media analysts in Belgrade and Novi Sad. This is also related to the second 
issue of obtaining information on issues deemed too sensitive and/or 
controversial, particularly on Kosovo as well as for the media freedom. The 
researcher discovered that a respondent from the Kosovo office did not report 
back via email communication when presented with the questions on the Kosovo 
case study. This could be due to secrecy or the sensitivity and controversy of the 
questions or due to time constraints. Also, when contacting the Serbian Ministry 
for European Integration to request additional interviews from other respondents, 
an official had rejected the request stating that the questions called for political 
elucidation, and that by law, as officials working for the government, they were not 
permitted to respond to such questions. This could also be a barrier as a result of 
secrecy, respondent bias and the sensitivity of some of the questions.  
To compensate for this, the need for triangulation was necessary-using 
other primary and secondary sources such as EU progress reports and press 
releases, newspaper and journal articles, Serbian and Kosovan government 
reports and Serbian government Action Plans as well as interviewing multiple 
people from different fields (journalists and media analysts). For the research 
study, journalists and media analysts/investigators had to also be interviewed with 
regard to the case study on media freedom and transparency. This is due to the 
fact that they have the most knowledge of the media environment in Serbia. They 
would also be able to provide sensitive information (i.e. how much control does 
the government have over the media) as opposed to other politicians in Serbia. 
Additionally, it was discovered that when interviewing some of the officials from 
the Ministry for European Integration about very broad, less sensitive questions in 
regards to the media, they did not seem to have much knowledge. The same can 
be said of the officials from the Serbia Unit in the European Commission-they had 
insufficient knowledge of the media environment in Serbia. Therefore, journalists 
and media analysts in Serbia had to be interviewed to provide information about 
the media in terms of ownership and transparency other politicians might hide. 
This relates to the question of saliency and visibility of the media to the EU-if the 
issue of media transparency and ownership isn’t as high on the EU agenda as 
opposed to Kosovo and isn’t in the EU acquis, politicians in Serbia may hide their 
compliance or practice fake compliance as the case study on the media freedom 
will test.  
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3.8 Conclusion 
 
 
 The methodological chapter presented the research questions and the 
hypotheses that will test the nature of compliance practiced by the Serbian 
government under the Progressive Party since 2012. It also provided a discussion 
on the qualitative methods the research will use, namely focusing on semi-
structured interviews in addition to a range of primary and secondary sources 
through which content analysis will elucidate the arguments made. The 
explanatory or intervening variable as discussed throughout the chapter on EU 
competence and visibility of compliance to EU conditionality will be tested to see 
if they cause fake and partial compliance in each case as generated by the 
hypotheses. Due to the EU’s lack in competence and knowledge in the area of 
media freedom and the primary focus being on Kosovo, it could be argued that the 
EU is in a far better position to scrutinise action and policy on Kosovo than it is on 
the media environment in Serbia, something which the case studies will further 
explore. The rationale for the selection of the case studies was due to significance 
of media freedom and Kosovo to the EU, with both having a fundamental bearing 
on the rule of law, democracy and stability-core values which the EU seeks to 
promote and export to acceding countries and member states. The following 
chapter will present the first case study on Kosovo, with conditionality for this policy 
area coming from negotiating Chapter 35.  
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Chapter 4: Europeanising Serbia’s Kosovo Policy: 
A litmus test for Serbia’s accession to the 
European Union 
 
“As long as the Serb people exist, Kosovo will be Serbia…” Dr. Vojislav Koštunica 
(Serbian Prime Minister, 2004-2008). 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
 The Kosovo issue represents the deeply entrenched nationalism of 
Serbian politics and has more often than not, hindered Serbia’s European Union 
membership aspirations, thereby making Serbia one of the most ‘reluctant’ 
Europeanisers for many years since the ousting of Milošević in 2000. Kosovo’s 
unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, was perceived by Serbia as a 
fundamental threat to its sovereignty, territorial integrity and national identity, 
which Serbia vowed to never recognise. Much of the scholarship regarding the 
significance of Kosovo to Serbia points to the national, religiously-infused master-
narrative construed around the “myth” depicting the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, which 
was used as a political tool to mobilise the Serbian population against their 
Albanian counterparts who had settled in the region in the centuries following the 
battle. The Kosovo myth, which alluded to the themes of sacrifice and victimisation 
of the Serbian people, became so entrenched in Serbian nationalist discourse that 
the supposed and real persecution of Serbs under Kosovar Albanians in the 1980s 
and 1990s was construed as part of a long history of national suffering, which 
dates back to 1389 (Bieber 2002, p. 100). It was a result of this that each Serbian 
government took an oath to preserve the territorial integrity of Serbia, with Kosovo 
as its constituent part while the 2006 Serbian Constitution was amended to include 
Kosovo (Constitution of the Republic of Serbia 2006).  
The research argues that Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo is twofold: on the 
one hand, the Serbian government maintains their hardline non-recognition of 
Kosovo stance while on the other hand they seek to control the Serb majority areas 
in Northern Kosovo through parallel state structures. Unwilling to import another 
frozen conflict such as that of Cyprus and thus, further erode its credibility, the EU 
has made solution of the Kosovo issue a part of the conditionality for Serbia prior 
to accession. Although this does not entail Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo, the 
priority became to find a resolution of Serbian-controlled North Kosovo that would 
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integrate the Kosovar Serbs into Kosovan institutions, thereby gradually ceding 
control to Kosovo. 
 In this chapter, we analyse the shift in Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo that 
began with the Progressive Party-led government elected in the May 2012 
parliamentary and presidential elections, which has led to the signing of the historic 
Brussels Agreement on the Comprehensive Normalisation of Relations between 
Kosovo and Serbia on 19 April 2013. This Agreement sought to resolve the issue 
over North Kosovo and led to the conclusion of agreements based on a number 
of areas whose implementation was crucial for Serbia’s progress in the accession 
negotiations. The research argues that the Serbian government strategy has been 
one of partial compliance with regard to the implementation of the agreements, 
where some agreements had been fully or partially implemented while others have 
stalled or frozen. When it came to implementation, the Progressives were faced 
with two competing tensions: accession to the EU, which would bring substantial 
economic benefits to Serbia, and retention of Kosovo. Confronted with external 
pressures from both the EU and Kosovo and internal electoral pressure, the 
Serbian government’s strategy became the minimum they could achieve that 
would secure EU benefits while maintaining the fiction that Kosovo was still an 
integral part of Serbia. Such a strategy of partial compliance allowed for the EU to 
not only offer rewards to Serbia, but it had also allowed the Serbian government 
to engage in multilevel games where the Serbian government had attempted to 
“hammer” out compromises which they sold to their domestic constituency as 
favourable to Serbia, thus enabling them to garner further public support.  
 Many scholars (Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015; Bieber 2015; Ejdus 
2014) seem to suggest that this shift in Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo under the 
Progressive Party was based on a rationalist sense of material gains arising from 
EU accession. Economides and Ker-Lindsay (2015) further posit that the “change 
in Serbia’s approach towards Kosovo is based on pragmatism and political 
opportunism, rather than absorption, adaptation, convergence or identity 
formation” (p. 1027). This case study takes the research a step further, arguing 
that while Serbia’s change in its policy towards Kosovo under the Progressive 
Party was based on the rationalist theory of material concerns, it was also a result 
of electoral considerations of gaining and maintaining power as posited by 
statecraft theory. Therefore, the Serbian Progressive Party had to find a way to 
manage both EU accession and Kosovo that would not lead to a decline in 
domestic support.  
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The first section of this chapter (4.2) provides a background of the 
significance of Kosovo in Serbian public and political discourse, with a focus on 
the evolution of the SNS’ position on Kosovo. The following section (4.3) then goes 
on to  present a contextual background of Kosovo and Serbia’s relations, focusing 
on the most contentious area, North Kosovo, which is claimed by both Serbia and 
Kosovo and has hindered Serbia’s relations with the EU. In this section, we will 
also examine the ethnic division of Kosovo in order to illuminate Serbia’s 
reluctance to cede control of this problematic zone. In the next section (4.4), we 
introduce the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of 
Relations between Kosovo and Serbia (i.e. henceforth, the “Brussels Agreement”) 
which forms much of the interim benchmarks or “conditions” for Serbia set by the 
European Union for Chapter 35 on Kosovo. We also analyse the Agreement as a 
case of the European Union’s ‘constructive ambiguity,’ which has resulted in 
tensions from both Pristina and Belgrade due to the different interpretations of the 
agreements. In this section, we argue that the constructive ambiguity has allowed 
for Serbia to effectively not recognise Kosovo, which could pose as a stumbling 
block later on in the pre-accession process. However, despite the ambiguity of 
some of the agreements and issue concerning the status of Kosovo, the Serbian 
government has nonetheless demonstrated partial compliance to EU conditionality 
stemming from Chapter 35. Section 4.5 will offer empirical evidence through 
analysis of some of the agreements in the Brussels dialogue which the Serbian 
government has implemented either fully or to a certain extent, in order to elucidate 
the government strategy of partial compliance to EU conditionality on Kosovo. 
Given the EU’s extensive competences in enforcing Serbian compliance to 
Kosovo conditionality, the research argues that Serbia’s non-compliance became 
difficult to hide as a consequence of external pressures from both the EU and 
Kosovo who monitored compliance through the annual Commission and Kosovan 
government progress reports (4.6). In the final section (4.7) the research makes 
use of the analytical framework to analyse the Serbian government strategy of 
partial compliance to conditionality stemming from Chapter 35. The research 
argues that while rationalism can be used to explain the Serbian government’s 
strategy of securing maximum EU benefits while maintaining the fiction of control 
over Kosovo, this theory is inadequate in explaining the reasoning behind this 
strategy. Therefore, Bulpitt’s (1986) concept of statecraft where parties seek to 
maintain positions of power complements rationalist theory as it further elucidates 
the Serbian government strategy of partial compliance being a result of electoral 
considerations rather than just material concerns arising out of EU accession.  
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4.2 Kosovo in Serbian Public and Political Discourse 
 
 The significance of Kosovo to Serbs is perhaps best exemplified in an 
“Appeal” signed in 1982 by prominent officials of the Serbian Orthodox Church 
who had claimed that the Kosovo issue is not only “a biological one” to Serbs but 
“it is about the spiritual, cultural, or historic identity of the Serbian people” (Ejdus 
and Subotić 2014, pp. 166-167). The Church, long seen as the defender of Serbian 
claims over Kosovo, has further warned of the repercussions of any future loss of 
Kosovo, positing that, “Kosovo is our memory, our hearth, the focal point of our 
existence. And to take away from a nation its memories is to kill it and spiritually 
destroy it” (Ejdus and Subotić 2014, p. 167). Central to the idea of the Kosovo 
issue representing the cradle of Serbian national identity is the Kosovo myth which 
alludes to the themes of sacrifice and victimisation of the Serbian people. 
According to the myth, on the eve of the Kosovo battle in 1389, the Serbian prince: 
Knez Lazar chose a heavenly instead of an earthly kingdom for the Serbian 
people, thus leading to military defeat by Turkish Ottoman forces the following day 
but ensuring heavenly salvation for the Serbs. Serbian politicians like Vuk 
Jeremić12 and the Serbian Socialist Party leader Ivica Dačić had frequently 
equated Kosovo with Serbia’s own Jerusalem, the centre of Serbian Orthodox 
Christianity and the seat of some of the oldest Serbian Orthodox Churches 
(Barlovac 2010; RTKLive 2017). The Kosovo myth thus became the instrument for 
nationalist mobilisation in Serbian public and political discourse particularly during 
the time of Milošević and the War on Kosovo in 1998, leading up to the NATO 
bombing of Serbia in 1999.  
 While the myth was used to justify historical and territorial claims to 
Kosovo, according to Ejdus and Subotić (2014), it was also utilised as a 
mechanism to “justify historical vindication of the Serbian people against their 
adversaries” (p. 169). The majority of Kosovo is predominantly Albanian who have 
often clashed against their Serbian counterparts, most visibly in the period 
following Milošević’s rise to power. Milošević had refuelled Serbian nationalism 
with the Kosovo myth at a time when the Kosovar Serb minority had been 
demanding more protection against the Albanian majority. In his famous speech 
marking the six-hundredth anniversary of the Kosovo battle, Milošević vehemently 
announced that, “the Kosovo heroism does not allow us to forget that, at one time, 
                                                          
12 Vuk Jeremić was Serbian Foreign Minister between 2007-2012 and served as a 
candidate in the Serbian Presidential elections in April 2017. 
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we were brave and dignified and one of the few who went into battle 
undefeated…Six centuries later, again we are in battles and quarrels (cited in 
Ejdus and Subotić 2014, p. 169). Thus, he was referring to the battles that were 
being fought between the Albanians and Serbs, reminding Serbs not to forget the 
Serb “heroism” during the 1389 battle, and alluding once more to the sacrifice and 
persecution of the Serbian people. 
The stripping of Kosovo’s autonomy in a series of changes to the 
Constitution in 1989 by Milošević ultimately served to heighten ethnic tensions and 
hostilities between the Kosovar Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians, thus leading up 
the 1998-1999 Kosovo War. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) attacks on the 
Serbs and the wave of ethnic cleansings of Albanians during the war incited by 
Milošević culminated in the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia and according to 
Jansen (2000) “marked a dramatic resurgence in the self-perception of Serbs as 
victims within Serbian nationalist discourse” (cited in Bieber 2002, p. 105). This 
idea of victimisation of Serbs in nationalist and political discourse was further 
reinforced by the loss over Kosovo, first through the establishment of UNMIK in 
1999, followed by the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008. 
The themes of victimisation and sacrifice served as political tools in the nationalist 
discourse to justify claims over Kosovo by each ruling political party. Even 
preceding Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the preservation of Kosovo was 
included in a 2006 amendment to the Serbian Constitution, and each Serbian 
government was required to swear an oath to protect the territorial integrity of 
Serbia, with Kosovo as its constituent part (Constitution of the Republic of Serbia 
2006). This clause would serve to prevent recognition of Kosovo by any Serbian 
government or risk charges of treason because, according to the Serbian Patriarch 
Irinej, Kosovo independence was “a sin” (Ejdus and Subotić, 2014. P. 170). 
The vast majority of the Serbian political parties remain against Kosovan 
independence. Aside from the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) led by Koštunica, 
the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) has always adopted a hardline nationalist 
discourse when it came to Kosovo and Kosovan independence, which was most 
evident during the Kosovo War and the subsequent NATO bombing of Serbia in 
1999. The current Serbian Progressive Party leader and President, Aleksandar 
Vučić, had served as the SRS deputy secretary general and Information Minister 
under Milošević. During his position, he had issued a statement, calling for the 
expulsion of all foreign journalists coming from NATO countries because they had 
“instigated NATO's aggressive activities, which were aimed at destroying the 
constitutional order and territorial integrity of Serbia and Yugoslavia and of 
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misinforming the world” (Committee to Protect Journalists 2000). According to 
Pond (2013), Vučić as Information Minister had also “defended the vast ethnic 
cleansing by paramilitary police of more than 60% of the 90%-majority Albanians 
living in the Serbian province of Kosovo” (p.7). Although still firmly opposed 
towards Kosovo’s recognition, Vučić, along with other former Radical dissidents 
who had left the SRS to form the pro-EU party: the SNS, have since 2008 
abandoned some of the hardline, nationalist rhetoric towards Kosovo in favour of 
a more pragmatic, realistic approach to Kosovo for the sake of EU membership 
and electoral gain. This was partly due to the fact that Kosovo had lost some of its 
saliency among Serbian voters due to more pressing concerns relating to the 
economic crisis, which, according to the SNS party programme, could only be 
resolved through membership of the EU (Srpska Napredna Stranka 2011, p. 41). 
Due to this decline of saliency and predominance of the Kosovo issue in the 2012, 
2014 and 2016 elections, as a consequence of Serbia’s dire economic situation, 
the priority became accession to the EU while Serbia’s control on Kosovo 
gradually weakened. Even though formal recognition of Kosovo by Serbia was still 
taboo, the focus became resolving the issue of the contested North and protection 
of the Serbian majority residing in the northern Kosovo municipalities. The EU had 
made it a formal condition of Serbia’s membership of the EU to normalise relations 
between Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs in Northern Kosovo, thus leading 
up to the establishment of the historic Brussels Agreement between Pristina and 
Belgrade under the leadership of the SNS, which became the most visible political 
evolution of the SNS’s position towards Kosovo. In the following section, we 
present a general contextual overview of the jurisdictional conflict in Northern 
Kosovo that has contributed to regional instability and impeded Serbia’s EU 
accession. 
4.3 Context: Northern Kosovo 
 
 While Kosovo remains predominantly Albanian, due to the lack of an official 
census, it is difficult to determine the exact number of Serbs residing in Kosovo. 
The CIA World Factbook states that Albanians make up 92.9% of the total 
population while Serbs make up only 1.5% among other ethnic groups that also 
reside in Kosovo (Central Intelligence Agency 2016). According to a report 
published by the Balkan Policy Research Group, “there are no reliable official 
population figures for the Serbs of Kosovo, because most boycotted the 2011 
census. Estimates range from the official figure of 25,532 to the OSCE’s 143,574” 
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(Prelec and Rashiti 2015, p. 14). The report argued that there was another way to 
determine the estimate of the Serb population in Kosovo, through extrapolation 
from the 2013-2014 local and parliamentary election returns, which estimates that 
if they voted at the overall Kosovo average, there are about 145,820 Kosovan 
Serbs living in Kosovo (Prelec and Rashiti 2015, p. 4). According to the same 
report, the majority of Serbs live in North Kosovo, about 63,293 according to 
estimated figures. Another 53,900 reside in the six Serb-majority municipalities 
south of the Ibar River while as many as 28,628 may be residing in Albanian-
majority areas (Prelec and Rashiti 2015, p. 4). However, it is significant to note 
that these are only statistical analyses and not figures taken from an official 
census. The map below in figure 4.1 demonstrates the ethnic breakdown of 
Kosovo, indicating that the North is where there is the largest concentration of 
Serbs, as well as the southern municipality of Štrpce.  
 
Figure 4.1 Distribution of Ethnic Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo 
  
(BBC News 2008). 
 Despite Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008, 
the central authorities in Pristina did not have full sovereignty over their territory, 
as the majority-Serb populated areas were still controlled by Belgrade. Given their 
proximity to Serbia, this was primarily the situation in the northern municipalities 
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while the southern Serbian municipalities had been more or less integrated into 
the Kosovan institutions before Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. 
The North has been plagued by separatism, putting up of barricades and low-level 
violence as attempts to resist rule from Kosovan authorities prior to and following 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Attempts to integrate the Northern Kosovar 
Serbs have failed first through UNMIK and then the Ahtisaari Plan.13 Instead, 
Serbs in Northern Kosovo have set up parallel institutions (i.e. police, judiciary, 
civil protection, interim councils) accepting only Belgrade’s authority, which 
Kosovo has deemed as illegal. Beha (2015) states that the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has defined parallel structures “as 
institutions that work in violation of UN Resolution 1244” (Beha 2015, p. 106). A 
more specific definition of parallel structures from the OSCE is:  
“bodies that have been or still are operational in Kosovo after 10 June 1999 
and that are not mandated for under UN Security Council Resolution 1244. 
In the majority of cases, these institutions operate under the de facto 
authority of the Serbian government and assume jurisdiction over Kosovo 
from Serbia proper, or operate in the territory of Kosovo” (Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe 2003, p. 5). 
 
Both the EU and Kosovo have deemed these structures as illegal, and their 
maintenance soon became incompatible with Serbia’s EU membership prospects. 
Moreover, the constant jurisdictional conflict over Kosovo, particularly in the North, 
produced a non-sustainable environment for multiethnic coexistence and post-
conflict peacebuilding processes (Marković 2017, p. 19). In order to break the 
stalemate between Kosovo and Serbia, the EU, backed by the UN, initiated a new 
round of talks aimed at normalising relations between the two sides, which became 
                                                          
13  Both the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Ahtisaari 
Plan attempted to solve the issue of Kosovo, especially over the disputed area of Northern 
Kosovo. UNMIK was an international and civil security presence whose mission was to 
“establish and oversee development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions 
to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo” (UNMIK 
Mandate 1999). In May 2001, the Head of the Mission, Hans Hækkerup, “signed the 
Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, stipulating the 
transfer of competences from the international community onto Kosovo’s institutions” 
(Ejdus and Subotić 2014, p. 171). UNMIK had also created the preconditions for the final 
settlement on Kosovo’s status.  
The Ahtisaari Plan is also formally known as the Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Kosovo Status Settlement, was a plan drafted by the former Finnish President, Marti 
Ahtisaari, and put forward before Kosovo declared independence as a roadmap for 
Kosovo to transition from UNMIK control and to give Serbs living in Kosovo more rights 
(Balkan Investigative Reporting Network 2015, p.37). According to Beha (2015), the 
Ahtisaari Plan “proposed extensive local self-governing rights to Serbs living in Kosovo 
through decentralisation of power, and enhanced local self-governing rights for the 
Mitrovica North” (p. 105). However, seen as a success in Kosovo, this Plan too failed and 
was rejected by the Serb population in Kosovo, especially in the North.  
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part of the Brussels dialogue. The first round of talks was the so-called technical 
dialogue, commencing in March 2011 and ending in May 2012 where agreements 
were made on a number of technical issues which included: “freedom of 
movement, civil registry, cadastral books, customs, integrated border 
management (IBM), higher education degrees and regional representation of 
Kosovo” (cited in Ejdus 2014, p. 2). Progress on normalising relations with Kosovo 
and the beginning of the technical dialogue allowed for the EU to use its carrot-
and-stick conditionality approach and award Serbia with candidate status in March 
2012, a month before the parliamentary elections. This move made by the EU was 
also an attempt to boost support for President Boris Tadić and the Democrats, and 
to prevent the Serbian Progressive Party, made up of former members of the 
nationalist Serbian Radical Party- from coming to power. In spite of this, the 
Progressives secured victory, and soon found themselves in the driving seat of 
Serbia’s EU integration process. 
 The Brussels talks took on a more serious tone shortly following the 
election of the Progressives, where EU integration became a genuine goal of the 
newly formed government. This new political dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia 
began in October 2012 and culminated with the conclusion of the “First Agreement 
of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations” between Kosovo and 
Serbia signed in Brussels on 19 April 2013 under the auspices of the EU’s High 
Representative, Catherine Ashton (Ejdus 2014, pp. 2-3). The Brussels Agreement 
was a landmark deal, with  the Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood 
Policy, Štefan Füle claiming it was “a historic day for Serbia-Kosovo relations, for 
the entire Western Balkans region and for the European Union” (European 
External Action Service 2013). Following the Agreement, the EU rewarded Serbia 
with the start of the accession negotiations at the First Intergovernmental 
Conference on 14 January 2014. In August 2015, the Brussels Agreement 
Package was developed “to revitalise the 2013 Brussels Agreement” and included 
new agreements on telecommunications, energy, the establishment of the 
Association of Serb Majority Municipalities (ASM), and the opening of the Mitrovica 
Bridge (Phillips 2017, p. 9). Following soon after, Serbia opened the first two 
chapters in the accession negotiations: Chapter 32 on Financial Control and 
Chapter 35 on Kosovo in December 2015 (Poznatov 2015).  
 Although the Brussels Agreement was seen as an initial success and 
signalled a new wave of the normalisation of relations between Serbia and 
Kosovo, the Agreement soon began to show its limitations. The first sign of 
weakness was the constructive ambiguity of the entire agreement, which, as we 
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argue, resulted in different, often divergent interpretations from both Kosovo and 
Serbia. In the following section, we examine the Brussels Agreement in more 
depth, arguing that while the Brussels Agreement did have its own limitations as 
a result of the EU’s constructive ambiguity approach, it did nonetheless enforce 
some level of compliance by the Serbian Progressive-led government, thus 
enabling Serbia to progress further in the accession negotiations and open 
additional chapters.  
 
4.4 EU Conditionality and the Brussels Agreement 
  
 The most significant chapter for Serbia in the accession process and one 
of the first to be opened and the last to be closed is Chapter 35 on “other issues” 
which for Serbia meant Kosovo. This chapter also has implications for the opening 
and closing of all other chapters in the negotiating process. Moreover, the majority 
of EU conditionality for Serbia stemming from Chapter 35 comes from the 2013 
Brussels Agreement on the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. 
The 15-point Agreement reached between the two sides mainly dealt with 
resolving the issue of Northern Kosovo as it “integrates the institutions of the 
Serbian municipalities in northern Kosovo into the Kosovar state in exchange for 
extensive local autonomy to the northern province” (Vachudova 2014, p. 130). The 
Brussels Agreement aimed to remove all parallel structures and integrate both the 
security structures (i.e. police and civil protection) and judiciary into Kosovo 
structures which would be under Kosovan control, as well as holding municipal 
elections in Northern Kosovo facilitated by the OSCE. It also foresaw the 
establishment of the Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities 
(ASM), a cornerstone of the Brussels Agreement, which would grant considerable 
autonomy to the Serbian majority. The 2013 Brussels Agreement had also 
foreseen discussions on energy and telecommunications between Kosovo and 
Serbia. Finally, both Kosovo and Serbia agreed not to block the other’s progress 
in their respective EU path. While not part of the original Brussels Agreement, 
Chapter 35 additionally called for the implementation of the previously made 
technical agreements which included: customs (abolishing parallel structures and 
parallel customs stamps); freedom of movement (allowing third states’ nationals 
entry into Serbia from Kosovo, implementing the automobile license plates 
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arrangements in Northern Kosovo14); regional cooperation (enabling Kosovo’s 
participation in regional initiatives); recognition of diplomas, cadastre, and 
cooperation with EULEX. 
 However, as many scholars have argued (Ejdus 2014, Subotić 2014, Beha 
2015, Bieber 2015, Nešović and Celeghini 2015, Reljić 2015), the 2013 Brussels 
Agreement represents a case of the EU’s ‘constructive ambiguity.’ This term 
suggested that the Agreement was rather ambiguous, allowing both Serbia and 
Kosovo to interpret it in their own, often opposing ways. An example of this 
constructive ambiguity was related to the status issue on Kosovo. One scholar, 
Ejdus (2014) argued that the constructive ambiguity allowed for Serbia to 
effectively not recognise Kosovo while representatives in the Kosovan government 
saw the agreement as “factual recognition of Kosovo” (Ejdus 2014, p. 7; Beha 
2015, p. 109). To further complicate the status issue, the opposition parties in 
Kosovo who had protested against the agreement with vigour, particularly the 
Kosovan self-determination movement and party, Vetevendosje, claimed that “the 
Agreement with Serbia has suspended entirely state-building of Kosovo. Instead 
of state-building, we have an association of Serb municipalities” (Beha 2015, p. 
109). According to Bieber (2015), this “creative ambiguity” on the part of the EU 
did not clearly address the status issue of Kosovo, meaning the Brussels 
Agreement did not indicate whether Kosovo is a state or not (p. 313). Even when 
examining the text of the Agreement, the parties involved (Serbia and Kosovo) are 
referred to as “sides” and not as states, thus further bringing the status of Kosovo 
into question. Evading the status question allowed room for compromise and the 
normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo but also led to 
consequences for the negotiation process as it “precluded the signing of formal 
agreements and treaties, which would have implied that both parties had equal 
status or that the agreement was legally binding” (Bieber 2015, p. 313). As 
Gvosdev (2013) argues, the agreement drew on the time-honoured principle of 
                                                          
14 The license plate agreement reached on 14 September says that the parties will cease 
the use of “proba” temporary plates by 15 November 2016.The “proba” temporary license 
plates had only been applicable to Kosovo-registered vehicles which they had to purchase 
before entering Serbia. Under the new agreement reached in September, vehicles will 
enter Kosovo from Serbia and vice versa with “relevant parts of the respective license 
plates” covered by white stickers although it is not clear which parts would be covered. 
Edita Tahiri claimed this would be similar to the model between Macedonia and Greece, 
when, due to the name dispute, Greece required Macedonian vehicles to cover the letters 
MK since 2012 (Pristina Insight 2016). In other words, Kosovo would presumably cover 
the RKS which stood for Republic of Kosovo.  
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“don’t ask, don’t tell,” leaving aside these crucial status issues” (cited in Bieber 
2015, p. 313).  
 The ambiguity of the status issue was also exacerbated by five EU member 
states not recognising Kosovo, which allowed Serbia to exploit this ambiguity for 
its own purposes and national interests. Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia and 
Spain do not recognise Kosovo due to having secessionist issues on their 
doorstep. Moreover, as Bieber (2015) has argued, “the EU’s position remained 
ambiguous regarding its demands from Serbia. While officially it could not seek 
Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo, governments and parliaments in some EU 
member states, in particular Germany, made it clear that eventual EU accession 
would require full recognition” (p. 314). As far as what the end document would 
be, an EU official from the Commission has even confirmed that, “we’re not even 
clear about what this normalisation should involve, only that it should be through 
a legally-binding agreement!” (European Commission Official X 2016). Such 
contrasting viewpoints among the EU’s own member states on the question over 
Kosovo’s status would allow Serbia to use the EU’s constructive ambiguity to its 
advantage-progressing on the path towards EU membership with certain 
concessions to the Serbs in both Serbia and Kosovo.  
The research argues that despite its limitations, the Belgrade-Pristina 
dialogue could be viewed as a success as it had enforced some level of partial 
compliance by the Serbian government, and allowed for both Kosovo and Serbia 
to reach and implement agreements on a number of issues that would have 
seemed impossible in the past. While the EU’s carrot-and-stick conditionality 
approach was still applicable, the EU’s role was less about exerting direct 
pressure; “instead [it] generated [agreement] by conversations, through 
discussions on what was the common problem” (Bieber 2015, p. 313). Thus, it 
would be up to Serbia and Kosovo to decide on the agreements made and be 
responsible for their implementation. The advantage in such an approach, with the 
EU acting as a facilitator, was to gradually normalise relations between both 
Kosovo and Serbia, promoting political stability and enhancing regional 
cooperation, two principle conditions applicable to all the Western Balkan states 
arising from the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). Moreover, Prelec 
(2013) posits that the EU’s constructive ambiguity was successful in that it allowed 
both sides to reach agreements that would have been dead if spelled out in black 
and white. This was because the purpose of the approach was to “get the parties 
to commit publicly to an agreement whose content is to be filled in later, often by 
EU officials, out of the spotlight” (cited in Bieber 2015, p. 314). Additionally, the 
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constructive ambiguity of the mediation process also allowed both Serbia and 
Kosovo to perceive each agreement as a victory and present them as such to their 
individual publics. An EU official from our findings posits that: “during the 
implementation, both sides try to transform what was agreed into what they would 
have liked to be agreed” and often in opposing ways that suited their individual 
interest (European Commission Official X 2015). This strategy was an exercise in 
the Serbian government’s statecraft allowing Serbia to move forwards in the 
accession process while simultaneously convincing their nationalist constituency 
at home that they were protecting national interests, which included the fiction of 
retaining Kosovo.  
 In the next section, we analyse the implementation of some of the 
agreements including on security structures (police and civil protection), justice, 
energy and telecommunications and municipal elections and argue that all of these 
areas in which the Serbian government has demonstrated some compliance, have 
a fundamental bearing on the sovereignty of Kosovo. An official from the EU 
Commission from our interview data supports this argument claiming that “the 
Agreement was actually the first time when they [Serbian government] recognised 
Kosovo is not Serbia” (European Commission Official X 2015). Although this 
statement may appear to be at odds with the Serbian government objective of 
retaining Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia, discursive institutionalism posits 
that that the Serbian government had discursively denied that the agreement 
implied Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo. 
 
4.5 The Implementation of the Brussels Agreements 
 
4.5.1 Security Structures- Police and Civil Protection 
 
 One of the most important dimensions of the Brussels Agreement concerns 
the security structures in Northern Kosovo. Given the history of violence and 
contested authority of the divided communities in Northern Kosovo, security is a 
vital component for promoting peacebuilding processes and ensuring regional 
stability, a key conditionality stemming from the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements relevant for all the Western Balkan countries. Prior to the Brussels 
Agreement, both the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
and other international organisations (EULEX and the OSCE) had failed in 
managing security in Northern Kosovo thus perpetuating security dilemmas 
between security forces controlled by Belgrade and those controlled by the central 
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government in Pristina (Marković 2017, pp. 43-44). Following Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence in 2008, the Kosovo Police took over authority in the whole of 
Kosovo, thus inevitably clashing with the parallel police forces in the North 
controlled and financed by Belgrade. The EU realised that such an environment 
was unsustainable in the long term and did not offer prospects for peacebuilding 
nor did it solve the EU’s Balkan dilemma. Moreover, if Serbia wanted to join the 
EU, the government had to comply with conditionality set forth in the Brussels 
Agreement, which, as mentioned previously, became part of negotiating Chapter 
35 on Kosovo.  
Points 7, 8, and 9 of the Brussels Agreement refer to the dismantling of 
Serb parallel security structures and their subsequent integration into the Kosovo 
security structures. Points 7 and 9 specifically indicated that there “shall be only 
one police force in Kosovo called the Kosovo Police;” that “all police in northern 
Kosovo shall be integrated in the Kosovo Police (KP) framework”, and that 
“salaries will be only from the KP” (Government of Serbia, Office for Kosovo and 
Metohija  2013). Moreover, Point 9 of the Brussels Agreement refers to there being 
only one “Police Regional Commander for the four northern Serb majority 
municipalities (Northern Mitrovica, Zvečan, Zubin Potok and Leposavić)” who will 
be a “Kosovo Serb nominated by the Ministry of Interior from a list provided by the 
four mayors on behalf of the Community/Association” (Government of Serbia, 
Office for Kosovo and Metohija  2013). Although the Brussels Agreement makes 
no explicit mention of civil protection, Point 8 of the Agreement refers to “other 
Serbian security structures” (Government of Serbia, Office for Kosovo and 
Metohija  2013).  According to the latest 2016 EU progress report for Serbia, the 
Commission claims that “Kosovo Serb police and civil protection personnel are 
now fully integrated into the Kosovo system” (European Commission 2016a, p. 
24). Despite the positive EU progress report, the research argues that this was an 
area where the Serbian government demonstrated partial compliance to EU 
conditionality established in the Brussels Agreement. Progress reports from both 
the Kosovan and Serbian governments indicate mostly positive developments and 
Serbian compliance in the area of police while the issue of Belgrade still 
compensating for the salaries of the integrated civil protection raises questions 
over the nature of compliance. Nonetheless, the research argues that the 
integration of both police and civil protection has had a positive impact and 
contributed to peacebuilding processes in the North of Kosovo.  
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The Kosovan government report from June 2016 stipulates that the police 
parallel structures have been dissolved and that 287 (out of 337)15 Kosovo Serb 
police officers have been integrated into the Kosovo police as of 31 December 
2013 while the Regional Directorate (also a Kosovo Serb) had been established 
on 22 July 2013 (Republic of Kosovo, Ministry for Dialogue 2016a, p. 15). The 
latest Serbian government progress report from April 2017 was also in accordance 
with the Kosovan report, and further stated that “the Republic of Serbia undertook 
appropriate measures to ensure that integration of Ministry of Interior (MoI) 
employees into Kosovo and Metohija security structures was executed 
successfully, efficiently and within the agreed timeframes” (Government of Serbia, 
Office for Kosovo and Metohija  2015c, p. 7). Both governments’ reports did note, 
however, some constraints in the implementation process such as the need for 
the integration of 39 former Serbian security administrative staff and the official, 
formal appointment of the Regional Commander of the Kosovo Police Regional 
Directorate. With regard to the formal appointment of the Regional Commander16, 
the Serbian government has claimed that, “the conditions for his formal 
appointment will only be created upon establishment of the 
Community/Association of Serbian Municipalities” (Government of Serbia, Office 
for Kosovo and Metohija, 2017b, p. 11).   
Stakić and Bjeloš (2015) argue that the “the characteristics of the civil 
protection units in the Northern Kosovo municipalities corresponds to those of 
specialised units-they are composed of full-time employees who are expected to 
be organised, equipped and trained to carry out complex tasks related to 
protection and rescue” (p. 10). Such complex tasks are manifold and include 
“observation and alert, firefighting, search and rescue operations, clearing 
snowdrifts during winter and other activities that fall under the concept of CP” 
(Stakić and Bjeloš 2015, p. 11). However, they also have additional tasks that are 
generally not the responsibility of CP such as road maintenance, clearing the Ibar 
riverbed, bridge repairs, securing buildings, etc. Moreover, there are claims that 
the CP also represent a political factor in the North: in 2011 CP were involved in 
setting up roadblocks and took part in violent clashes after the Kosovo Police 
special unit attempted to take control of the northern border crossings (Stakić and 
Bjeloš 2015, p. 13). The many abovementioned tasks the CP is involved in, 
                                                          
15 27 former Ministry of Interior employees had withdrawn from the process while 23 had 
been refused for “security reasons.” 
16 The Regional Commander is in the capacity of Acting Commander until his formal, 
official appointment. 
96 
 
regardless whether they fall under its jurisdiction, creates a rather ambiguous 
picture of what the CP actually constitutes. Furthermore, the research argues that 
the CP represent a security dilemma more so than the police structures as they 
exist in a legal vacuum—they operate outside of Kosovo’s legal framework and 
there is no equivalent in the Kosovan civilian emergency system. Stakić and Bjeloš 
(2015) argue that the mandate for these structures was to provide assistance to 
Serbian civilians in emergency situations while Kosovo and other international 
organisations operating within Kosovo have deemed these structures to be “illegal 
paramilitary structures that must be dissolved” (p. 6).  
The [November 2016] Kosovan government progress report indicates that 
the parallel structures of the CP have been closed while 483 former CP members 
have been integrated/employed into the Kosovo civil institutions (Republic of 
Kosovo, Ministry for Dialogue 2016b, p. 16). However, both governments’ reports 
indicated the still unresolved issue of payment of salaries to the newly integrated 
CP members and the issue concerning the handover of premises. While Kosovo 
claimed that the premises used by the former CP in the north needed to be handed 
over to the Kosovan Government,17 the Serbian government reported that 33% of 
the newly integrated members weren’t receiving salaries from the Kosovan 
government (Government of Serbia, Office for Kosovo and Metohija 2017b,  p. 28; 
Republic of Kosovo, Ministry for Dialogue 2017, p. 3). In an interview we 
conducted from an official from the Kosovan government, “the Serbian 
government still compensates for the salaries of integrated Serbian CP” and “uses 
them as a tool for political pressure in the north and all of the territory where Serbs 
live” (Member of Democratic Party of Kosovo 2017). One of the criteria for the 
successful integration of the former CP into Kosovo equivalent structures 
stemming from Chapter 35 was that “Serbia adopts the necessary regulations on 
the discontinuation of payment of salaries and provision of financial means to the 
civil protection in Kosovo” (Conference on Accession to the European Union-
Serbia 2015, p. 5). The April-October 2017 Serbian government progress report 
indicated that Serbia had prepared a draft law on ceasing to pay salaries and 
provide any financial support to CP members in Kosovo but the law would not be 
adopted until Kosovo normalises payment of salaries to all integrated members of 
the CP (Government of Serbia, Office for Kosovo and Metohija 2017a, p. 26).  
                                                          
17 According to an interview we conducted from a member of EULEX in Northern Kosovo, 
it is not entirely clear who owns the premises in the North and therefore, it wasn’t the 
responsibility of the Kosovar Serbs that had been employed in the CP structures to hand 
them over (EULEX Official, North Kosovo 2017).  
97 
 
Despite the disruption of this final stage of implementation of the 
agreement on CP, both Serbia and Kosovo have managed to dismantle the CP 
structures and integrate Serbia’s former members into Kosovo security structures, 
thus creating a more stable environment with less security dilemmas. The Kosovo 
government progress report also posited that: “the closure of civil protection has 
had a positive impact in the security situation in the northern part of Kosovo” 
(Republic of Kosovo, Ministry for Dialogue 2016b, p. 17). Therefore, this was an 
area of partial compliance by the Serbian government given the outstanding issues 
of premises and salaries that have yet to be resolved.  
An EULEX official from the North claimed that the cooperation between 
Belgrade and Pristina in the area of security was overall positive (EULEX Official, 
North Kosovo 2017). The Serbian government had engaged in partial compliance 
in an area that had an impact on the fundamental sovereignty of Kosovo, 
demonstrating that the Progressives had realised the reality on the ground that 
Kosovo was not an integral part of Serbia. The former Serb police and CP were 
integrated and functioning according to the Kosovan legal framework while the 
Serbian parallel security structures had been dismantled.  
 
4.5.2 Justice Agreement 
 
 The justice agreement was also another major element of the Brussels 
dialogue that would have an impact on the security situation in the North. 
Antonijević (2016) posits that “Serbian judicial institutions in the northern part of 
Kosovo were more or less shut down in mid-2013, in accordance with the Brussels 
agreement” (cited in Orosz et. al 2016, p. 72). This meant that the judiciary only 
handled minor civil cases such as divorce and dissolution of property and parental 
issues while EULEX dealt with the high profile cases concerning war crimes, 
organised crime and cases dealing with high corruption, thus leaving a backlog of 
other criminal cases that had yet to be resolved (cited in Orosz et. al 2016, p. 72). 
The extension of EULEX’s mandate in the North-originally set to end in June 2016-
did not create the mechanisms for establishing a unified and operational justice 
system, which is a key benchmark for democracy and part of the 1993 
Copenhagen criteria. Given the ethnic divisions and the legal vacuum in North 
Kosovo where smuggling, organised crime and black commerce continued to be 
the norm prior to and leading up to the signing of the Brussels Agreement, it 
became fundamental to establish a unitary justice system, comprising the entire 
territory of Kosovo. Thus, points 10 and 11 of the 2013 Brussels Agreement called 
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for the integration of Serb judicial authorities into the Kosovo justice system.  
Additionally, both points dealt with the ethnic structure of (northern) district and 
central (Appellate) courts’ judges to ensure minority representation and equal 
participation in legal procedures: the central court in Pristina would establish a 
panel composed of a majority of Kosovo Serb judges to deal with all Kosovo Serb 
majority municipalities. The district court, composed of both administrative staff 
and judges will sit permanently in Northern Mitrovica and each panel would be 
composed of a majority of Kosovo Serb judges (Government of Serbia, Office for 
Kosovo and Metohija 2013). The establishment of both regional and central courts 
was to not only integrate the former Serbian judiciary into the Kosovan legal 
framework, but it also sought to “build a sustainable framework for cooperation 
between [Kosovar] Albanians and Serbs” (Marković 2017, pp. 33-34). Therefore, 
the conditionality stemming from the Brussels Agreement would also ensure 
compliance with the conditionality of regional cooperation. 
In the November 2016 Kosovan government progress report, Kosovo 
confirmed that the recruitment of 45 Serb judges, 14 prosecutors and 141 
administrative staff had been completed (Republic of Kosovo, Ministry for 
Dialogue 2016b, pp. 18-19). On 30 November 2016, both Kosovo and Serbia 
agreed on a document titled ‘Conclusions of EU facilitators on Justice,’ which 
defined all the elements for the completion of integration in the field of justice 
(Government of Serbia, Office for Kosovo and Metohija 2017a, p. 12). In this 
document, “it was agreed that the appointment of judges and prosecutors, as well 
as the integration of the administrative staff into the the Provisional Institutions of 
Self-Government (PISG) in Pristina be scheduled for 10 January 2017” 
(Government of Serbia, Office for Kosovo and Metohija 2017a, p. 12). On this day, 
Serbia claimed it would comply with the EU conditionality stemming from Chapter 
35 on ending tenure for all the to-be integrated judicial personnel (Government of 
Serbia, Office for Kosovo and Metohija 2017a, p. 12). However, this process was 
delayed until a new agreement had been reached with the final implementation of 
the justice agreement being set for 17 October 2017, when Serbian judges, 
prosecutors and judicial staff would be fully integrated (European External Action 
Service 2017). Despite an additional week’s delay due to the failure of Serb judges 
and prosecutors to show up at the office of Kosovo President Hashim Thaçi to be 
sworn in, on 24 October 2017, 42 judges and 14 prosecutors took part in the oath-
taking ceremony, thus finalising the implementation of the justice agreement 
(European Western Balkans 2017).  
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An EULEX official from the North interviewed for the purpose of the 
research claimed that the integrated judges are still required to undergo training 
to be familiarised with the Kosovan legal framework and there is a backlog of 
cases that need to be dealt with in order to have a fully functioning justice system 
in the North (EULEX Official North Kosovo 2017). Therefore, the research argues 
that this is also an area of partial compliance given the fact that the justice system 
is still not functioning although implementation of the justice agreement is 
complete. The justice agreement also represented a benchmark for democracy 
and like police and CP, had an impact on the sovereignty of Kosovo where Serbia 
had de facto recognised Kosovo through its own independent, integrated justice 
system in the North that would function according to the Kosovan legal framework 
and would no longer fall under Belgrade’s jurisdiction.  
 
4.5.3 Telecommunications and Energy Agreements 
 
 The Brussels Agreement had additionally foreseen discussions on energy 
and telecommunications which had led to the establishment of agreements in both 
fields-one in energy in September 2013, with a revitalised agreement in August 
2015, and one in telecommunications also in August 2015. Both the energy and 
telecommunications agreements called for subsidiary companies of the energy 
and telecom companies in Serbia to be established and licensed to operate in 
Kosovo according to the Kosovan regulatory and legal framework, which would 
imply Serbia’s de facto recognition of Kosovo as a state. The EU praised Serbian 
government efforts in fully implementing the telecommunications agreement with 
Kosovo in December 2016 while the energy agreement remains frozen and 
unimplemented. The research argues that Serbia’s willingness to implement one 
agreement and not the other is an example of the government’s strategy of partial 
compliance in which the Progressives are attempting to achieve the minimum that 
would allow for the EU to be satisfied, thus leading to advancement in rewards 
such as the opening of chapters in the accession negotiations. Regarding the 
energy and telecommunication agreements in particular, the Serbian 
government’s decision in implementing the telecom agreement while not 
implementing the energy agreement, was for reasons of ownership where both 
sides claimed that the property inside of Kosovo to be in their respective ownership 
(Sovrlić and Đapić 2018, p. 26). While both agreements posed issues of 
ownership, Serbia was successful in preserving the ownership of the new telecom 
company which would be a subsidiary of Telecom Serbia, but the agreement on 
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energy was more complex where the value of ownership was greater than with 
telecom. This was due to the fact that the infrastructure in the field of energy was 
greater and therefore, held more value than with telecommunications. 
The telecommunications agreement signed in August 2015 between 
Kosovo and Serbia under the auspices of the EU and implemented in December 
2016 was one of the most significant success stories of the Brussels dialogue. The 
agreement called for the establishment of a new telecom company, which would 
be a subsidiary of the Serbian, state-owned Telekom Serbia. According to a 
source we interviewed from the European Commission: 
“This operator will be licensed by the Kosovan regulator to operate 
throughout all of Kosovo. It is a company that will provide fixed and mobile 
services. The fixed services can be provided in the entire territory of 
Kosovo, but the mobile operation is a ‘temporary authorisation’ that covers 
only the existing Serbian infrastructure on the ground. Some of that 
infrastructure is not in the North (for instance, there is an antenna at the 
Gračanica monastery)” (European Commission Official X 2016c).  
 
The Agreement additionally posited that Serbia would give its consent to 
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which would then allocate a 
three-digit dialling code comprising the whole of Kosovo. Before the Brussels 
Agreement, Kosovo had three different country codes,18 none of which belonged 
to Kosovo as it wasn’t a member of the ITU. This resulted in rather expensive 
roaming charges in mobile telephony and citizens carrying more than one mobile 
phone particularly since the Serbian dialling code +381 did not work in the south 
of Kosovo due to poor coverage (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network 2015, 
pp. 56-57). 
With the agreement, Kosovo would receive its own dialling code of +383 
while the usage of the other three would cease after a waiting period. The research 
posits that the dialling code was another example of the EU’s constructive 
ambiguity on the status issue and the ambiguity of the entire mediation process, 
which had allowed both sides to interpret the dialling code in different, opposing 
ways. The Kosovan government recognised it as an international dialling code and 
tacit recognition of Kosovo as a state while Serbia declared it was instead a code 
for a geographic area, which is owned by the Republic of Serbia (Government of 
Serbia, Office for Kosovo and Metohija 2016c and 2016d). The element of the 
                                                          
18 The three different dialling codes used in Kosovo are the Serbian country code +381, 
Monaco’s of +377 and Slovenia’s +386. (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network 2015, p. 
57). 
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code being one for a geographic area supports our findings as this was also 
confirmed in a statement made by an official from the EU Commission:  
“Kosovo is not a member of the UN, hence it is not a member of the ITU 
(the International Telecommunications Union). The ITU has the global 
institution to assign country codes. Therefore the only chance for Kosovo 
to have its own code was a regional code” (European Commission Official 
Y 2016). 
 
 In this regard, the entire process of “normalisation” thus allowed Serbia to 
maintain the fiction of retaining Kosovo while implementing agreements along the 
way and thus progressing forwards in the EU negotiations. In a press release, the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) had confirmed the full implementation 
of the telecommunications agreement by both sides. According to the report, 
Kosovo had been granted a dialling code by the ITU and the subsidiary company 
of Telekom Serbia had been granted a license for (permanent) fixed telephony 
and an authorisation for (temporary) mobile telephony issued by the Kosovo 
Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (European External Action Service 
2016b).  
 Before the Brussels agreement on energy, Kosovo was “dependent upon 
two main power stations which do not meet the growing electricity needs of 
Kosovo’s economy” (Marković 2017, p. 52). Coupled with that, the political division 
of the electricity network between Belgrade-owned Elektroprivreda Srbije (EPS) 
and Pristina-controlled Korporata Energjetike e Kosovë (KEK), indicated that 
Kosovo could not cope with its poor efficiency in terms of electricity production 
(Marković 2017, p. 52). Therefore, as Marković (2017) argues, the Brussels 
agreement on energy sought to unify the energy system of Kosovo in addition to 
expanding and promoting cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina in areas of 
trade and joint production of electricity (p. 52). In line with the agreement, the 
Serbian company, EPS would be integrated within the Kosovo energy system, 
which essentially meant that “the electricity network previously controlled by 
Belgrade should be managed by Pristina but while granting executive autonomy 
to Serb-dominated areas in the North of Kosovo” (Marković 2017, p. 52). In order 
to achieve this, two energy companies (one for trade and the other for supply and 
distribution) were to be established and integrated into Kosovo’s energy system, 
and be licensed to operate under Kosovo’s legal and regulatory framework. These 
two energy companies would also be subsidiaries of the Serbian energy company 
EPS. According to the most recent (2017) Kosovan government report, “Serbia is 
blocking the energy agreement by not allowing the new company [for supply and 
distribution] to be registered in Kosovo in accordance with Kosovo Law as 
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provided by the energy agreement reached in 2013” (Republic of Kosovo, Ministry 
for Dialogue 2017, p. 2). The Kosovan government stipulates that this is due to 
the fact that the new company is refusing to mention Kosovo as the country of 
operation in its statute, which is mainly for political reasons of not recognising 
Kosovo as a state (Republic of Kosovo, Ministry for Dialogue 2017, p. 2). 
 This research posits that the implementation of the telecommunications 
agreement while the energy agreement remains frozen demonstrates an overall 
Serbian government strategy of partial compliance to the Brussels agreements. 
Despite numerous delays in the implementation process, Serbia had finally 
allowed Kosovo to be granted a dialling code on 15 December 201619 and the 
subsidiary company of Telekom Serbia has been given a license and established 
according to the Kosovan legal framework (European Western Balkans 2016b). 
However, according to an official from the European Commission, the energy 
companies have not been established and licensed to operate even though “the 
Serbian prime minister (at the time, Vučić) has signed agreements that explicitly 
state that they will establish and operate the [energy] companies according to the 
Kosovan legal and regulatory framework. In addition, they managed to do exactly 
this for telecoms” (European Commission Official X 2016b). The research posits 
that with the telecommunications agreement, Serbia managed to preserve its 
property as “the arrangement also enables the transfer of assets to the new 
subsidiary company of Telekom Serbia without any customs, taxes or charges” 
(European External Action Service 2016a). However, differences remain over the 
ownership structure of the new energy company for supply and distribution 
services which Kosovo wants to own but Serbia is not allowing. The research 
posits that the desire to preserve the ownership of the energy company as it did 
with the telecom company could be a valid reason as to why the Serbian 
government has not implemented the energy agreement. Another reason for 
Serbia’s lack of compliance in this area could very well be a result of Kosovo’s 
reluctance to implement the agreement on the Association of Serbian 
Municipalities according to an official from the EU Commission (European 
Commission Official X 2016b). The same official has also posited that the Serbian 
strategy has always been “what is the minimum that they can achieve which would 
allow the EU to be satisfied” (European Commission Official X 2015). The fact that 
                                                          
19 According to NGO Aktiv (think tank in Kosovo), the dialling code has thus far only been 
assigned but will be operational by June 2018. After this date, Serbian citizens in Serbia 
will have to use +383 for calls made out of Serbia to Kosovo (Official from NGO Aktiv 
2017).  
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Serbia has implemented the telecom agreement in full while stalling on the energy 
agreement is a good example of this strategy where the Serbian political elites 
comply in one area but not in another, in the hopes the EU would be satisfied.  
The fact that Serbia managed to protect its property in the area of 
telecommunications through the transfer of assets from Serbia Telecom to the new 
subsidiary company and progress forwards in the accession negotiations through 
partial compliance, is an example of the government’s pragmatic nationalist 
approach. The Serbian government had used EU accession successfully to 
protect national interest in North Kosovo as the telecom agreement essentially 
allowed Serbia to maintain the status quo in Kosovo where Serbia was able to 
preserve its ownership in the area of telecoms. In this regard, the Serbian 
government strategy followed the logic of two-level games where the Progressives 
had appealed to their nationalist constituency in both Kosovo and Serbia while at 
the same time receiving a green light from the EU to open additional chapters in 
the negotiation process. Serbia has since opened two additional chapters as of 
February 2017: Chapter 20 on Enterprise and Industrial Policy and Chapter 26 on 
Education and Culture, with Chapter 26 being “provisionally” (or temporarily) 
closed (Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Serbia 2017).  
 
4.5.4 Municipal elections, parallel structures and the Association of Serbian 
Municipalities 
 
 The holding of fair and free elections is another pillar constituting 
democracy and therefore, would form part of the political criteria of a country’s 
readiness to join the EU. Moreover, the EU’s political conditionality posits the need 
for stable institutions guaranteeing democracy. Prior to the Brussels Agreement, 
Serbs living in central Kosovo only partially took part in elections while North 
Kosovo boycotted elections organised by UNMIK, only participating in those 
organised by Belgrade. Given the fact that this situation was unsustainable in the 
long term and did not promote regional cooperation, Point 12 of the Brussels 
Agreement asserted the need for municipal elections to be organised in the 
northern municipalities in 2013 with the facilitation of the OSCE and in accordance 
with Kosovo law and international standards (Government of Serbia, Office for 
Kosovo and Metohija 2013). Moreover, the elections had foreseen the 
establishment of local governments in the four northern municipalities, thus in line 
with the Copenhagen (political) criteria. The EU conditionality from Chapter 35 
also called for the dismantlement of parallel structures including Serbian 
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discontinuation of funding and support of these structures (i.e. interim municipal 
councils, municipal staff) (Conference on Accession to the European Union-Serbia 
2015, p. 4). Various reports from the Council for Inclusive Governance, the 
European Commission and both the Kosovan and Serbian government have 
indicated that this was an area where the Serbian government has engaged in 
partial compliance (European Commission 2014; Gashi and Novaković 2017; 
Republic of Kosovo, Ministry for Dialogue 2016b; Government of Serbia, Office for 
Kosovo and Metohija 2015c). More concretely, the Serbian government had 
encouraged participation of Kosovar Serbs in municipal elections organised in 
2013 in the North and again, subsequently in the Kosovan general elections in 
2014.  
In a report published by the Council for Inclusive Governance, point 12 of 
the Brussels Agreement is only half implemented: Local elections took place but 
municipal administrations have not been established (Gashi and Novaković 2017, 
p. 6). The EU progress report from 2014 for Serbia indicates positive 
developments in the field of elections indicating that: 
“For the first time, local elections were held Kosovo-wide with the 
facilitation of the OSCE in November 2013 (and repeated in North Mitrovica 
in February 2014) and, again for the first time, municipalities in the north of 
Kosovo were inaugurated in conformity with Kosovo law. Kosovo Serbs 
from both north and south of the Ibar River took part in the early general 
elections in June 2014” (European Commission 2014, p. 5).  
 
The success of the elections in Kosovo was mainly due to Belgrade’s 
influence over the politicians loyal to them (i.e. the Srpska List/Serb List) in 
Kosovo. Orosz (2016) argues that “the elections in Kosovo gave an opportunity to 
Belgrade to foster changes in the Serbian elite in Kosovo through the Serb List 
and to fill in positions with Serbian politicians that are loyal to Belgrade and through 
whom it could directly influence politics and decision-making in Kosovo” (cited in 
Orosz et. al 2016, p. 19). The Serbian government exerted pressure on the Kosovo 
Serbs to participate in the elections and vote for their Serb representatives in the 
Serb List. Examples of such measures of external pressure by the Serb 
government are expressed by the Kosovar Serbs where some argued that free 
sugar, cooking oil and cash were reportedly traded in exchange for votes. Another 
Kosovo Serb added, “welfare workers offered around twenty euros to people with 
social needs in exchange for them voting” (Salem 2013). Other Kosovar Serbs 
that had been pressured to vote by Belgrade also reported to BalkanInsight that 
they had been more or less ordered to show up and cast ballots, or risk losing their 
jobs (Salem 2013). The research posits that similar to the areas of police, civil 
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protection and the judiciary, the Serbian government ceded control of Kosovo 
through compliance to EU conditionality in the area of elections, therefore 
integrating the Kosovar Serbs into Kosovar political structures.  
Participation in Kosovo’s elections implies integration into Kosovo, thereby 
through coercion and pressure of the Kosovar Serbs into participation in Kosovo’s 
elections, the Serbian government is de facto recognising Kosovo as a state. 
However, the Progressives have discursively denied any such recognition of 
Kosovo as a state in addition to claiming that they have not abandoned the 
Kosovar Serbs while they have done exactly this by trading compliance on Kosovo 
for EU-related gains. This strategy also follows Putnam’s (1988) “logic of two-level 
games”-by pressuring Serbs  to vote for politicians the Serbian government 
controls, the government can claim they are defending Serbian national interest 
as the Srpska List is expected to protect Serb interests and act in Belgrade’s 
favour. The Serbian Foreign Minister [Prime Minister at the time]: Ivica Dačić told 
the Kosovar Serbs: “You need to help us in order to help yourselves, so that we 
can continue helping you. That is why you need to go to the polls” (Salem 2013). 
He also expressed the “need to win these elections and then constitute the 
Community of Serbian Municipalities, which means Serbian authorities, police and 
judiciary” (Salem 2013). Additionally, the Serbian government had succeeded in 
exerting pressure on the Kosovar Serbs to participate in both the June 2014 and 
2017 parliamentary elections in Kosovo, fulfilling conditionality of the Brussels 
Agreement. However, we argue that this could have negative implications for 
Kosovo as Serb politicians backed by Belgrade can be expected to block any 
decisions not in favour of the Serbs (Prelec and Rashiti 2015, p. 13). 
The Kosovan government report from late 2016 additionally noted that the 
municipal elections from 2013 produced local governments in the North and that 
“some progress had been made with regard to the legal functioning of the four 
northern municipalities” (Republic of Kosovo, Ministry for Dialogue 2016b, p. 12). 
The same report indicated positive developments and progress made in the 
municipalities in areas of delivering public services, managing local budgets, 
reporting of activities to relevant Kosovan authorities, participation in the process 
of public administration reforms and improvements have been made in the context 
of providing services to citizens. With regard to the last point, the financial system, 
cadastral system, and civil registry are operational in the municipality of Mitrovica 
North (Republic of Kosovo, Ministry for Dialogue 2016b, p. 12). The government 
report also noted several areas which lacked progress with the first being the issue 
over symbols in the northern municipalities where “four northern municipalities are 
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still operating without official symbols, coat of arms, stamps, etc.” (Republic of 
Kosovo, Ministry for Dialogue 2016b, p. 13). Additionally, three municipalities in 
the North (Zvečan, Leposavić and Zubin Potok) have also not integrated their 
administrative staff while Mitrovica North was successful in this field. Cadastral 
offices in three northern municipalities have also not been integrated in the Kosovo 
system, and the education and health systems have yet to be integrated. With 
regard to the last point, health and education are the most significant issue for the 
Serbs in Kosovo and these parallel structures have still to be dismantled. The 
formation of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities (ASM) was supposed 
to resolve this issue, but the establishment of the ASM remains frozen due to 
conflicting interpretations by both Kosovo and Serbia regarding its organisational 
structure and competences.  
The ASM, first envisioned in the Ahtisaari Plan, was supposed to grant 
more autonomy to the Serbians living in Kosovo, and would include all of the 
northern as well as southern Serbian municipalities. It would replace the individual 
competences of the municipalities where the ASM would have executive authority 
in the areas of health and education, urban and regional development and 
economic development (Government of Serbia, Office for Kosovo and Metohija 
2015a and 2015b). According to a Balkan Investigative Reporting Network report, 
“it will also allow Serbia to contribute money – in a transparent manner – to the 
body” which is of vital interest to the Serbs residing in North Kosovo who rely on 
money coming from Belgrade (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network 2015, p. 
36). However, both Serbia and Kosovo have viewed the ASM and the 
competences it would have in vastly dissimilar ways. The Kosovan government 
views the ASM as an autonomous organisation similar to that of an NGO while the 
Serbian government has used the media outlets in Serbia to represent the ASM 
as an organisation which would have executive powers that would protect Serbian 
national interest (Government of Serbia, Office for Kosovo and Metohija 2015a). 
While it is difficult to establish what structure and powers the ASM will have as the 
statute has yet to be drafted, the research posits that the Serbian government has 
“sold” the ASM as a Serbian entity similar to that of a third layer of government 
that would protect Serbian institutions (Government of Serbia, Office for Kosovo 
and Metohija 2015a). 
In general, the Serbian government strategy with regard to elections and 
the ASM is also one of partial compliance and can best be explained by Putnam’s 
(1988) “logic of two-level games.” On the one hand, the Serbian government has 
represented the ASM as a protection of Serbian national interests by promising to 
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create an autonomous community that would have executive authority and 
maintain the Serbian institutions. Until the establishment of the ASM, the Serbian 
government maintains the parallel structures in health and education. However, 
the Progressives have exerted pressure on the Kosovar Serbs to participate in the 
municipal and general elections in Kosovo as fulfilment of EU conditionality 
stemming from Chapter 35 and the Brussels Agreement to move ahead in the 
accession negotiations. Nenad Rašić, a Serb MP in Kosovo’s Parliament, has also 
expressed his concern that as with the elections, the Serbian government will use 
the ASM to fulfil EU criteria: “the Association of Serb Municipalities will not meet 
the needs of the Kosovo Serbs but will represent a major success story for 
Belgrade’s policy towards Kosovo” (cited in Orosz et al. 2016, p. 138).  
The Serbian strategy of partial compliance to the EU conditionality 
stemming from Chapter 35 and the Brussels Agreement is a consequence of the 
EU’s position with regard to Kosovo. Knowing that it could not enforce Kosovo’s 
recognition by Serbia, the EU has nonetheless remained adamant in its decision 
to not import another frozen conflict such as that of Cyprus, which acceded in the 
2004 enlargement. Therefore, the EU has prioritised the fulfilment of conditionality 
by Serbia from Chapter 35, and has additionally linked progress in this policy area 
with the opening up of chapters and progress in the accession negotiations. The 
effectiveness of the EU enforcing Serbian compliance regarding Kosovo was also 
ensured by the increase in external actors monitoring Serbian compliance through 
progress reports and press statements, thereby making non-compliance difficult 
to hide. In the next section, we examine the EU’s competences in a highly visible 
policy area such as Kosovo to account for the Serbian government strategy of 
partial compliance. 
 
4.6 The EU’s Position 
 
 Bickerton (2011) argues that “from being a source of legitimacy, Normative 
Power Europe is today in search of its own legitimacy” (cited in Whitman 2011, p. 
25). Given the EU’s failure to find a solution to the Cyprus issue prior to the 
country’s accession, the EU has placed salience on the resolution of Kosovo prior 
to Serbia’s membership, but without explicitly stating whether this would entail 
recognition. Instead, the EU has acted as a mediator in the normalisation process, 
in the hopes that the Serbian and Kosovan governments would find a sustainable 
solution that would be acceptable to the EU and to both Serbia and Kosovo. 
Realising that it could not enforce recognition of Kosovo upon Serbia given that 
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five member states also remain against recognition20, the EU’s search for 
legitimacy vis-à-vis its policy towards Kosovo has allowed it to establish more 
stringent conditionality and has additionally linked Serbia’s compliance towards 
Kosovo conditionality with progress in the accession negotiations including 
opening up of chapters.  In line with the EU Negotiating Framework, the EU 
Common Position on Chapter 35 explicitly states that the progress of Serbia in the 
negotiations largely depends on the progress made in reaching the interim 
benchmarks for Chapter 35. Given the Progressives’ and Aleksandar Vučić’s goal 
of EU membership, the Serbian government had to engage in some level of 
compliance to appease the EU and thus progress in the accession negotiations. 
Thus, partial compliance was enabled as a result of the EU’s extensive 
competences in a highly visible policy area (i.e. Kosovo).   
 The Council of the European Union publishes documents known as the 
EU’s “common position” which state the interim benchmarks a country must meet 
in order to progress in the accession negotiations, in addition to clauses positing 
an action the EU can take if a country is not implementing the necessary criteria. 
The EU Common Position for Chapter 35 for Serbia explicitly states: 
“If progress in the normalisation of relations with Kosovo significantly lags 
behind progress in the negotiations overall, due to Serbia failing to act in 
good faith, in particular in the implementation of agreements reached 
between Serbia and Kosovo, the Commission will on its own initiative or 
on the request of one third of the Member States, in accordance with point 
25 of the negotiating framework, propose to withhold its recommendations 
to open and/or close other negotiating chapters, and adapt the associated 
preparatory work, as appropriate, until this imbalance is addressed” 
(Conference on Accession to the European Union-Serbia 2015, p. 3). 
  
This clause indicates that the EU will withhold incentives such as the opening and 
closing of chapters if Serbia refrains from complying with EU conditionality, which 
includes implementation of agreements made with Kosovo. Unlike with regard to 
media freedom, which is an internal issue and an area where the EU lacks 
competences, the Kosovo issue is an area where the EU has extensive 
competences and where there is an increase in external actors monitoring 
compliance (i.e. the EU, Kosovo and the international community) which would 
make Serbia’s non-compliance difficult to hide. The Serbian government is 
expected to cooperate with the Kosovan government, which then publishes 
progress reports, similar to those of the European Commission, noting progress 
                                                          
20 Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia and Romania all are EU member states with 
secessionist issues on their doorstep and thus have not recognised Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence.  
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and often criticising lack of progress by the Serbian government in the 
implementation of the Brussels agreements. These reports are duly noted by the 
EU and taken into consideration when seeking appropriate measures to either 
reward Serbia for compliance in the form of opening chapters and access to EU 
funds, or sanction Serbia by hindering Serbia’s advancement in other areas of the 
accession negotiations. An example of the EU rewarding Serbia for compliance 
was following the August 2015 revitalised Brussels package when Serbia and 
Kosovo signed four new accords: on establishing the Association/Community of 
Serb municipalities, on energy, telecoms, and the Mitrovica Bridge. This allowed 
for the opening of the first negotiation chapters, Chapter 32 on Financial Control 
and Chapter 35 (European Parliament 2015). As a consequence, the Serbian 
government realised that progress in the Brussels dialogue was linked with 
advancement in the accession negotiations, which would eventually lead to 
membership.  
 Although the salience of EU conditionality to Kosovo was enough to 
enforce some compliance on behalf of the Serbian government, our empirical 
evidence suggests that the Serbian government strategy has been the minimum 
they could achieve that would allow for the EU to be satisfied (European 
Commission Official X 2015). This strategy can partly be explained by electoral 
considerations, which took precedence over the conformity to EU values where 
the Progressives found themselves managing two different, competing tensions: 
EU accession and the retention of Kosovo. Not wishing to lose domestic support, 
the Progressives had to satisfy both camps, and thus partial compliance to EU 
conditionality became the strategy in dealing with these two tensions. 
 
4.7 The Serbian Government’s Statecraft  
 
 Despite the decline in Euroenthusiasm among the Serbian public since 
2010, Serbia’s accession to the EU is still supported by nearly half the population 
according to the results from opinion poll research published by the Serbian 
Ministry for European Integration as shown in Figure 4.2. The salience of EU 
membership for a small and economically dysfunctional country like Serbia is 
regularly emphasised by the Serbian government, particularly from the Serbian 
President and leader of the Progressive Party: Aleksandar Vučić. A former 
journalist of the Serbian popular daily: Politika, notes that “Vučić will not change 
the European agenda-he was built on it-aware that there is no political future 
without the EU” (Former journalist from Politika 2016). The rationalist argument of 
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cost-benefit calculation by domestic actors supports the Progressives’ decision of 
Serbian accession given the material incentives membership would bring.  
However, the decision to engage in partial instead of genuine compliance 
was a consequence of the nationalist background of the Serbian Progressive Party 
coupled with the need to appeal to a sector of their domestic population that 
remains against giving up control over Kosovo. While rationalist theory may partly 
account for Serbian government strategy of partial compliance, this theory is 
inadequate in explaining the reasoning behind this strategy. Therefore, Bulpitt’s 
(1986) concept of statecraft where parties seek to maintain positions of power 
complements rationalist theory as it supports the Serbian government strategy of 
partial compliance- the Progressives and Vučić sought to appeal to both the EU 
and their nationalist constituency in order to progress forward in the accession 
negotiations as well as retain power at home. In this section, the research 
examines the Serbian government’s decision to engage in partial compliance as 
being mainly a result of electoral considerations rather than just material concerns 
arising out of EU accession.  
 
Figure 4.2 Polls Depicting Serbians’ Attitudes towards EU Accession and 
Recognition of Kosovo 
 
(Source: Ministry for European Integration, Government of Serbia 2010-2017). 
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(Source: Taken from two opinion polls: International Republican Institute 2015; and the 
Belgrade Institute for European Affairs 2016.) 
 
 An examination of opinion polls from June 2010 to June 2017 published by 
the Serbian Ministry for European Integration elucidates that accession to the EU 
is still supported by nearly half of the Serbian population as shown in Figure 4.2. 
Despite the slight decline in support for Serbia’s EU accession shortly prior to the 
Progressives’ coming to power following the May 2012 general elections, support 
for the EU has been steady since. Therefore, it became imperative for the 
Progressives to maintain their goal of EU accession, particularly given the fact that 
there is no real viable economic option for Serbia other than the EU. Despite a 
multitude of voices, including from the opposition right-wing parties, calling for a 
strengthening of relations with Russia for economic reasons21, Ker-Lindsay (2016) 
argues that “many in the Serbian government know that Russia has little to offer 
in the longer term” (cited in Maza 2016). He further posits that: “it is the investment 
from major EU companies that will turn the country around economically, and 
Russia just cannot compete with this” (cited in Maza 2016). The Serbian 
government realised that non-compliance to EU conditionality would ultimately 
hinder the allocation of EU structural funds to Serbia, and thus, some level of 
compliance to EU conditionality was necessary in order to secure some of these 
funds in addition to other EU benefits including the opening and closing of chapters 
in the accession negotiations. Therefore, the material incentives coupled with the 
                                                          
21 Serbia is heavily dependent on Russian energy exports as 80% of its gas exports come 
from Russia. Additionally, Russia has invested into the Serbian infrastructure including the 
South Stream Pipeline and a railway track between Belgrade and Pančevo (Ramani 2017). 
Nonetheless, the EU’s share of Serbian trade is 63.2 per cent according to the government, 
compared with Russia’s 9.5 per cent (Byrne 2014).  
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domestic public’s support for the EU can partly account for the Serbian 
government’s decision to engage in partial compliance. 
With regard to the question over Kosovo, an examination of opinion poll 
research published by non-governmental organisations such as the International 
Republican Institute and the Belgrade-based Institute for European Affairs show 
that a large majority of citizens in Serbia are not prepared for Serbia to recognise 
Kosovo even if this became a condition for EU membership. The opinion poll 
published by the International Republican Institute showed that the majority (57 
per cent in July and November 2015) indicated that Serbia should refuse to accept 
recognition of Kosovo at the expense of staying out of the EU while the survey 
conducted by the Belgrade-based NGO, the Institute for European Affairs, claimed 
that 80 per cent of respondents stated that Kosovo should never be recognised as 
independent (International Republican Institute 2015, p. 15; B92 2016b). The 
attitudes towards Kosovo’s recognition expressed in the opinion polls are further 
reinforced by the extreme right, nationalist parties that had entered Parliament 
following the 2016 elections and include the Serbian Radical Party, Dveri and the 
Democratic Party of Serbia.22 The Progessives’ decision to maintain the fiction of 
retaining Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia is attributed to the government’s 
strategy of demonstrating a sense of governing competence in order to win future 
elections. A political analyst from Belgrade supports this argument, positing that 
“any party or politician who recognises Kosovo would be politically punished in the 
elections” (Political analyst from Belgrade 2017). As the Brussels Agreement was 
seen as Serbia’s de facto recognition of Kosovo, members of far right parties, the 
Serbian Orthodox Church and parts of the Serbian electorate had accused Serbian 
government officials of treason (Čabrić 2013). In order not to lose popular support 
and face further political backlash, the Progressives employed a strategy of 
discursive denial in order to minimise the extent of Serbian concessions. 
The research argues that as a result of the prohibitive compliance costs to 
Kosovo conditionality, the Progressives aimed to build a policy package that was 
                                                          
22 Radical leader Vojislav Šešelj’s Radicals hold 22 seats; Dveri and the Democratic Party 
of Serbia in a joint coalition hold 13 (National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 2016). 
Although these are relatively smaller parties, they still enjoy support among the Serbian 
population. Tena Prelec, a researcher at the LSEE argues that “the comeback of Šešelj’s 
SRS only weeks after his first-grade acquittal by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, as well as the seats secured by DSS-Dveri, indicate that Serbian 
nationalism and pro-Russian stances are still an important factor in the country” (Prelec, 
T. 2016). Thus, any decision made by the Progressives that could lead towards recognition 
of Kosovo would have negative repercussions for the Serbian government, and could 
ultimately lead to Vučić and the Progressives Party’s defeat in the next election cycle.  
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acceptable to their domestic public and would satisfy the EU in order to move 
forwards in the accession negotiations. Partial compliance became a way for the 
Serbian government to manage both the tensions of accession to the EU, which 
would bring considerable economic benefits, in addition to maintaining the fiction 
that Kosovo was still an integral part of Serbia in order satisfy their nationalist 
constituency at home so as not to lose domestic support. This strategy can best 
be attributed to Robert Putnam’s (1988) “logic of two-level games” where domestic 
political leaders are players at two tables – the international and the domestic – 
and are thus doubly constrained by both what is negotiable internationally and 
what is acceptable domestically” (cited in Noutcheva 2006, p. 5). Thus, according 
to Putnam (1988), “national governments seek to maximise their own ability to 
satisfy domestic pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments” (Putnam 1988, p. 434). In this respect, through partial compliance, 
Serbian political actors were able to satisfy both the EU and their pro-EU 
supporters, in order to progress forwards in the accession negotiations with 
considerable benefits along the way. At the same time, the Serbian government 
was able to minimise the costs of compliance to Kosovo conditionality by 
‘hammering’ out compromises which they later sold to their domestic 
constituencies as being in favour of Serbia, thus garnering further public support.  
 While partial compliance may be enough to satisfy the EU in the meantime, 
Noutcheva (2012) argues that “the changes introduced through the manipulation 
of material incentives may not be sustained beyond the delivery of the anticipated 
benefits, and may even be reversed in time” (Noutcheva 2012, p. 30). The 
research argues that this could entail a similar situation to that of Bulgaria and 
Romania who acceded in 2007 but where post-accession has led to stalled 
(Bulgaria) and even reversed state building (in Romania) and an increase in cases 
involving high corruption and organised crime. Ganev (2013) argues that Bulgaria 
had been one of the least corrupt countries in 2007 but post-accession, the 
willingness of political elites to tackle organised crime and corruption deteriorated 
substantially while Romania has seen no improvement (Ganev 2013, p. 29). Unlike 
in the pre-accession phase, where the same Bulgarian and Romanian political 
elites remained motivated to compliance with EU conditionality, the EU’s usage of 
incentives and sanctions had no effect on Bulgarian and Romanian political elites 
in the post-accession phase. Moreover, it did not lead to reforms that would have 
improved the functionality of administrative structures and tackled organised crime 
and corruption. This failure on behalf of the EU to enforce reforms following 
accession through the usage of incentives and sanctions in Bulgaria and Romania 
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was primarily due to the absence of a threat post-accession as opposed to the 
pre-accession phase where the threat of exclusion was prevalent.  
The research argues that Serbian political elites’ decision to engage in 
partial compliance to EU conditionality is not sustainable beyond the delivery of 
EU benefits in the long term, even following Serbia’s accession to the EU. This is 
a consequence of the fact that Serbian government strategy, primarily its shift in 
policy toward Kosovo, was based on the statecraft theory of maintaining positions 
of power instead of a sincere desire to adapt to EU values and norms in the 
constructivist sense. The research argues that if the EU were to grant Serbia 
membership, the country could very well follow the examples of some of its 
neighbours, post accession, such as Bulgaria, Romania and even Hungary where 
EU values and norms are being undermined and called into question, as will be 
the discussion in the concluding chapter. Even in the pre-accession phase, the 
high adaptation costs of Kosovo conditionality, which has compelled Serbian 
political elites to engage in partial compliance has not led to full implementation of 
all the agreements signed between Pristina and Belgrade in the Brussels 
Dialogue. The Brussels Agreement has already begun to show its weaknesses 
and limitations as evidenced in the EU’s constructive ambiguity approach on what 
full normalisation might entail-- Kosovo sees it as recognition of its statehood while 
Serbia views it as “everything but recognition” (Gashi and Novaković 2017, p. 3). 
This could pose as a potential risk and lead to a breakdown in implementation of 
future agreements as is already visible in the frozen agreements on energy and 
the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities.  
 
4.8 Conclusion  
 
  Serbian national identity is encompassed by the Kosovo myth, which 
alludes to the myth of sacrifice and victimisation of the Serbian people under 
Albanian rule. For Armstrong (1982), one of the many theorists on nationalism, 
these myths and symbols “are usually more persistent than purely material factors” 
in ethnic nationalisms and argues that these myths can be transferred for political 
purposes” (cited in Őzkirimli 2000, pp. 172- 173). The Kosovo myth was first 
exploited by Milošević to mobilise the Serbian population against the onset of 
Albanian nationalism and Kosovo’s move for independence. Kosovo, thus became 
an integral part of the Serbs’ struggle against its enemies, from Milošević’s famous 
rally in 1989 to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, and has 
since become every government’s ambition in preserving Kosovo as an integral 
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part of Serbia. Due to economic concerns and corruption being more pressing 
issues for the Serbs, Kosovo began to lose saliency in the years following the 
election of the Progressives. However, this did not imply that the Kosovo myth 
became completely removed from Serbian politics nor did it indicate that the 
Progressives or any other Serbian political party was prepared to recognise 
Kosovo’s independence publicly. The research has posited that such a measure 
would be cause for political backlash and would lead to a decline in the 
Progressives’ popularity. Despite Serbia’s firm non-recognition policy regarding 
Kosovo, an EU official from our interview data posited that the Serbian government 
had recognised through the Brussels Agreement, the reality that, Kosovo is not 
Serbia (European Commission Official X 2015).  
  The Kosovo case study has argued that the Brussels dialogue was initially 
viewed as a success and an area where the Progressives have engaged in partial 
compliance. The agreements the research has analysed that have been either 
fully or partially implemented all have a fundamental bearing on the sovereignty of 
Kosovo, particularly the dismantlement of Serbian parallel structures and the 
subsequent reintegration of Serbs into Kosovan institutions. Additionally, the 
justice agreement, elections and the agreement on police and civil protection 
represent pillars of democracy and have implications for the political criteria that 
demonstrate a country’s readiness to join the European Union. However, 
according to rationalist theory, the Progessives are complying out of material 
concerns arising from EU benefits rather than a notion of cultural belonging or 
identification with EU norms and values. Serbia’s policy shift on Kosovo was 
therefore based on pragmatism and political opportunism of wishing to protect 
Serbian nationalist interest vis-à-vis EU integration in addition to electoral 
considerations of what EU accession would bring to Serbia and its citizens. 
Combined with the government’s objective of Serbian accession, compliance on 
Kosovo conditionality was in part enabled as this was a highly visible policy area 
where the presence of external actors monitoring compliance was greater. In 
highly visible policy areas, the EU is equipped with extensive competences to 
enforce political leaders to comply, thereby making non-compliance difficult to 
hide.  
In order to manage the repercussions of compliance with Kosovo 
conditionality, the discursive institutionalist approach posits that the Serbian 
political elites had maintained the fiction of retaining Kosovo through public 
discourse out of electoral concerns. This would seem to suggest a case of shallow 
Europeanisation where, despite partial compliance, the prohibitive costs of 
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recognising Kosovo led to the government’s discursive denial of Serbia’s de facto 
recognition vis-à-vis the Brussels dialogue, thus indicating that there was nothing 
sincere about Serbia’s policy shift towards Kosovo. An official from the European 
Commission interviewed for the purpose of the research also reflects this 
argument: “I would not say it [Serbia’s policy shift] is sincere. Instead of saying 
yes, we [referring to Serbian government] must do this because we believe in the 
rights of 1.8 million Kosovans. I think that there is a realisation we have to do this 
because we have no other option if we are serious about our European integration. 
And as I said, there is always an element of what is the minimum that they [the 
Serbian government] can do” (European Commission Official X 2015). This is 
supported by the fact that nationalist elements still exist in the Serbian Progressive 
Party’s position on Kosovo, evidenced by their non-compromising recognition 
strategy and desire to retain some semblance of control over Serb-dominated 
parts of Kosovo (i.e. through not implementing the energy agreement, seeking 
executive status for the ASM) .  
Though one cannot deny the major shift in the Progressives’ position 
towards Kosovo from that of hardline nationalism advocated under the Radical 
Party and Milošević in the 1990s to the beginning of normalisation, the Brussels 
dialogue has shown its weaknesses and limitations, namely those relating to the 
unresolved status issue. Similar to the Ahtisaari Plan, the Brussels Agreement 
avoided the status issue entirely, which enabled Serbian political elites to use the 
dialogue to their own advantage, and often in ways that was detrimental to both 
sides for the sake of political gain. Vučić and the Progressive do not seem to be 
prepared to recognise Kosovo today any more than when they were in the 1990s. 
This is evidenced by the Progressives’ blocking of Kosovo from UNESCO 
membership in October 2015. In an open letter to UNESCO, the Progressive 
leader Aleksandar Vučić declared that “Kosovo cannot be considered a state” 
because under the legally binding UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) “Kosovo and 
Metohija is a territory which is a part of the Republic of Serbia under the United 
Nations administration” (Srpska Napredna Stranka 2015). Moreover, the train 
incident in January 2017 in which Serbian political elites sent a train covered in 
the controversial slogan “Kosovo is Serbia” in 21 different languages was also a 
move that had served to heighten tensions and demonstrated that despite partial 
compliance, nationalist elements still persisted in the Progressives’ policy towards 
Kosovo (Morina, D. and BIRN 2017). 
While there has been compliance to Kosovo conditionality, this has not 
been the case in terms of compliance to conditions stemming from Chapter 23 on 
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Justice and Fundamental Rights, which would include freedom of expression and 
independence of the media. Instead, persistent government interference in the 
Serbian media outlets through financing and influence on editorial content, 
including non-transparency in ownership structures, indicate a strategy of fake 
compliance in this policy area. This is exacerbated by the lack of EU competence 
in enforcing media freedoms in some of its own member states and candidate 
countries which accession countries such as Serbia can exploit. The next chapter 
will argue that this has allowed the Serbian government to trade pliancy on Kosovo 
for room for manoeuvre in domestic areas such as in media freedom as 
demonstrated in Vučić’s authoritarian policy in the media sector.  
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Chapter 5: A Free Media? The Pervasiveness of 
Politics in the Media Sector in Serbia 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In a post-Communist country that is still undergoing processes of 
democratisation and where there is an oversaturation of media outlets, the media’s 
economic survival more often than not depends on its political relationship with the 
state. The government, in this regard, intervenes in the media through direct 
ownership or through indirect mechanisms of control, such as through financing 
from the state budget, including in advertising. The media is then expected to 
promote the work of the government and publish positive news coverage of the 
leading political elites in power. Such is the case with Serbia, where the media 
market is small and thoroughly oversaturated with many media outlets,23 the 
majority of which depend on government financial support as a key basis for their 
sustainability. Ryabinska (2011) argues that in Serbia and some of its Balkan 
neighbours, the media  “are not autonomous from governments or vested 
interests, but highly dependent on them, and they function not as democratic 
institutions, but as tools for trading influence and manipulating public opinion in 
the interests of power-holders” (p. 4). The Serbian government’s authoritarian 
policy towards the media has led to a significant decline in media freedom where 
the media outlets serve as powerful PR for the leading party officials, 
predominantly Progressive Party leader and President, Aleksandar Vučić.  
The research posits that what constitutes an independent and pluralistic 
media is very difficult to determine. The EU does not have clear criteria for defining 
media freedom as it is not part of the acquis and exists solely as benchmarks for 
the negotiating chapters pertaining to freedom of expression, which include 
Chapter 23 on Justice and Fundamental Rights and Chapter 10 on Information 
Society and the Media. Given the difficulty in defining media independence and 
pluralism, we refer to the EU’s benchmarks as the basis for our analysis. Freedom 
of expression conditionality from Chapter 23 posits that Serbia respects 
independence of the media through: “the application of a zero-tolerance policy as 
regards to threats and attacks against journalists…transparency (including on 
                                                          
23With a population of roughly seven million, Serbia has over 1000 registered media 
outlets. The figures differ slightly from report to report, but the official number from the 
Serbian Business Registers Agency is 1742 (Jonić 2016). 
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ownership of media), integrity and pluralism” (Conference on Accession to the 
European Union-Serbia 2016, p. 28). In these benchmarks, there is no mention of 
state withdrawal from the media including of the limits of state funding of the 
media. From an interview conducted with a former official from the EU 
Commission, media that is free from political influence and control is the core 
principle of media independence (EU Commission Official Y 2016b).  
In order to meet the EU conditionality on media freedom and thus bring the 
media environment up to European standards, the Serbian government adopted 
three laws--public information and the media, electronic media and public 
broadcasting services in August 2014 (B92 2014). Despite the adoption of the new 
media laws, Serbia has achieved very little progress when it comes to reforming 
the media sector, and significant state interference in the media still persists. 
Political influence has had a negative effect on the media especially through the 
continued financing of media outlets through indirect means such as project co-
financing and state advertising. The research argues that the adoption of the three 
new media laws and the government’s Action Plan for their implementation was in 
reality a means to convince the EU on paper that Serbia was complying with 
conditionality stemming from Chapter 23. By simulating EU-compliant change in 
the short run while seeking ways of reversing that change and maximising profits 
in the long run, Serbian politicians were engaging in fake compliance. Noutcheva 
(2006) argues that “if domestic actors pass legislation compliant with EU demands 
but legal enforcement does not follow up, and problems of technical nature are not 
obvious, the ensuing conclusion is that there is no political will to do the reforms 
requested. Hence, the actors do not believe in the appropriateness of these 
domestic changes” (p. 11). The Serbian government’s strategy of fake compliance 
can also be attributed to the EU’s lack of capacity to enforce and regulate media 
freedom in some of its own member states, which has given Serbian politicians a 
margin for manoeuvre when it came to compliance.  
In the first part of the chapter, we provide a statistical analysis of media 
freedom in Serbia since 2003 in order to demonstrate the decline. Then we 
examine the most significant, national Serbian media outlets in order to 
demonstrate non-transparent ownership as well as government interference. The 
second part of the chapter will examine the media laws adopted by the Serbian 
government in August 2014 and the implementation strategies of the Serbian 
government, according to government’s Action Plan for Chapter 23. The study will 
argue that the adoption of the media laws and Action Plan for their implementation 
were strategies the Serbian government used to persuade the EU of their 
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compliance on paper. In reality, implementation was limited and the media laws 
did not lead to greater transparency or state withdrawal from the media, including 
in financing and ownership, which posit a strategy of fake compliance. In the 
following section, we offer an explanation for the Serbian strategy of fake 
compliance by examining the EU’s position on compliance to EU conditions with 
regard to media freedom. As full compliance to media freedom conditionality 
comes with reputational costs, we argue that the EU’s lack of competence in this 
policy area has enabled the Serbian government to simulate domestic-compliant 
change (i.e. fake compliance).  
 
5.2 Statistical Analysis of the Serbian Media Environment From 2003-2017 
 
 In Serbia, the media environment has seen a slow decline since the fall of 
Milošević. A 2017 Freedom House report ranked Serbia as partly free in the area 
of freedom of the press with a score of 49 out of 100 (100 being the worst and 0 
the best) and the country is ranked as the 98th out of 201 in the world in press and 
media freedom (Freedom House 2017)24. It has fallen from its highest ranking of 
72nd in 2011. In the Freedom House 2017 regional rankings and scores for Europe, 
Serbia ranked 38 out of 42 countries, with only four countries ranked below Serbia 
in press freedom (Freedom House 2017). Out of its Balkan neighbours, Croatia, 
Montenegro, Bulgaria, Romania and even Kosovo scored above Serbia while 
Albania, Bosnia and Macedonia scored below.25Additionally, according to the 
Freedom House index, Serbia was among the seven countries that suffered the 
largest declines in press freedom in 2017 (Freedom House 2017).26 Freedom 
House listed the reasons for the decline in Serbia being due to President Vučić 
using his election campaign to “discredit unfriendly media outlets” while “the pro-
government tabloid Informer has smeared critical journalists with familiar 
accusations of mafia ties or collusion with foreign intelligence agencies” (Freedom 
House 2017). These developments, in addition to surveillance of independent 
reporters and attacks on journalists have also contributed to the decline in press 
freedom in 2016. A 2016 IREX Media Sustainability Index (MSI) rated Serbia the 
                                                          
24 Although there are 197 countries in the world, Freedom House Index reports on an 
additional four “territories” which include the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Somaliland, 
Crimea, and Hong Kong.  
25 Macedonia was the only Balkan country that scored as “not free” and was 41st in the 
region ranking one number above Turkey.  
26 The other countries that suffered the biggest decline in 2017 besides Serbia were 
Poland, Turkey, Burundi, Hungary, Bolivia and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Freedom House 2017).  
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lowest since the MSI began in 2001 due to “the long-term deterioration of media 
law implementation and enforcement” which is a result of political pressures and 
influence on the media, worsening economic conditions, attacks on journalists and 
unprofessional reporting to name a few (IREX Media Sustainability Index 2016, p. 
125). The overall average score for Serbia according to the 2016 IREX Index was 
1.71 (the highest being 4), with the country seeing little or no change and falling 
into the category of an unsustainable, mixed system (IREX Media Sustainability 
Index 2016, p. 126). Despite a slight increase, the most recent 2017 report posits 
that “in the last 24 months, around 50 serious independent analyses of different 
aspects of the Serbian media sector were prepared; all pointing to an 
unsustainable media situation” (IREX Media Sustainability Index 2017, p. 2). Table 
5.1 demonstrates the decline in media freedom since 2003, according to the MSI. 
 
Table 5.1  
 
(Source: IREX Media Sustainability Index 2003-2017). 
 
The 1.71 score suggests a steady decline in media sustainability and freedom, 
since 2003 when the average score was 2.52 and falling into the category of “near 
sustainability” (IREX Media Sustainability Index 2010, p. 103). 2012 was when 
figures had dropped to those that would indicate an unsustainable, mixed media 
system, which means that a “country minimally meets objectives, with segments 
of the legal system and government opposed to a free media system” (IREX Media 
Sustainability Index 2016, p. 126). These figures seem to suggest that media 
freedom in Serbia was in slow decline since 2009 shortly after the election of the 
Democratic Party under incumbent Serbian President Boris Tadić. However, since 
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the Serbian Progressive Party came to power in 2012, the media environment has 
not improved and continues to decline, threatening the country’s democratic 
prospects among which include membership to the EU.  
 
5.3 An Overview of Serbian Government Interference in the Mass Circulation 
Media  
 
 We have undertaken an analysis of both national and private mass-
circulation media in Serbia to determine the extent of government interference and 
control, in addition to transparency. Based on our findings, we argue that the 
majority of the bigger media outlets rely on Serbian government financing which 
makes them more prone to political interference and control. However, the 
financial deals the Serbian government has with some of these media outlets are 
difficult to prove as there exists very little information on this grey zone, according 
to one of our sources from BIRN (Member of Belgrade Centre for Security Policy 
2017). This would seem to suggest that many of these media outlets, including the 
mass circulation dailies, have opaque or non-transparent ownership structures 
pointing to a strategy of fake compliance as even the media laws adopted in 
August 2014 by the Serbian government did not lead to greater transparency, 
which will be discussed further on in the chapter. The following table 5.2 
demonstrates the circulation, viewership and listenership of some of these media 
while Table 5.3 depicts their ownership structures.  
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Table 5.2 Most significant Serbian national media 
(Sources: Ipsos Strategic Marketing August 2015 Report, Association of Electronic 
Independent Media (ANEM) 2012; Marketing Mreža 2014; National Media Registry Serbia 
2014.) 
Name 
Circulation, 
listenership/viewership Type 
Politika 55,970 (2012); 52,498 (2014) Print daily 
Večernje Novosti 109,736 (2012); 95,300 (2014) Print daily 
Blic 121,480 (2012); 112,979 (2014) Print daily 
Danas 164,428 (2014) Print daily 
Alo 113,842 (2012); 92,290 (2014) Print daily 
Informer 103,000 (2014)27 Print daily 
Kurir 107,667 (2014); 99,434 (2015) Print daily 
Radio Television of Serbia 
(RTS 1 and 2) 
24% average share in 
viewership 
Public TV 
broadcaster 
Radio Television of Vojvodina 
(RTV) 
1.09% average share in 
viewership 
Public TV 
broadcaster 
TV Pink 
16.9% average share in 
viewership National TV station 
TV Happy 
6.82% average share in 
viewership National TV station 
Prva 
12.87% average share in 
viewership National TV station 
B92 
8.04% average share in 
viewership 
National TV & radio 
station 
 
Table 5.3 Ownership Structures of Mass-Circulation Media in Serbia 
Name Ownership Structures 
Politika 
50% state-owned; 50% non-transparent though 
suspected East Media Group 
Večernje Novosti 
30% state-owned, 7% PIO Fund, 63% private Austrian 
and Cypriot companies 
Blic Ringer Axel Springer, private 
Danas 
Društvo za Novinsko Izdavačku Delatnost Dan Graf D.o.o 
Beograd 
Alo Ringer Axel Springer, private 
Informer Insider Team D.o.o., Dragan Vučićević 
Kurir Adria Media Group, Aleksandar Rodić 
Radio Television of Serbia 
(RTS 1 and RTS2) Public broadcaster, state-owned 
TV Happy 
Semi-transparent, possibly linked to business tycoon 
Predrag Peconi 
Radio Television of 
Vojvodina (RTV) Public broadcaster, state-owned 
TV Pink Private; Pink International Co. d.o.o. Beograd 
Prva Non-transparent 
B92 Non-transparent 
 
                                                          
27 Circulation figures for Informer were taken from a 2014 MarketingMreza report, 
published by Research Solutions Partner, as there was a significant error in the circulation 
figure in the Official Serbian Media Registry which had reported over 26,000,000 
(MarketingMreza 2014).  
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As indicated by Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, thirteen mass-circulation media 
were analysed in order to examine the extent of government interference in the 
media as well as transparency in ownership structures. First, we will report on our 
findings for the media in which the state has partial ownership: the print dailies 
Politika and Večernje Novosti. Then, we will demonstrate government influence in 
relation to some of the print media (Blic, 24 Sata, Alo) in addition to the tabloids 
and dailies (Kurir and Informer) that serve as propaganda tools for the Serbian 
Progressive Party. Finally, we will look at the major private television channels 
where the Serbian government has influence. 
 The state owns 50% of Politika while the owner of the other 50% is non-
transparent and unknown to the public, which we will discuss at length further on 
in the chapter. The Serbian government also owns around 30% in Večernje 
Novosti. Matić and Nedeljković (2014) argue that “the state bodies firmly hold to 
their governing rights in Politika and Večernje Novosti, especially to the 
appointment of directors and editors-in-chief, who are selected on political 
grounds” (p. 351).  
 Some of the most significant print media in Serbia, having the largest 
circulation, are privately owned, such as Blic, Danas, Alo, Informer and Kurir. We 
have analysed the extent of state control and influence in each, and have 
discovered that there is significant government influence in some bigger “tabloid” 
dailies (Informer, Kurir), while others (Blic, Alo and Danas), have some degree of 
independence. According to Saša Dragojlo from the Balkan Investigative 
Reporting Network, there exists no direct influence on the daily, Danas (Dragojlo 
2016). A journalist from the NDNV, would also agree: 
“Except for Danas, the Vučić government has direct influence on all the 
print media… Blic and Alo (all from the same company, Ringier) are not in 
an ideological but in a financial deal with the Serbian government. 
Unfortunately, a large number of journalists and editors who have fought 
for the government’s deflection from the media, no longer work in these 
papers. Also, another Serbian daily emerged, Srpski Telegraf, which like, 
Kurir and Informer, strongly supports the Serbian government” (Journalist 
from the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina 2016e). 
 
Aside from Danas, Blic is another daily in which you can find criticism of the SNS 
government (Jahić 2017). This would suggest some degree of freedom for the 
Serbian media, but a journalist from the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy writes:  
“I think the government does not dare to strike on Blic, and treat it as a 
case of free media, but Blic is on the verge of acceptable business for their 
owners (i.e. its profit is less than before, and Blic tries to refrain from open 
and clear criticism of the authorities)” (Member of Belgrade Centre for 
Security Policy 2017).  
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 A 2015 report published by the Anti-Corruption Council in Belgrade on 
ownership structures and government control of the media in Serbia shows the 
daily tabloid, Informer as being subject to direct government influence and 
favouring the leading Serbian Progressive Party. The Report argues that “from the 
very beginning, this daily is characterised by activities that favour the Serbian 
Progressive Party and its members who are prominent state functionaries” (Anti-
Corruption Council 2015a, p. 44). The tabloid, Kurir, presents an interesting case 
as it had briefly deflected from being a pro-government daily to criticising the SNS 
for a while, attempting to portray themselves as independent, but Kurir has 
apologised and soon returned to supporting the Progressive-led government. It is 
not publicly known why Kurir had returned to its stance of being a pro-government 
or “regime” paper, but journalists speculate that the tabloid received some sort of 
financial compensation to terminate its campaign against the government 
(Journalist from BIRN 2016b). Furthermore, in the March 2017 presidential 
election campaign, Kurir was one of the major dailies that had covered its front 
page with advertisements supporting Vučić’s election in April (Balkan Investigative 
Reporting Network 2017).   
 In the domain of national television and radio, there is also indirect 
government interference and non-transparent ownership structures. The 
government has influence in these media either through financial deals or 
influence on editorial content and policy. Out of the television and radio stations 
listed in Table 5.2, TV Pink, TV Happy, Prva, B92 (both radio and television) are 
all private. According to journalist from the Independent Journalists’ Association of 
Vojvodina, the television Pink and TV Happy are similar to the daily tabloid 
Informer in that they are heavily influenced by and in support of the current Serbian 
government while B92 and Prva televisions are financially tied to the government 
(Journalist from the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina 2016e). 
Moreover, RTV B92, which is owned by a Cyprus-registered company, stopped 
airing two comedy shows in 2013 that had spoken critically of Aleksandar Vučić 
(Matić and Nedeljković 2014, p. 343). B92 was once renowned for its 
independence especially during the Milošević period but is now politically 
influenced and has also “lost its identity as a source of reliable and responsible 
journalism” (Matić and Nedeljković 2014, p. 343).   
 In our analysis of the major Serbian media with national coverage, we have 
elucidated that there is government influence in both the print media and audio-
visual outlets (i.e. television), although this type of government influence (whether 
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through financial deals or ownership structures) is often opaque. Our analysis 
seems to indicate a greater degree of independence in the national print media 
than in the television. In the following sections, we examine the 2014 media laws 
whose purpose was to regulate the media environment (especially financing from 
the state budget and transparency), and bring it up to European standards. We 
also analyse the Action Plan for their implementation and seek to argue that 
despite Serbian government claims of compliance in the area of media freedom, 
a lack of legal enforcement of the laws posits that this is actually an area where 
the Serbian government has engaged in fake compliance with regard to 
conditionality.  
 
5.4 The New Media Laws of August 2014  
 
In September 2011, the Serbian government cabinet composed of the 
Democratic Party (DS) and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) adopted a media 
strategy along with an action plan with implementation planned for 2016. The 
adoption of the media strategy was a requirement the Serbian government had to 
fulfil at the time in order to be granted candidacy for EU membership (Kisić 2015, 
pp. 75-76). The main goals of the strategy are as follows:  
“to ensure public interest; develop a media market; to guarantee pluralism 
which entails diversity of ownership, sources of information and media 
content; to ensure the state’s withdrawal from the media which would entail 
their privatisation and/or conversion of state ownership into shares; to 
guarantee ownership transparency; to prevent cross-ownership 
(simultaneous ownership of different types of media outlets); to contribute 
to media literacy; and media digitalisation” (Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe 2011).  
 
While pluralism and ownership transparency are explicitly mentioned in the EU’s 
Common Position on Chapter 23 for freedom of expression, there is no clear 
definition in the benchmark what pluralism entails. Additionally, the EU 
benchmarks do not mention cross-ownership nor the state’s withdrawal from the 
media. While transparency in ownership is a key benchmark, this does not entail 
transparency in financing of the media particularly vis-à-vis advertising. 
In August 2014, a package containing three new media laws was adopted 
that had stemmed from the 2011 media strategy-the Law on Public Information 
and the Media, the Law on Electronic Media, and the Law on Public Service Media 
(B92 2014). These new laws adopted by the Serbian Progressive-led government 
were supposed to make the Serbian media landscape match European standards 
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by complying with the EU conditionality stemming from Chapter 23 on Justice and 
Fundamental Rights and Chapter 10 on Information Society and the Media-the two 
chapters that would have the most impact on media freedom in an accession 
country. The interim benchmarks for Chapter 23 specifically dealt with the freedom 
of expression, which included independence and pluralism of the media. More 
specifically, these benchmarks were “transparency (including in ownership of the 
media), integrity and pluralism” in addition to “full respect of the independence of 
the media” including application and implementation of a “zero-tolerance policy 
with regards to threats and attacks against journalists” (Conference on Accession 
to the European Union-Serbia 2016, p. 28). Chapter 10 on Information Society and 
the Media at the time of writing does not have benchmarks but this chapter would 
include audio-visual policy entailing the correct provisions and amendments to the 
Law on Public Service Media that would ensure a degree of independence for the 
Public Service Broadcasters RTV Serbia and RTV Vojvodina. Additionally, 
Chapter 10 entailed independence of the Regulatory Body for Electronic Media 
(REM). Because there currently exists no benchmarks and no Serbian 
government Action Plan for Chapter 10, we have left it out of our research. 
Therefore, we have also omitted discussion on the public service broadcasters as 
it would be difficult to test for fake compliance without concrete benchmarks and 
Action Plan for their implementation. 
The following sections will examine the Law on Public Information Media 
adopted in August 2014 and the government’s Action Plan for its implementation, 
and compare and contrast it with the EU conditionality from Chapter 23 on Justice 
and Fundamental Rights in order to test the hypothesis of fake compliance. First, 
we analyse government interference in the media through state ownership, and 
transparency of ownership structures. Then, we will examine state control through 
financing of the media vis-à-vis advertising and project co-financing. Finally, we 
analyse the violations of freedom of expression by the Serbian government 
through attacks and threats against journalists and influence over editorial policy. 
 
5.5 State Ownership and Issues of Transparency in the Serbian Media 
 
According to the most significant law, the Law on Public Information and 
the Media, Article 142 prescribes mandatory privatisation of all media that is in “full 
or predominantly in public ownership and which are wholly or predominantly 
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funded from public funds” (Službeni Glasnik 83/2014).28Article 143 of the same 
Law prohibits further funding of the media from public revenues after 1 July 2015 
(Službeni Glasnik 83/2014).  However, the deadline for privatisation had been 
extended to 31 October 2015 due to the entire process being delayed for a few 
months (Maksić 2016, p. 9). According to the latest 2016 report published by the 
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), of the 73 public companies that 
were found in the portfolio of the Privatisation Agency, 50 media outlets joined the 
privatisation process while 23 did not join the privatisation process at all (some 
automatically declared bankruptcy while others sought different modalities). The 
ones who sought different modalities are RTV Vranje, RTV Preševo and TV Tutin, 
which had decided to voluntarily share ownership among employees (Maksić 
2016, p. 9). Of the aforementioned 50 media that had entered the privatisation 
process, 34 have found owners while 16 have either been closed down due to 
bankruptcy or are waiting for the distribution of free shares to employees who are 
entitled to them (Maksić 2016, p. 9).  
The following Table 5.4 demonstrates the privatisation of the media, with 
data collected from two main reports: the February 2016 report, “Soft censorship: 
changes in the media sector-from bad to worse” published by the Balkan 
Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) and the second from the Independent 
Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina (NDNV) from April 2016. The first 39 listed 
media outlets have failed to privatise, and have either been closed down due to 
bankruptcy or are in the process of distributing shares to employees. The first 16 
of these have entered the privatisation process while media outlets 17-39 did not 
join the privatisation process. The last 34 media (39-73) have been privatised. Two 
media outlets, Radio Paraćin and Radio Ćićevac have changed their name and 
activity and are now companies involved in letting and other real estate 
management. Radio Pruga was privatised but privatisation was cancelled shortly 
afterwards because the new owner, Mirjana Krstić, as well as the people who 
signed a preliminary agreement with her about taking over Radio Pruga, failed to 
comply with obligations under the purchase contract (Cenzolovka 2016a; 
Kolubarske.rs 2016). However, Radio Pruga, as of September 2016 continues to 
emit programmes despite failed privatisation (Cenzolovka 2016b). 
 
 
                                                          
28 This would not include public broadcasters as these were to be dealt with in a separate 
law on Public Broadcasting and the Media.  
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Table 5.4: Privatisation of media in Serbia, as of May 2016 
(Sources: Maksić 2016, p. 27; Nezavisno Društvo Novinara   Vojvodine 2016b). 
  
Name of 
media 
outlet 
Status 
Sold 
for 
(€) 
Buyer/new 
owner 
Type of 
media 
1 
Radio 
Bačka 
Failed privatisation, 
distribution of shares in 
process 
x x 
Local 
Radio 
2 
Radio 
Pirot 
Failed privatisation, shut x x 
Local 
Radio 
3 
Radio 
Sečanj 
Failed privatisation, 
continues to emit 
programmes 
x x 
Local 
Radio 
4 Naš Glas 
Failed privatisation,   
distribution of shares in 
process 
x x Local TV 
5 
Reč 
Naroda 
Failed privatisation,   
distribution of shares in 
process 
x x 
Local Print 
Weekly 
6 TANJUG 
Failed privatisation, shut 
down but continues to 
operate 
x x 
State/Nati
onal News 
Agency 
7 
Radio 
Bujanova
c 
Failed privatisation, received 
the decision on the transfer 
of free shares 
x x 
Local 
Radio 
8 
RTV 
Bačka 
Palanka 
Failed privatisation,  
distribution of shares in 
process 
x x Local RTV 
9 
Radio 
Požareva
c 
Failed privatisation, but still 
not closed down 
x x 
Regional 
Radio 
10 
Radio 
Subotica 
Failed privatisation,  
distribution of shares in 
process 
x x 
Local 
Radio 
11 
RTV 
Trstenik 
Failed privatisation,  
distribution of shares in 
process 
x x Local RTV 
12 
RTV Alt 
(Reč 
Radnika) 
Failed privatisation, received 
the decision on the transfer 
of free shares 
x x Local RTV 
13 TV Ljig 
Failed privatisation,   
distribution of shares in 
process 
x x Local TV 
14 Dnevnik 
Failed privatisation,  
distribution of shares in 
process 
x x 
Regional 
Print Daily 
Newspape
r  
15 
Radio 
Odžaci 
Failed privatisation, received 
the decision on the transfer 
of free shares 
x x 
Local 
Radio 
16 
Petrovac 
Na Mlavi 
Failed privatisation, shut x x 
Local 
Radio 
17 Vrbas  
Did not enter privatisation, 
shut 
x x Local RTV 
18 
TV 
Smederev
o 
Did not enter privatisation,  
received the decision on the 
transfer of free shares 
x x Local TV 
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19 
Štampa, 
radio i film 
Bor 
Did not enter privatisation,  
received the decision on the 
transfer of free shares 
x x Local RTV 
20 
RTV 
Vrnjačka 
Banja 
Did not enter privatisation, 
went into bankruptcy 
x x Local RTV 
21 
RTV 
Vranje 
Did not enter privatisation,  
in process of distributing 
shares 
x x Local RTV 
22 
RTV 
Mladenov
ac 
Did not enter privatisation, 
shut  
x x Local RTV 
23 
RTV 
Kovačica 
Did not enter privatisation,  
in process of distributing 
shares 
x x Local RTV 
24 
RTV 
Ćuprija 
Did not enter privatisation, 
shut  
x x Local RTV 
25 
Radio 
Zrenjanin 
Did not enter privatisation, 
shut 
x x 
Local 
Radio 
26 
Radio 
Sombor 
Did not enter privatisation, 
shut 
x x 
Local 
Radio 
27 
Radio 
Kikinda 
Did not enter privatisation, 
shut 
x x 
Local 
Radio 
28 
Radio 
Paraćin 
Did not enter privatisation, 
changed nature of their work 
x x 
Local 
Radio 
29 
Radio 
Obrenova
c 
Did not enter privatisation, 
shut 
x x 
Local 
Radio 
30 
Radio 
Novi 
Bečaj 
Did not enter privatisation, 
shut 
x x 
Local 
Radio 
31 
Radio 
Leskovac 
Did not enter privatisation, 
shut 
x x 
Local 
Radio 
32 
Radio 
Lazarevac  
Did not enter privatisation, 
shut 
x x 
Local 
Radio 
33 
Radio 
Drina 
Did not enter privatisation, 
shut 
x x 
Local 
Radio 
34 
Radio 
Despotov
ac 
Did not enter privatisation, 
shut 
x x 
Local 
Radio 
35 
Radio 
Ćićevac 
Did not enter privatisation, 
changed nature of their work 
x x 
Local 
Radio 
36 Preševo 
Did not enter privatisation,  
received the decision on the 
transfer of free shares 
x x Local TV 
37 Pobeda 
Did not enter privatisation, 
shut 
x x Local Print 
38 
Info 
Centar 
Tutin 
Did not enter privatisation,   
received the decision on the 
transfer of free shares 
x x Local TV 
39 
Info 
Centar 
Kosjerić 
Did not enter privatisation,  
shut 
x x Local TV 
40 RTV Inđia Sold/privatised 
63,4
58 
Danijela Suša Local RTV 
41 
TV 
Apolo/Nov
Sold/privatised 
174,
950 
Srbija danas doo 
Local TV; 
About 
500,000 
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osadska 
TV 
average 
viewers29 
42 
Info Pres 
Centar 
Vladičin 
Han 
Sold/privatised 
8,23
0 
Miloš Dinić 
Local 
Radio 
43 
IPC 
Kulska 
Komuna 
Sold/privatised 
3,50
0 
Radovan Kovač 
Local 
Radio 
44 Radio Šid Sold/privatised 
531,
000 
Kopernicus Cable 
Network 
Local 
Radio 
45 
Radio 
Raška  
Sold/privatised 
14,9
50 
Kopernicus Cable 
Network 
Local 
Radio 
46 
RTV 
Stara 
Pazova 
Sold/privatised 
47,3
00 
MR&Co doo Local RTV 
47 
Nedeljne 
Novine 
Sold/privatised 
34,0
00 
Milojko Pavlović 
Local Print 
Weekly 
48 Pančevac Sold/privatised 
238,
000 
Zoran Peševski, 
Auto Centar Zoki 
Local Print 
Weekly; 
Circulation
: 9,310 
(2015)30 
49 Studio B Sold/privatised 
530,
000 
Maxim Media, 
Ružica Krdžić 
Regional 
RTV 
50 BC Info Sold/privatised 
19,0
00 
Jovica Burkić 
Local 
Radio 
51 
Novi 
Pazar TV 
Sold/privatised 
89,3
50 
Konzorcijum 
Fizičkih Lica-
Denis Mavrić 
Regional 
TV; 
500,000 
average 
viewership
31 
52 
RTV 
Pančevo 
Sold/privatised 
87,2
00 
Radoica 
Milosavljević 
Regional 
RTV 
53 
Centar za 
Informisa
nje, Novi 
Kneževac 
Sold/privatised 480 
Radoica 
Milosavljević 
Local Print  
54 
RTV  
Kragujeva
c 
Sold/privatised 
85,5
00 
Radoica 
Milosavljević 
Local 
RTV. 
55 RTV Brus Sold/privatised 
10,2
00 
Radoica 
Milosavljević 
Local RTV 
56 
RTV 
Caribrod 
Sold/privatised 
18,6
00 
Radoica 
Milosavljević 
Local RTV 
57 
TV 
Požega 
Sold/privatised 
39,0
00 
Radoica 
Milosavljević 
Local TV 
58 TV Pirot Sold/privatised 
26,3
00 
Radoica 
Milosavljević 
Local TV 
59 
Radio  
Požega 
Sold/privatised 
7,10
2 
Dragana Petrović 
Local 
Radio 
60 
JP RTV 
Šabac 
Sold/privatised 
446,
001 
Aleksandar 
Živanović 
Local RTV 
                                                          
29 Email communication from the Director Of Apolo/Novosadska TV, 24 October 2016. 
30  Official Media Registry, Serbia, 2014. 
31 Email communication from the Director of RTV Novi Pazar, 24 October 2016. 
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61 
Glas 
Podrinja 
Sold/privatised 
184,
601 
IN Tehnik, doo 
Šabac, Nenad 
Živanović 
Regional 
Print 
Weekly. 
Between 
3,000-
3,500 
readership
.32 
62 Niška TV Sold/privatised 
78,0
00 
Slađana Ostojić Local TV 
63 
Ivanjički 
Radio 
Sold/privatised 
14,3
60 
Ana Baković 
Local 
Radio 
64 
Info 
Centar 
Bački 
Petrovac 
Sold/privatised 
4,35
1 
Agroplod doo 
Gložan 
Local 
Radio 
65 
JIP Novi 
put 
Sold/privatised 
46,2
56 
Kopernicus Cable 
Network 
Local RTV 
66 
Radio 
Barajevo 
Sold/privatised 
11,7
20 
Doris Aćimović 
Local 
Radio 
67 
Radio 
Valjevo 
Sold/privatised 
17,4
00 
Doris Aćimović 
Local 
Radio 
68 
Radio 
Medveđa 
Sold/privatised 
1,42
0 
Konzorcijum 
fizičkih lica 
Local 
Radio 
69 
Radio 
Pruga 
Sold/privatised>cancelled 
privatisation, continues to 
operate since September 
2016 
1,20
0 
Mirjana Krstić 
Local 
Radio 
70 TV Blace Sold/privatised 
2,57
0 
Narodne Novine 
Niš-Danijela 
Vuković 
Local TV 
71 
Radio 
Šumadija 
Sold/privatised 
34,0
00 
Saša Janković 
Local 
Radio 
72 
JP RTV 
Kruševac 
Sold/privatised 
14,0
00 
Radoica 
Milosavljević 
Regional 
RTV 
73 
Bačka 
Topola  
Sold/privatised 
31,1
65 
Udruženja za 
regionalnu 
komunikaciju, 
Endre Huzak 
Local 
Radio 
 
  In order to tackle the issue of state ownership in the media, the Serbian 
government not only adopted the Law on Public Information and the Media which 
entailed privatisation of all state-owned media as mentioned previously, but had 
also adopted an Action Plan for Chapter 23 in this policy area. According to the 
Action Plan, Serbia “had achieved full withdrawal of state ownership of the media” 
which resulted in “further enhancement of transparency of media ownership,” and 
the “strengthening of media pluralism” (Government of Serbia, Ministry of Justice 
2016, pp. 243-245). The results seem to posit that the privatisation process has 
finished, however, this is not the case according to the 2016 EU Commission 
progress report. Moreover, the “privatisation of state media outlets has not led to 
                                                          
32 Email communication from the editor of Glas Podrinja, 24 October 2016. 
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greater transparency of ownership or funding sources, including state funding” 
which, despite Serbian government claims that they have complied in this area as 
the Action Plan posits, would seem to imply a strategy of fake compliance 
(European Commission 2016a, p. 19). Political elites in the Serbian government 
are finding ways to keep their influence in the media as well as retaining control of 
some major state-owned media such as the daily newspaper Politika for example, 
which we will discuss further on in the chapter. We elucidate our argument through 
examples based on two key findings: 1.) The creation of media conglomerates 
closely associated with political parties in power (i.e. business tycoons and 
companies that have purchased media that are closely affiliated in some way to 
the ruling SNS or other parties in Serbia such as the Social Democratic Party). 2.) 
Two mass circulation, state-owned dailies, Politika and Večernje Novosti who 
have both avoided efforts to privatise and whose ownership remains shrouded in 
fog despite the adoption of a media registry. We examine and provide an analysis 
of both cases in the following paragraphs.  
According to Table 5.1, out of the 34 privatised media, thirteen media were 
purchased by people or companies affiliated with the ruling SNS while one was 
affiliated with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) led by Rasim Ljajić (Maksić 2016; 
Nikolić, Z.B. 2015). The SDP is another smaller party in the Serbian government 
that entered into a coalition with the SNS in the 2014 elections, but in 2016, the 
party joined Boris Tadić’s Alliance For a Better Serbia which includes more pro-
EU oriented parties such as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the League 
of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (LSV) (National Assembly of the Republic of 
Serbia 2016). Obradović and Brajović from the Independent Journalists’ 
Association of Serbia (NUNS) and the Journalists’ Association of Serbia (UNS), 
both argue that interest in acquiring property was not the main reason for the 
purchase of the media outlets but rather, the media were purchased by close 
affiliates of the ruling SNS for political reasons (i.e. in order to influence and control 
the media) (cited in Gotev and Poznatov 2016).  
Two business tycoons associated with the ruling party, Denis Mavrić, and 
Radoica Milosavljević along with a company that supports the government, 
Kopernikus, have purchased some of the major media during privatisation. The 
entering into stakes in the media of officials and business tycoons close to the 
leading political party and its smaller coalition partner, suggests the continued 
desire of the Serbian government to retain their grip on the media, albeit indirectly. 
Denis Mavrić- who had been appointed director of RTV Novi Pazar in 2008 by the 
Social Democratic Party leader, Rasim Ljajić- purchased the same television 
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station for €89,350. At the time of the purchase in August 2015, the SDP was in a 
coalition with the ruling SNS. Perhaps most impressive was the business tycoon, 
Radoica Milosavljević who purchased a total of eight media outlets which included: 
RTV Brus, RTV Caribrod, RTV Požega, TV Pirot, Centar za Informisanja Novi 
Kneževac, RTV Pančevo, RTV Kragujevac and RTV Kruševac. Milosavljević was 
once deputy mayor of Kruševac as a member of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) 
but is known to be Bratislav Gašić’s “silent business partner” (Nikolić, Z. B. 2015). 
Gašić is a member of the ruling SNS and Minister of Defense. It is not publicly 
known what Milosavljević’s connections are with the Defense Minister, which 
would indicate non-transparency. Indicators suggest Milosavljević’s ties with the 
ruling SNS, particularly when the city of Kruševac awarded RTV Kruševac €17,500 
through project co-financing of the media a few hours before it was purchased by 
Milosavljević (Nikolić, Z. B. 2015). Perhaps the most notable indication of the 
government’s influence on the media during and after privatisation is when 
Milosavljević made Miroslav Milankov editor in chief of RTV Pančevo. Milankov is 
also the President of the Advisory Board for providing information to the SNS city 
committee (Nikolić, Z.B. 2015). Matić from the BCSP also remarked that the media 
purchased by Milosavljević “openly favoured the Progressives during the election 
campaign for April’s parliamentary elections in 2016” and that the SNS Defense 
Minister Gašić “on average, had almost half of the daily news dedicated to him on 
RTV Kruševac” (Member of Belgrade Centre for Security Policy 2017). Although 
these media are local and regional media, nonetheless, they were quite influential 
because they were located in the municipalities where the SNS had a strong 
backing. A member of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, as our interview 
data indicates, remarked that “these media were important in the campaign for the 
elections last year. All these media were the biggest in their communities because 
they were state media, given state subsidies and had more developed production 
than private media, who usually had fewer employees. In that sense, they were 
influential” (Member of Belgrade Centre for Security Policy 2017). 
Kopernikus purchased three media outlets as well (Radio Šid, RTV Raška 
and “Novi Put” Jagodina). Kopernikus is a cable network company composed of 
three channels, which, according to a report on ownership structures and control 
of the media published by the Anti-Corruption Council in Serbia, is close to the 
SNS also. The Report posits that “this company has been considered close to the 
Serbian Progressive Party since its third programme during the election campaign 
in 2011/2012 when the party leased the company through the firm Sens d.o.o.21 
marketing” (Anti-Corruption Council 2015a, p. 26). An example of such an 
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affiliation is the show on TV Kopernikus, “Good morning with Đuka” in which the 
MP and official of the SNS Vladimir Đukanović is the show’s host (Anti-Corruption 
Council 2015a).  
These findings suggest that despite privatisation of some Serbian media 
outlets, there is still heavy political influence through the purchase of some of these 
aforementioned media that are listed in Table 5.4 by business tycoons and 
companies that are closely affiliated with Aleksandar Vučić’s ruling Serbian 
Progressive Party. We argue that this is not surprising because our findings with 
interviews from Serbian journalists even before the privatisation process was 
finished, suggest that the SNS and their business tycoons were going to try to buy 
out some of the media outlets being privatised. A statement by a journalist from 
the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina whom we interviewed on 24 
June 2015 confirms this:  
“I do believe that the SNS along with their tycoons, will, out of 73 media 
that are being privatised, try to buy those media that they consider to be 
essential. The rest, in case journalists don’t decide to participate in 
ownership, will probably be left to their own fate, which will in very many 
cases actually lead to the extinction of some media” (Journalist from the 
Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina 2015). 
 
A member of the Association of Journalists (UNS), also stated in a similar 
comment, “it is being said that some of their officials or tycoons who are close to 
the SNS, will try to enter through stakes in some media, during privatisation” 
(Member of Journalists’ Association of Serbia 2015). A strategy of fake compliance 
on behalf of the Serbian government prevails despite efforts to privatise the media 
in Serbia. The benchmarks for Chapter 23 do not explicitly mention withdrawal of 
state ownership from the media including in financing. The recommendations for 
Chapter 23, however do mention explicitly: “implementation of the media strategy 
with a view to appropriately regulating state funding and putting an end to control 
of media by the state” (European Commission 2013, p. 38). Our interview data 
posits that these recommendations have no legal basis, unlike the interim 
benchmarks. Such ambiguity in the EU interim benchmarks for withdrawal of state 
ownership through privatisation would allow Serbian politicians room for 
manoeuvre and the ability to engage in compliance on the surface to persuade the 
EU they have made efforts in this area. 
Moreover, the privatisation process was in itself full of irregularities and 
inconsistencies. In the process of privatisation, media announced a public call for 
the sale of shares. In the case that no one was interested in purchasing the media 
outlets, shares were distributed among the employees who were entitled to them. 
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However, the Serbian government had made an announcement that employees 
were only entitled to free shares if they did not have shares in other public 
companies or state firms (Nezavisno Društvo Novinara Vojvodine 2016a, p. 11). 
A journalist from the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina argued 
that: 
“This was related to all media. So, those who have previously received 
any state shares free could not get the shares of the media in which they 
worked if privatisation failed. However, no one had tried to prevent 
employees who did not have the right to free shares to participate in the 
purchase of media in auctions. This government decision influenced the 
fact that there were a large portion of the media in which no one had the 
right to free shares, so after the failed auction, these media entered the 
liquidation process” (Journalist from the Independent Journalists’ 
Association of Vojvodina 2017).  
 
Our findings show that the government’s decision did not apply to outside buyers 
(i.e. tycoons, etc.) which would suggest an uneven playing field (Member of 
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy 2017). A member of the Belgrade Centre for 
Security Policy (2017) further posits that: 
“Even this limitation was not crucial. Employees expressed little interest in 
participating in the purchase of their company, because they [the media] 
have not been able to survive without additional capital, and the workers 
did not have this additional capital to invest, and in addition, a number of 
these companies had debts. Debts could only be covered by some investor 
on the side” (Member of Belgrade Centre for Security Policy 2017). 
 
Finally, we argue that some of the major, mass-circulation media such as 
the partially state-owned dailies, Politika and Večernje Novosti, were exempted 
from the privatisation process according to the Law on Privatisation (Journalist 
from BIRN 2018). Radio Television Serbia (RTS) claimed that the Assembly of 
Serbia “adopted amendments to the Law on Privatisation, enabling 17 companies 
of strategic importance for the state, as well as economic entities in Kosovo and 
Metohija, to be exempted from the existing deadline for privatisation for a 
maximum of one year” (RTS 2015). This was “to enable the postponement of 
bankruptcy and forced payment of Politika and Večernje Novosti and the other 17 
companies so that they can be successfully privatised” (RTS 2015). However, we 
argue that the amendments to the Law on Privatisation to exempt partially state 
owned media such as Novosti and Politika was in reality a means to keep these 
two mass-circulation dailies in the hands of the government as nothing has 
changed at the time of writing-both media outlets still remain in the hands of the 
government. Additionally, both dailies have unclear ownership structures, which 
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was another characteristic of the media environment in Serbia, and one the EU 
sought to resolve through its conditionality approach.  
 Transparency of ownership is one of the interim benchmarks of Chapter 
23 on Justice and Fundamental Rights that the Serbian government needs to meet 
in order to progress on its path towards the EU. In order to meet the interim 
benchmark on transparency in ownership structures, the Law on Public 
Information and the Media posited the need for a Media Register. According to the 
Action Plan, the Serbian government had asserted that an “efficient and 
transparent Registry of the media ownership structures had been established and 
was operational” and that the data in the registry was “regularly updated” 
(Government of Serbia, Ministry of Justice 2016, p. 246). However, despite the 
establishment of a media register, the EU Commission has expressed concern 
that “unclear ownership structures continue to be a feature of the media 
environment since the privatisation of the state media” (European Commission 
2016a, p. 21). This would seem to suggest a strategy of fake compliance on behalf 
of the Serbian government because the establishment of a media register as 
stipulated by the Law on Public Information and the Media did not lead to 
implementation of the interim benchmark on transparency in ownership. 
Noutcheva (2006) argues that one way to test for fake compliance is by looking at 
the implementation of domestic laws in accordance with EU conditionality. With 
regard to the media register, Serbian political actors passed legislation compliant 
with EU demands but this was not effectively enforced as the media register 
existed only on paper and did not actually constitute the real owners of some of 
the mass circulation media. Moreover, as our interview findings posit: “the 
verification of these data provided by the media is not done, so there are fictitious 
owners and therefore it is not visible who really stands behind the media and 
whether there is an illegal concentration of media” (Member of Belgrade Centre 
for Security Policy 2016). We will elucidate our argument using examples based 
on two of the biggest mass-circulation dailies: Politika and Večernje Novosti that 
have non-transparent ownership structures. 
Both Politika and Večernje Novosti are partially owned by the Serbian 
government: the state has 50% shares in Politika and 30% in Večernje Novosti 
respectively (Janjić 2015). The purpose of the media registry was to “provide to 
the public information on the media” (Službeni Glasnik 83/2014). This is supposed 
to make the media more transparent in ownership structures, but this hasn’t 
happened even though the process of registering media has finished and both 
Politika and Večernje Novosti are among the media that have been registered. 
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According to a journalist from the Independent Journalists’ Association of 
Vojvodina (NDNV), “yes, they [Politika and Večernje Novosti] are registered, but 
the Register constitutes only who are the owners and not who are also the real, 
final owners” (Journalist from the Independent Journalists’ Association of 
Vojvodina 2016b). By this, he means, that aside from the government’s share, 
both dailies are also partly owned by companies whose true co-owner is unknown.  
Politika’s ownership is split between the Serbian government who owns 
50% while the co-owner who has the other 50% share is unknown. The other 50% 
share was originally owned by the German VAC group but was then purchased by 
the Russian company East Media Group in Moscow in 2012. However, “the origin 
of the money, the real owner or the purchaser, as well as the manner in which the 
transaction was executed are not known to the public” (Anti-Corruption Council 
2015a). There have been many allegations in the media especially from the 
current Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić that the business tycoon, Miroslav 
Bogićević was behind the purchase as a favour to the Democratic Party (DS) when 
the Democrats were in power before 2012. More surprising, is the fact that some 
media reports claim that the East Media Group has been closed down under the 
law of the Russian Federation (Stevanović 2016). According to a journalist from 
the NDNV, “this is a big crime in question and no one is able to get any information 
on what this is all about” (Journalist from the Independent Journalists’ Association 
of Vojvodina 2016b). What is evident here is that no one in Serbia knows whom 
the co-owner is who holds the other 50% share. Moreover, “if this non-transparent 
part of the property is added to the other half held by the state, our interlocutors 
point to political influence” (Martinović 2016). Although Politika was added to the 
media registry, this did not help nor clarify transparency of ownership. Our findings 
indicate that even the media registry would not solve the transparency in 
ownership of some of the major government owned media such as Politika for 
example. In our interview with a member from the Anti-Corruption Council in 
Belgrade, she described how Politika would be registered:  
“They will state that it is 50% Politika A.D. and 50% some “fictitious firm” in 
Russia, and so what does that mean to us now? That does not mean 
transparent ownership; transparent ownership means that we know a 
physical person, we really know who is the owner and that will not happen 
in Serbia in a long while” (Member of the Anti-Corruption Council 2015). 
 
Večernje Novosti is another tabloid whose ownership structures remained 
unknown for a long time. The Serbian government owns about 29.51% of this 
mass circulation daily, PIO (Retirement and Disability Fund) owns around 7.15% 
while three offshore companies own the other 63%: Trimax Investment GMBH 
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(24.98%), Ardos Holding GMBH (25.89%) and one from Cyprus titled Karamat 
Holdings LTD (12.55%) (Anti-Corruption Council 2015a, p. 36). For a long time the 
true owners of these offshore companies was hidden until it became known that 
wealthy business tycoon, Milan Beko, was behind the ownership of these 
companies. However, the media register makes no mention of his name, once 
again indicating non-transparency of Večernje Novosti (Serbian Business 
Registers Agency 2016). 
 To conclude, we have argued that the Law on Public Information and 
Media adopted in August 2014 by the Serbian government requires state 
withdrawal from ownership of the media as well as prohibiting the further funding 
of the media from public revenues, which would include the state budget. All state-
owned media was to be privatised by 1 July 2015 with the extension of the deadline 
until the end of October 2015. To persuade the EU of Serbia’s compliance, the 
Law on Public Information and the Media, and the establishment of the media 
register to ensure greater transparency in ownership and the government Action 
Plan for implementation, had in fact, led to a strategy of fake compliance due to 
there being an overall lack of legal enforcement. The media register exists and 
functions but this is only on the surface as the public remains unaware of some of 
the real owners of major media outlets, while privatisation remains unfinished and 
has allowed for political influence to persist. The Law also introduced the concept 
of co-financing media projects that met the public interest as a permissible form of 
state aid. We will examine this in the following section on soft-censorship and 
financing of the media.  
 
5.6 Different Mechanisms for Financing the Serbian Media as a Means to 
Retain Government Control  
 
The Serbian government has retained control and influence of the media 
indirectly via different mechanisms of soft censorship. According to the 2013 
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network report (BIRN), “soft censorship is a term 
that covers a variety of actions intended to influence media output, short of legal 
or extra-legal bans, direct censorship of specific content, or physical attacks on 
media outlets or media practitioners” (Matić and Maksić 2013, p. 4). Soft 
censorship mechanisms used to influence the media indirectly focus mainly on 
financial aspects such as: 
“pressures to influence news coverage and shape the broad media 
landscape or the output of specific media outlets or individual journalists 
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through biased, and/or non-transparent allocation or withholding of 
state/government media subsidies, advertising, and similar financial 
instruments” (Matić and Maksić 2013, p. 4).   
 
Such mechanisms were all used by the Serbian government throughout the years, 
particularly with the Serbian Progressive Party and the previously ruling 
Democratic Party, to influence the media. With the new media laws of 2014, the 
use of state subsidies- a major form of state aid in the past-has officially ended 
with the privatisation process. Instead, the Law on Public Information and the 
Media has introduced the principle of project co-financing as a permissible form of 
state aid to finance the media outlets that meet the public interest, which would 
ensure media pluralism and improve the quality of content production 
In order to persuade the EU that the Serbian government is complying with 
EU conditionality, the new law on project co-financing as a permissible form of 
state aid to replace state subsidies was adopted coupled with the government 
Action Plan for its implementation. The purpose of the law was to monitor project 
co-financing and allow for media outlets to receive state aid in a transparent, non-
discriminatory manner. The Serbian government Action Plan of 2016 postulated 
that “efficient mechanisms for monitoring the functioning of the system of co-
financing media projects from the budgetary and/or public financial resources 
pursuant to new legislation on project funding of media have been established.” 
Further, they have been established through “the introduction and effective 
implementation of the obligation of public authority bodies that regularly submit 
reports on co-financing media projects” and through the “analysis of the public 
authority bodies on the quality of the supported projects based on beneficiaries’ 
reports on disbursement of funds” (Government of Serbia, Ministry of Justice 2016, 
p. 248). The 2016 EU progress report for Serbia posited that “co-financing of 
media content to meet public interest obligations needs to be implemented in line 
with the legislative framework, using transparent and fair procedures, and without 
interference by the state administration, especially at local level” (European 
Commission 2016a, pp. 19-20). The critical stance of the EU with regard to project 
co-financing suggests fake compliance despite the adoption of the new law in 2014 
and the Serbian government claim that public authorities regularly submit reports 
on project co-financing of media projects. In this regard, project co-financing, 
which was supposed to ensure media independence and pluralism through 
financing of media projects in a fair and transparent way whose content met the 
public interest and was decided by an independent commission, was still used to 
award large sums of money to government friendly media. In the following section, 
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we briefly introduce the concept of project co-financing and then examine some 
examples that demonstrate the non-transparency and discriminatory funding 
allocations to media outlets that were considered to be “government friendly” and 
additionally, the non-transparent reporting mechanisms of how the public money 
was spent.  
 
5.6.1 Project Co-Financing 
 
A member from the Journalists’ Association of Serbia (UNS) explains the 
concept of project co-financing more clearly:  
“The law [on Public Information and Media] provided for project co-
financing of media at various levels of government: the national, provincial, 
city and municipal. This means that each unit of government at any level 
determines an amount in its budget for the project co-financing of media 
content of public interest for citizens. Media outlets apply, submit a project 
and the committee decides on this according to the proposal of journalists 
and media associations…Now in these committees the project that meets 
the public interest is decided as this guarantees that it will in some way be 
transparent...”( Member of Journalists’ Association of Serbia 2015). 
 
In addition, the committee that decides on the projects is supposed to be 
independent, meaning free from political control and composed of experts from 
journalists and media associations instead of politicians. The principle of project 
co-financing has long been seen as a form of state aid to already impoverished 
media struggling on the media market rather than a means of informing the people 
better or an incentive for the production of better quality media content (Barlovac 
2016, p. 4; BIRN Serbia 2014, p. 3).   
 Our findings show that what has changed is that the competition is now 
regulated by the Law on Public Information and Media. Moreover, the law 
expressly states that out of the funds the Serbian government sets aside to 
allocate to the media annually, 95% of the government funds must be allocated 
through project co-financing and only 5% can be given through individual 
allocation to the media according to the procedure laid down by the Rules on co-
financing” (Journalist from BIRN 2016a). This means that the government is 
allowed to only give 5% of its budget allocated for financing of the media, to certain 
media that would not be through project co-financing while 95% would be given 
through project co-financing. In the past, implementation was regulated on the 
basis of the internal rules of the city/municipality rather than by law (Journalist from 
BIRN 2016a). Although the new law on project co-financing was supposed to stop 
the interference of the state in the process of project co-financing and ensure 
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transparency of funding allocations, our research suggests that the opposite 
happened. There were many instances of bypassing of the law, the persistence of 
political influence on the media via media favouritism including those media that 
were “friendly” to the state, and the non-transparency of the whole process. This 
would seem to suggest that the Serbian government Action Plan responded to EU 
conditionality on paper, while implementation of the legislative framework 
remained limited, with state interference persisting. 
A report published by the Independent Journalists’ Association of 
Vojvodina (NDNV) in 2016 listed that, “out of 191 local (at municipal level) calls for 
proposals, irregularities were noticed in 132 (69.1%) of them and were related to 
the text of the call [for project co-financing], the selection of the Expert 
Commission, the transparency of the process...” (Nezavisno Udruženje Novinara 
Srbije 2016, p. 11 and 109). With regard to the text of the call, there were some 
local governments that favoured certain media that served as PR for the local 
government. One of the most common examples of this was formulation of criteria, 
for example, “the scope and quality of previous media cooperation with the 
municipality”, which is illegal and cannot be criteria based on which to evaluate a 
certain media project (Nezavisno Udruženje Novinara Srbije 2016, p. 26). This 
allowed the local governments to favour the media who cooperated with them as 
for some municipal governments this meant media that reported positively on the 
work of the local government (Nezavisno Udruženje Novinara Srbije 2016, pp. 25-
27). In some cases within the text, the local governments omitted the requirement 
of stating the total amount of the competition that would be granted for that year, 
as well as the largest amount one media can receive for the project. According to 
a report by the Independent Association of Journalists in Serbia, “determining the 
minimum and maximum amounts is of great importance with respect to the fact 
that some local governments allocated large sums, or a large percentage of the 
total allocated funds, to one, apparently favoured media” (Nezavisno Udruženje 
Novinara Srbije 2016, p. 27). With regard to the selection of the committee, there 
were many irregularities: selection of inactive journalists and media associations; 
state authorities choosing non-representative organisations; Commission 
selecting persons who are holders of public office; and state authorities choosing 
their own representatives and claiming they were “media professionals” 
(Nezavisno Udruženje Novinara Srbije 2016, pp. 36-38).  
One of the biggest issues that arose with the concept of project co-
financing was the continuation of political influence in the media by favouritism of 
media that are in some way connected to the political parties in power in Serbia, 
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such as through the business tycoons associated with political parties who 
purchased the media during the privatisation process. In this way, some media 
whose new owners are these business tycoons affiliated with the SNS, receive 
greater sums of money than others such as those not affiliated with political parties 
in Serbia (through project co-financing). Table 5.5 demonstrates the media outlets 
connected to government officials that received the greatest amounts of money 
through project financing competitions and is gathered from two reports: BIRN and 
one report titled, “White Book on Project Co-Financing of Public Interest in the 
Sphere of Public Information,” published by various different journalists’ 
associations (Nezavisno Udruženje Novinara Srbije 2016). RTV Kruševac and 
RTV Caribrod are both newly privatised media owned by Radoica Milosavljević 
who is affiliated with the SNS. “Novi Pazar,” recently owned by Denis Mavrić is 
affiliated with the Social Democratic Party of Serbia (SDP). Finally, Studio B is 
owned by Maksim Media Group, whose physical owners are Ružica Miloš Krdžić. 
A journalist from the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina in Novi Sad 
suggests that the Krdžić family is closely associated with the SNS though it is 
unknown whether they are actual members of the ruling party or close associates 
(Journalist from the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina 2016d). 
Tanja Maksić from BIRN also notes that “although there is no clear political 
affiliation, the program orientation of Studio B indicates support of the SNS” 
(Maksić 2016, p. 10). Finally, the independent Media Ownership Monitor Serbia 
claims that “today, the Krdžić family has good cooperation with the ruling party, 
which is reflected in the editorial concept of Studio B, but also through budgetary 
financing of the media owned by this family” (Media Ownership Monitor Serbia 
2017).  
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Table 5.5 Results of Project Co-Financing Competitions in 2015-16  
Name of 
media 
Year Amount 
received 
through 
project co-
financing 
Total 
value of 
allocated 
funds for 
project 
financing 
Total % 
of 
allocate
d funds 
Ownership Funder 
 
RTV 
Kruševac 
2015 2.1 million 
RSD; €17,086 
NA NA Radoica 
Milosavljević 
City of 
Kruševac 
budget 
RTV 
Caribrod 
2016 13,200,000 
RSD; 
€107,405 
NA 80% Radoica 
Milosavljević 
City of 
Caribrod 
budget 
Novi 
Pazar 
2015 151,639,000 
RSD; 
€1,233,967 
(for the next 3 
yrs.) 
169,639,2
00 RSD; 
€1,377,26
6  
More 
than 
80% 
Denis 
Mavrić 
City of 
Novi 
Pazar 
budget 
Studio B 2015 23,000,000 
RSD;  
€187,164 
45,000 
RSD; 
€365.00 
More 
than 
50% 
Maksim 
Media 
Group, 
Ružica 
Krdžić 
Belgrade 
city 
budget 
(Source: Maksić, T. 2016). 
 
 This political influence as shown in Table 5.5, demonstrated unfair and 
non-transparent allocation to certain media outlets. Discriminatory allocations to 
favoured media continued, thus promoting media content where the government 
was allowed to interfere in the production of content and editorial policy and use it 
for their own personal and political party needs. A Member of the Independent 
Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina from Novi Sad, argues that, “the problem is 
that they abuse the laws so that the money is allocated to their media; in the 
Commission they put people who are loyal to them, and the whole process cannot 
be controlled by anyone on the outside” (Journalist from the Independent 
Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina 2016d). Therefore, the entire process 
becomes non-transparent as the same journalist once again points out: “if in the 
Commission, there are no members of the press and media associations, we do 
not know what is the content of the project, and we especially do not know how it 
has been carried out and for what funds have been spent” (Journalist from the 
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Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina 2016d).  
In addition to serving as PR for political parties, the allocation of funds 
through project financing to government friendly media also did not support media 
pluralism. For example, Belgrade-based television station, Studio B, through 
project co-financing received 23 million RSD in 2015, which was “more than the 
other 22 media in the Commission for the City of Belgrade received together” 
(Nikolić, M. 2015). This project was nothing new, and was used to finance a regular 
programme on Studio B, titled, Beograde, Dobro Jutro (Good Morning, Belgrade). 
Dalila Ljubičić from the Media Association argues that,  
“the allocation of more than 50 per cent of the budget for one media, 
significantly reduces the ability to support the production of media content 
that is not general information, but that relates to more specific topics of 
public interest. In this way, the principle of pluralism of media content in the 
public interest is seriously called into question” (Nikolić, M. 2015).  
 
Because one media received more than the other 22 media from the commission 
for the city of Belgrade for a project that was not a novelty, media pluralism as part 
of the EU conditionality is not being respected. In addition, a journalist from the 
Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina argues that, “this television is in 
the hands of a person [Ružica Krdžić] that is a member of the Progressive Party. 
In doing this, the television carried out a frantic campaign for the SNS and against 
the opposition. A gruesome campaign” (Journalist from the Independent 
Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina 2016d). He argues that, “contrary to the law, 
in the individual projects, one of the main activities is ‘monitoring the work of local 
government,’ which is understood as the advertising of authorities and political 
parties” (Journalist from the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina 
2016c).  
The Balkan Investigative Reporting Network report also noted other cities 
throughout the country where project co-financing was abused to report on the 
work of the government in 2015 such as in the cities of Aleksandrovac, Kula, 
Zrenjanin and Prokuplje (Maksić 2016, p. 15). Niš was another major city where 
86% of the total budget of around 50 million RSD was allocated to the TV and 
radio portal Belle Amie together with TV Zona and TV Kopernikus, all which are 
linked with the ruling party (Maksić 2016, p. 16). The same trend exists even at 
the time of writing where in 2017, in cities like Belgrade, Novi Sad and Niš, project 
co-financing was used to indiscriminately allocate money to government-friendly 
media outlets (Safe Journalists 2017). Additionally, independent media (Danas 
daily, Vreme weekly, Beta news agency and Association Eutopia) have not 
received a penny (Safe Journalists 2017).  
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To conclude, project co-financing, although changed and now defined in 
the Law on Public Information and the Media, so far has not promoted independent 
media that is free from political interference. Media that have been favoured by 
the government and whose new owners are connected to the ruling Progressive 
Party received greater amounts through project co-financing as opposed to 
smaller, independent media. Although the entire process was non-transparent, 
and it is not known to the public how this money was spent and what it had been 
used for, the perception is that these media often abused project co-financing to 
promote the work of the government and positive images of government officials. 
Referring back to the Europeanisation literature on the degree of domestic change, 
in project co-financing as stipulated by the Law on Public Information and the 
Media, the degree of domestic change was low. The Serbian government had 
merely “absorbed” the media law into their domestic structures without modifying 
existing processes and policies. That is to say, political interference via project co-
financing and discriminatory as well as non-transparent funding allocations to 
media outlets continues despite the adoption of the new law and the government’s 
Action Plan for its implementation. 
Additionally, a 2016 BIRN survey posited that project co-financing was 
seen as a mechanism for influencing editorial policy. In a 2016 BIRN report, the 
majority of respondents that participated in a survey “did not see project financing 
as an opportunity for greater professional challenges, for an investigative story or 
series of programmes. The reason for this is the fact that the media where they 
work is strictly controlled, with authoritarian editorial policy…” (Maksić 2016, p. 23). 
In addition, BIRN (2016) reported that, “others have a problem to get adequate 
funds for projects on which they work. These are mainly non-governmental media 
organisations or internet portals…” (Maksić 2016, p. 24). One respondent from the 
BIRN 2016 report described the situation as, “I think that the money is not used 
for the right purposes. For example, for investigative journalism or projects, but 
rather in the interest of advertising political parties or local authorities” (Maksić 
2016, p. 24). In the next section, we turn to another means of indirect state funding 
and this is through state advertising in the media that often promotes positive 
images of the leading political party, which was especially evident in election 
campaigns.  
 
5.6.2 State advertising 
 
Another significant mechanism of the Serbian government used to 
147 
 
influence the media is through advertising. This was seen as an unregulated form 
of state aid to media markets, but which state officials and agencies abused for 
political propaganda and self-promotion. The EU conditionality stemming from 
Chapter 23 makes no mention of the regulation of state financing, including 
advertising, allowing Serbian government officials to use this omission in the 
conditionality as room for manoeuvre. However, as stipulated by the progress 
reports of 2015 and 2016, the EU did express concern over “informal pressure on 
editorial policy” which “is exerted through the distribution of advertising funds” 
(European Commission 2015 and 2016a). To persuade the EU that the Serbian 
government will regulate this field in a way that would prevent political control of 
the media, the Serbian government organised a TAIEX33 seminar and stated that 
it had implemented the TAIEX expert recommendations in addition to the 
recommendations from the Anti-Corruption Council (Government of the Republic 
of Serbia, Ministry of Justice 2016, p. 248). With regard to state financing vis-à-vis 
advertising, the Council recommended that:  
“the Ministry in charge of finance should set up criteria for budgetary 
limitations for advertising and promotion of activities of all state authorities 
and institutions, that is, of direct and indirect budgetary beneficiaries in the 
system of consolidated treasury account, and establish sanctions for 
breach of set criteria” (Anti-Corruption Council 2015a).  
 
Despite the Serbian government’s claim that the Council’s recommendations have 
been implemented, advertising as a means of indirect political control by the 
Serbian government still persists and is still very much unregulated, demonstrating 
once more a strategy of fake compliance to EU conditionality. Serbian political 
elites have “simulated” compliance to persuade the EU of domestic change.  
Although not illegal and often used in election campaigns, advertising as a  
means to retain political dominance over the media remains a serious concern as 
it exerts informal pressure on editorial policy and prevents the possibility for a free 
and pluralistic media. Tanja Maksić from BIRN argues that, “public campaigns 
organised by marketing agencies and regular coverage of the work of state bodies 
or public companies are two main modes of advertising that incorporate significant 
political influence” (Maksić 2016, p. 10). Furthermore, “advertising contracts 
offered by Serbian state bodies often require media outlets to broadcast or publish 
interviews with state officials or print as news PR articles on the work of state 
organs or public enterprises” (Matić and Maksić 2013, p. 19). This “promotional 
                                                          
33 Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument of the European 
Commission. 
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content” was often disguised as news, and therefore, inhibits the media’s ability to 
carry out investigative and critical reporting. In this section, we analyse the political 
interference in the Serbian advertising market first through the relationship 
between media-buying agencies that purchase media advertising space and their 
connection to political parties. Then we will give an example of the 2017 
presidential election campaign in Serbia, which demonstrated Aleksandar Vučić’s 
grip on the media to secure his election victory and the subsequent protests 
following afterwards.  
In Serbia, the media are often dependent on state advertising for their 
survival.34 A BIRN 2013 report on soft censorship argued that “a lucrative 
advertising contract may be the difference between a media outlet’s survival or 
demise” (Matić and Maksić 2013, p. 20). Most of the funds spent on advertising 
goes through professional media-buying agencies. Matić and Jovović (2014) 
argue that “a characteristic feature of the Serbian advertising market is a close 
connection between political parties and leading agencies that purchase media 
advertising space” (Matić and Jovović 2014). Such an agency is Goran 
Veslinović’s Sekond Agency which has connections with the ruling SNS. 
Veselinović, a member of the Main Board of the Serbian Progressive Party, helped 
to establish the marketing agency “Sekond d.o.o.” Since its establishment in 
November 2012, Sekond has undergone a change in ownership: one of the new 
owners is Sanja Lalović who helped to devise a media plan during the election 
campaign of the Progressives in 2012 (Kurir 2015). This link between political and 
economic interests allows for leading politicians and political parties such as the 
SNS to exert political influence on the media outlets, since most of the media in 
Serbia depend on advertising for their sustainability and survival. “In 2011, the 
Anti-Corruption Council revealed the mechanism for political and economic 
influence intertwined in the functioning of advertising agencies that are run by 
politicians” (Matić and Jovović 2014). According to Matić and Jovović (2014), “the 
agency owner can act in the interest of his party by giving advertising contracts to 
individual media outlets that produce a favourable image of his party and 
withholding them from those with critical views” (Matić and Jovović 2014). Prior to 
2012, the leading politician who controlled the advertising space in national media 
through his agency, Direct Media, was Dragan Đilas, leader of the Democratic 
Party. With the shift in power to the Progressives in May 2012, that centre of media 
                                                          
34 Local media earn 30-35 percent of revenues from advertising (Matić and Nedeljković 
2014, p. 356). 
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power has gone to Goran Veselinović and other close associates of Aleksandar 
Vučić and his Progressive Party: 
“Findings of the research conducted by BIRN show that in 2011 and 2012 
at least four companies walked out on the leading advertising agency of 
the time, Direct Media (owned by the Democratic Party leader Dragan 
Đilas), and signed contracts with rivals from the pool of marketing agencies 
controlled by Srđan Šaper, the ex-member of the DS presidency. 
Veselinović’s Sekond Agency, close to the SNS, also joined this pool” 
(Kisić 2015, p. 93).  
 
 According to research conducted by BIRN, two pools of agencies have the 
highest percentage of clients in the advertising market, one is close to Đilas’s 
Direct Media while the other is composed of eight agencies, including those 
agencies owned by Srđan Šaper, Branimir Dimitrijević and Goran Veselinović 
(Kisić 2015, p. 93). Direct Media owned by Dragan Đilas was close to the 
Democratic Party of Serbia, but following the change of government in 2012 in 
which the Progressive Party came to power, some large advertisers decided to 
terminate contracts with Đilas’ Direct Media and enter the new pool of rival 
agencies now close to the Progressives. According to research conducted by 
Georgiev and Đorđević on behalf of BIRN (2014), “while the companies cited 
business reasons for the change of partners in the world of advertising agencies 
and media, this is interpreted as moving the centre of power to the new 
government, which embodies Goran Veselinović, the new partner of Srđan Šaper” 
(Georgiev and Đorđević 2014).  
This forces the media to then publish only positive news of politicians in 
power and the work of the government, which creates self-censorship in the 
media. In addition, the media are also forced to not publish critical texts of the 
government or they will be denied of any kind of advertising revenue. According 
to our findings, a member of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy describes the 
situation:  
“The problem is that the state bodies when placing their advertisements in 
the newspapers do not do it for rational (market, commercial) reasons, but 
political ones. They do not place their advertisements in the media that will 
bring them the greatest benefit, such as the greatest publicity, most 
coverage or coverage of certain audiences, but publish ads in the media 
they wish to financially strengthen. Media that expect to get a set of state 
advertising also are indirectly encouraged not to publish critical views on 
the government because the advertisement can very easily be denied and 
redirected to other media that is “friendly” to the authorities” (Member of 
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy 2016). 
 
The Anti-Corruption Council argued that “one of the most direct forms of 
political control over the media in Serbia is exemplified during election campaigns, 
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by the time slots in electronic media bought by political parties and advertising 
space in print media” (Anti-Corruption Council 2015a, p. 114). An example of this 
type of state control vis-à-vis advertising during elections in Serbia is probably 
most apparent in the 2017 presidential election campaign, in which the Prime 
Minister and leader of the Progressive Party, Aleksandar Vučić, nominated himself 
as a candidate and subsequently secured victory as Serbia’s new president. Maja 
Bjeloš from the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, argues that “Vučić’s 
domination in the media was particularly visible the day before the ‘election 
silence’ started, when all major dailies in the country featured a large advert for 
him on their front pages” (Bjeloš 2017). The Balkan Investigative Reporting 
Network found that Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party had taken over the front 
pages of all major newspapers35 in Serbia on Thursday, 30th March before the 
elections, which took place on Sunday, 2nd April (Balkan Investigative Reporting 
Network 2017). A study by BIRN shows that Vučić appeared a total of 128 times 
in the print media while his opponent Saša Janković appeared 71 times. Table 5.6 
shows the media coverage according to positive, neutral and negative for both 
candidates.36  
 
Figure 5.6 Presidential Campaign Coverage in the Serbian media 2017 
 
(Source: Rudić and Zaba, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network 2017).  
 
Moreover, Vučić’s autocratic control over the media was also most visible 
in the campaign that led up to the 2017 presidential elections where Rudić, a 
journalist from BIRN, noted that Vučić’s dominion over the media was 
                                                          
35 Such major dailies included: Politika, Blic, Srpski Telegraf, Kurir and Večernje Novosti.  
36 Other candidates included: Vuk Jeremić (appeared in print media: 55 times), Ljubiša 
Preletačević Beli (40 times) and the former Radical Party leader: Vojislav Šešelj (30 times). 
(Rudić and Zaba 2017). 
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characterised by “his alleged abuses of his post as PM to campaign and by vicious 
attacks in the pro-government tabloids on opposition candidates and on people 
close to them” (Rudić 2017b). The pro-government tabloid, Informer, accused Vuk 
Jeremić, a candidate in the presidential elections, of being a NATO candidate 
while Telegraf-also another pro-government daily- accused Janković of abusing a 
dead child on its front page on 21 February 2017 (Živanović 2017a). The Balkan 
Investigative Reporting Network reports that such smear campaigns and attacks 
on opposition candidates often go unpunished by the Ministry of Culture, whose 
mandate is to ensure that the law on freedom of information is respected 
(Živanović 2017a).  
Regulation of state advertising, as we have demonstrated, is not explicitly 
mentioned as an interim benchmark for Serbia and the Anti-Corruption Council 
recommendations, which the Serbian government has incorporated into its Action 
Plan, are not explicitly mentioned in the Chapter 23 benchmarks. The EU does 
remark, however that “the Serbian government should engage in a constructive 
relationship with the Anti-Corruption Council, seriously consider the latter’s 
recommendations and take them as much as possible into account” (Conference 
on Accession to the European Union-Serbia 2016, p. 26). The new Law on 
Advertising adopted in 2016 was supposed to regulate this field but instead this 
law “failed to deal with state advertising as a potential tool for undermining market 
competition and creation of clientelistic relations between the state and the media” 
(Member of Belgrade Centre for Security Policy 2015). According to attorney, 
Dragan Milić, this was because: 
“the advertising of state bodies and publicly-owned companies is not 
regulated by a special law nor is it incorporated in the Law on Advertising, 
which is a big legal void and paves the way for major irregularities, that is, 
for indirect influence on media content by enabling or disabling advertising 
of the state which, in market conditions in the Republic of Serbia, is one of 
the most important advertisers” (Milić 2017).  
 
 Like project co-financing, state advertising was an area where the degree of 
Europeanisation was low, falling short of absorption. Serbian elites merely 
absorbed EU criticism and recommendations without modifying existing structures 
and implementing legalisation that would regulate the advertising market, making 
it more fair and transparent and without serving as a mechanism for political 
propaganda.  
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5.7 The Threat to Freedom of Expression: Attacks on Journalists and the 
Government’s Influence on Editorial Policy 
 
One of the main concerns stemming from the European Union’s 2015 
Progress Report for Serbia was threats and violence against journalists (European 
Commission 2015, pp. 17-18). The Progress report also notes that journalists have 
little job security and low salaries and are thus prone to pressure and influence 
from economic and political quarters (European Commission 2016a, pp. 19-20). 
Threats and violence against journalists prevent freedom of expression, a basic 
human right emphasised in the EU Charter for Fundamental Rights, and a 
condition for any country’s- including Serbia’s-membership prospects. Freedom of 
expression also indicates a country’s readiness to join the EU, and is part of the 
interim benchmarks that make up Chapter 23 on Justice and Fundamental Rights.  
According to the Action Plan, the Serbian government has claimed that 
there has been an “increased number of actions undertaken by the prosecutors’ 
office in order to ensure protection of journalists, as well as prosecution of the 
perpetrators of criminal offences against journalists” (Government of Serbia, 
Ministry of Justice 2016, p. 240). Ironically enough, the Serbian government also 
claims that Serbia has received a positive opinion of the European Commission in 
the Annual Progress Report on Serbia in this area, which is not the case if we 
examine the 2016 Commission Progress Report. The Serbian government’s 
objectives outlined in the Action Plan to combat threats and violence against 
journalists and ensure their safety, and its reported claims that it has tackled this 
area with increased actions to prosecute perpetrators, demonstrates once again 
the Serbian politicians’ strategy of fake compliance in this area as this is only 
compliance on the surface. It is apparent when looking at the annual EU progress 
reports in comparison to the Action Plan that Serbian government officials are 
attempting to convince the EU of their compliance in this area. We elucidate our 
argument through a concrete example, which the EU has mentioned in its annual 
report: the 2014 actions against websites that had criticised the Serbian 
government handling of the flood crisis. The EU has warned that “serious efforts 
are needed to identify and prosecute those suspected of violating internet 
freedoms” (European Commission 2016a, p. 20).  
 In May 2014, Serbia, including some of its Balkan neighbours, was hit by 
devastating floods. This caused the Serbian government to impose a temporary 
state of emergency which allowed them to detain people for “inciting panic.” Online 
criticism of the government’s handling of the crisis was especially targeted. 
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Knežević (2014) notes that, “critical articles and blogs were removed, and whole 
websites, including the independent news outlet Peščanik, were blocked and 
subject to DDOS (distributed denial of service) attacks” (Knežević 2014). A 
journalist from NDNV argues that  
“there is plenty of public evidence that within the framework of the party, 
within the ruling SNS, there operates a numerous team of people working 
exclusively on advertising of the party and its leader on the Internet but 
who apparently use other methods that are far from acceptable and that is 
bringing down of some sites. Of course we do not have evidence that 
behind all this is the SNS but it is the fact that through the continuous 
destruction of sites or certain content on social networks and the like, the 
main targets are contributions critical of Aleksandar Vučić” (Journalist from 
the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina 2015). 
 
Dragan Janjić, a media expert from Belgrade, also argued that websites that had 
criticised the government’s handling of the flood crisis had been subject to hacker 
attacks and the arrest of citizens who had published the criticism. Although it 
cannot be proven who was exactly behind these attacks, Janjić also argues that 
“the very fact that the government responded to the censorship allegations by 
asking for evidence is both a threat and an admission of guilt” (Janjić 2014). 
Additionally, a Serbian journalist from RTV Mladenovac, Dragan Nikolić, was 
detained and interrogated by police for a critical comment on his Facebook 
account on the government handling of the floods (Vukojičić 2014). The Serbian 
government has posited in the Action Plan that “guidelines on forming the separate 
records of criminal offenses committed against journalists and attacks on media 
internet sites had been established” and that priority would be adopted in acting 
upon these criminal offenses (Republic of Serbia Government, Ministry of Justice 
2016, p. 241). The EU progress report shows that despite efforts, there has been 
no progress in this area (European Commission 2016a, p. 20). 
 Aside from the government response to the criticism of their handling of 
the flood crisis, a study conducted by the Western Balkans Platform for Advocating 
Media Freedom and Journalists Safety, reported that 33 physical attacks on 
journalists were recorded in Serbia between 2013-2016 (Zaba 2016). Moreover, 
the same study also concluded that “cases of journalists who have received death 
threats in Serbia and have been living under police protection for years, such as 
Brankica Stanković or Vladimir Mitrić, also remain unresolved” (Zaba 2016). The 
Independent Journalists’ Association, NUNS, “registered 57 incidents against 
journalists in 2015, and 33 in the first seven months of 2016. These included 16 
physical assaults, 41 verbal threats, 28 incidents involving pressure, and five 
attacks on property” (Marušić 2016). Most notably, in 2017, two leading journalists: 
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Stevan Dojčinović (editor of Serbia’s Crime and Corruption Reporting Network or 
KRIK) and Vukašin Obradović were both attacked and put under pressure from 
the Serbian government, thus leading to a media blackout by over 150 Serbian 
websites and NGOs. Dojčinović had published an investigative article about the 
Defense Minister, Aleksandar Vulin’s, controversial purchase of an apartment in 
Belgrade and was labelled as a “drug addict” by the Serbian government 
(Živanović 2017b). Obradović, founder of one of the oldest media outlets, Vranjske 
Novine and former head of the Association of Independent Journalists had gone 
on hunger strike to protest the closure of his paper and what he called the decline 
of media freedom (Živanović 2017b).  
Such attacks and violence against journalists despite claims from the 
Serbian government of the preventive measures taken to ensure journalists’ 
security (i.e. including investigations and prosecutions of the perpetrators etc.), 
demonstrates that the degree of domestic change in the area of freedom of 
expression is low. Referring to the Europeanisation literature, this type of 
absorption occurs when politicians simply absorb EU policies and ideas without 
modifying existing processes and policies. In this case, EU ideas and criticisms 
outlined in the progress reports and interim benchmarks are taken into account 
but no genuine policy is adopted and implemented that would ensure freedom of 
expression, including protection of journalists.  
 Thus far, we have illustrated the different mechanisms of state control of 
the Serbian media either through indirect financing mechanisms that exert informal 
pressure on editorial policy, or through opaque political connections vis-à-vis 
business tycoons that had purchased media outlets following privatisation. 
Moreover, non- transparency in ownership and financing, violations and attacks 
against journalists continue to be features of the media landscape. The 2017 
presidential elections in Serbia have demonstrated Aleksandar Vučić and the 
SNS’ continued grip on the media vis-à-vis the Serbian press, which has led to the 
erosion of democracy, as numerous citizens and journalists alike, have taken to 
the streets in the post-election period to protest against the autocracy of the SNS 
government. Despite the Progressives’ goal of Serbian accession, giving up 
control of the media would become a damaging reputational cost to the 
government that would prevent the media from serving as political propaganda 
tools in interest of the ruling party. It could lead to open criticism of the government 
and its policies and therefore the decrease in popular support as the statecraft 
argument would posit. The lack of clear interim benchmarks in Chapter 23 coupled 
with the EU’s limited competences in regulating media freedoms, have presented 
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the Serbian government with a margin for manoeuvre as they can simply absorb 
EU criticism without modifying existing structures. In the next section, we analyse 
the EU’s position regarding the conditionality stemming from Chapter 23 where we 
argue that media freedom is an area of low visibility as a consequence of the EU’s 
lack of capacity in enforcing media freedom in some of its own member states, 
thereby enabling applicant states to engage in fake compliance.  
 
5.8 The EU’s Position  
  
 The EU’s position regarding the conditionality pertaining to media freedom 
is rather complex as there exists no official law that would enforce media freedom 
and pluralism including transparency in ownership and financing, in the EU 
member states nor in the applicant countries. Media regulation is in the hands of 
the member states to implement, leading to significant variations in the form and 
level of media regulation (Harris 2013). This lack of capacity, therefore, raises 
questions about the competences of the EU in the area of media freedom. 
Moreover, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the EU is in a better position to 
scrutinise Serbia compliance with regard to Kosovo conditionality due to the 
presence of other external actors (i.e. Kosovan political elites).  In this section, we 
argue that that the EU’s limited competences in this policy area, coupled with the 
higher capacity of the EU to scrutinise Kosovo conditionality, has allowed the 
Serbian government to engage in a strategy of fake compliance, exploiting the 
ambiguity in the EU’s conditionality toward media freedom. First, we offer a 
discussion on the lack of media freedom regulations in the EU’s acquis, followed 
by an analysis of the consequence for media freedom across the EU and 
implications for dealing with an applicant state such as Serbia. 
  The EU’s acquis is categorised into 35 chapters in the accession 
negotiations, Chapter 23 on Justice and Fundamental Rights and Chapter 10 on 
Information Society and the Media being the two chapters that would have the 
most impact on media freedom. Each chapter focusing on a specific policy area in 
the accession negotiations comes with a specific set of conditionality, or interim 
benchmarks, an applicant country must comply with in order to proceed further 
down the path towards accession. Throughout the chapter, we have examined 
and analysed the conditionality from Chapter 23, for Serbia. Chapter 10 does not 
have yet interim benchmarks thus, we have left it out of our research. 
Every accession country and member state has adopted their own 
legislation pertaining to the freedom of the media to respond to EU conditions. For 
156 
 
Serbia, these domestic media laws were adopted in August 2014 and are included 
in Serbia’s Action Plan for Chapter 23. According to an official from the EU 
Commission,  
“The [accession] procedure does not only look at if the [media] laws have 
been adopted but also looks into their effective implementation. Thus, the 
EU does not close chapters. First, the government has to adopt the law, 
second they have to build the capacity to implement the law and then 
establish a track record of implementation” (European Commission Official 
W 2015).  
 
The aforementioned media laws adopted in 2014 do not deal with the regulation 
of advertising (as there currently exists no law that would regulate this field), which 
poses serious concern since the majority of media in Serbia depend on state 
advertising, therefore creating pressure on editorial policy in addition to serving as 
the political mouthpiece for the leading party. Although the media laws do mention 
the withdrawal of the state from the media through privatisation and the 
introduction of a media register to ensure ownership and financial transparency, 
media scholar, Kristina Irion, argues that media ownership and financial 
transparency are not part of the EU acquis and thus Serbia is under no obligation 
to implement them in a way that would actually improve the media environment 
(Irion 2014).  She further argues that “the failure to promote transparency in media 
governance is so far a crucial omission of European engineered media assistance” 
(Irion 2014).  According to Irion and Jusić, “neither the standards of the Council of 
Europe nor the EU acquis in the media sector provide for the introduction of such 
far-reaching transparency requirements,” (Irion and Jusić 2014, p. 24). This makes 
it possible for accession countries such as Serbia to use this lack of EU 
competences to their own advantage that would often violate media freedoms 
rather than regulate them in a manner that promoted pluralism and independence. 
Moreover, when considering media ownership and financial transparency, another 
EU official argues that there are certain norms to be expected which feed into 
Chapter 23 and Chapter 24 on rule of law (European Commission Official Z). We 
argue that expectations are weaker than explicit legal obligations in this case, 
therefore making it possible for applicant countries such as Serbia to manipulate 
such norms in the accession process.  
The acquis chapters and the interim benchmarks are tailored specifically 
to each accession country. Regarding Serbia, Chapter 23 on Justice and 
Fundamental Rights mentions the following interim benchmarks the country needs 
to meet in order to proceed to the next phase in the accession negotiations:  
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“full respect for independence of the media, a zero-tolerance policy as 
regards to threats and attacks against journalists” as well as “creating an 
enabling environment for freedom of expression, based on transparency 
(including on ownership of the media), integrity and pluralism” (Conference 
on Accession to the European Union-Serbia 2016, p. 28).  
 
However, state intervention in the media including ownership and financing of the 
media is not mentioned explicitly in the interim benchmarks. Moreover, although 
the conditionality from Chapter 23 mentions ownership transparency, this does not 
account for transparency in financing of the media. Conditions for independence 
and pluralism of the media, which would include media that is free from political 
intervention, forms part of the political criteria applicable to all accession countries. 
However, we argue that conditionality pertaining to freedom of expression are 
complex and open to interpretation according to an official from the EU 
Commission: “a lot of what is in the political criteria is not based on texts but it is 
more based on an understanding which is very open to interpretation” (European 
Commission Official X 2015). Moreover, the same official from the EU Commission 
noted, “I think we are on quite dodgy ground making some of those 
recommendations given what happens in our own Member States” (European 
Commission Official X 2015). Serbia, along with other accession countries must 
align their own domestic laws with those of the EU’s legislative corpus, the acquis, 
or in other words, adopt and implement the acquis. However, based on our 
findings, we argue that state intervention, including financing and ownership, in 
addition to transparency, are not part of the acquis. Additionally, the European 
Parliament notes that, 
“The acquis that is specifically relevant to the media sector and to media 
freedom is mostly associated with the processes of liberalisation and 
harmonisation of the internal market at EU level and refers only in an 
indirect manner to media freedom and pluralism. They follow long-
established internal EU policies on media freedom and pluralism and, 
therefore, the newly shifted focus is reflected only in an indirect manner, 
i.e. it is not included explicitly in the acquis” (European Parliament 2014, p. 
41). 
 
The lack of media freedom in the EU’s own legislative body allows for applicant 
countries, even member states, to exploit this ambiguity to their own advantage. 
In the following section, we elucidate this argument through analysis of the degree 
of media freedom and pluralism in some of the EU’s own member states. 
The 2016 EU Media Pluralism Monitor report analysed the media 
environment in 28 different member states, plus two candidate countries (Turkey 
and Montenegro) along four different categories: basic protection, market plurality, 
political independence, and social inclusiveness. Through an analysis of the 
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report, we see that media freedom is not fully respected in most of the member 
states, particularly the Central and East European Countries that joined in 2004 
and 2007. This raises concern over the EU’s capacity to enforce protection of 
freedom of expression including media independence and transparency in both 
the member states and accession countries such as Serbia. We elucidate our 
argument through several examples from the report. 
The market plurality indicator deals mostly with ownership including 
transparency, horizontal concentration of ownership, and cross-media 
concentration of media ownership. With regard to transparency in ownership, 
three countries, namely, Greece, Luxembourg and the Czech Republic, score a 
high risk in this indicator according to the report (European University Institute 
2017, p. 34). In Luxembourg, “media firms are not bound by transparency 
obligations vis-à-vis the public authorities” while in Greece “rules to ensure 
transparency vis-à-vis the competent authority do exist, but they do not seem to 
achieve the objective that they were enacted to pursue” (European University 
Institute 2017, p. 34). With regard to the political influence over the media, the 
political independence indicator examined political control over the media outlets, 
editorial autonomy, state regulation of resources and support, independence of 
the public service media and funding, and the relationship between the media and 
democratic electoral process. According to the report, “a vast majority of the 
countries examined score a medium risk in this area. Eight are at low risk 
(Sweden, France, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
United Kingdom), and four are found to be at high risk from political influences 
over their media systems - two of which are EU member states (Hungary and 
Slovenia), and two are candidate countries (Montenegro and Turkey)” (European 
University Institute 2017, p. 36). Furthermore, the report posits that “Hungary is 
the only EU country that scores high risks for all five indicators within the area of 
political independence, with most concerns being related to the indicators on state 
regulation of resources and support to the media sector, and independence of 
public service media governance and funding” (European University Institute 
2017, p. 37).  
The case of Hungary provides the best example where there has been a 
relatively significant decline in media freedoms. In mid-2010, the election of Viktor 
Orbán’s Christian, national and conservative government (the Fidesz-Hungarian 
Civic Alliance) overhauled the old media law and adopted a new one in its place 
that put the leading party in control of the media. Bajomi-Lázár (2013), argues that 
the “new regulation established a new supervisory body called the National Media 
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and Telecommunications Authority (NMHH), managed by the Media Council. The 
Media Council’s four members have been appointed by parliament’s ad hoc 
appointment commission; currently all of them are Fidesz nominees” (p. 81). 
Additionally, the Media Council’s Chair Annámaria Szalai has been directly 
appointed by the Prime Minister Orbán and heads both the NMHH and Media 
Council. The NMHH is in charge of frequency distribution for radio and is allowed 
to define the allocation criteria. The NMHH had distributed 18 out of 35 frequencies 
to pro-government stations and had additionally refused to renew a license for an 
“opposition” station (Bajomi-Lázár 2013, p. 82). This one-party colonisation of the 
media in Hungary does not suggest a conformity with EU values and norms. 
The results of the report indicate that enforcing and monitoring media 
freedom and legislation involving media freedom in even the member states is an 
issue that raises concern and questions over the EU’s competence in the area of 
media freedom, particularly with regard to transparency in financing and 
ownership as well as political interference. Therefore, due to a lack of explicit 
conditionality with regard to the EU and a legal basis, politicians in applicant 
countries such as Serbia, are able to exploit this conditionality to their own 
advantage and engage in a strategy of fake compliance.  
As we have shown throughout the chapter, the lack of EU competences in 
the field of media freedom, has allowed the Serbian government to engage in fake 
compliance. The media laws which were established along with the Action Plan 
related to Chapter 23 for their implementation were strategies the Serbian 
government used to persuade the EU of compliance. That is to say, they 
responded to the EU conditions with regard to media freedom on paper but there 
was an overall lack of legal enforcement suggesting a strategy of fake compliance. 
Moreover, the Serbian government was allowed to engage in fake compliance 
because of the higher salience the EU placed on Kosovo. Vukašin Obradović, 
President of the Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia (NUNS) argues, 
“EU officials have a quite tolerant attitude towards Aleksandar Vučić and the way 
that he treats the media. This is because EU officials are not interested in the 
media so long as Vučić fulfils his main political tasks relating to the Kosovo 
agreement, regional stability and other strategic issues” (AlJazeera 2016). This is 
reinforced by our interview findings where an official from the EU Commission has 
noted that: 
“That the EU is not really involved in the Serbian media. It is up to the 
national government to deal with its own media. We can provide language 
or press releases, even interviews, but we cannot engage directly with 
them. We have provided advice as to how to present the results to the 
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media, but in our experience the Serbian government doesn’t really listen 
to this at all” (European Commission Official X 2016d).  
 
Serbian politicians pay lip service to the importance of EU conditionality of 
media ownership and transparency, knowing they are not part of the acquis and 
thus do not reform the media sector in a way that would genuinely improve 
freedom of expression and independence of the media, including the phasing out 
of state intervention. The Serbian government’s reluctance to give up control over 
the media represents a reputational cost as we have discussed earlier in the 
chapter, as control of editorial policy allows Serbian politicians to promote positive 
images of themselves and their policies; the media serve as PR for the SNS.  
 
5.9 Conclusion 
 
 The media landscape in Serbia has not improved significantly and has 
been in steady decline since the period when the Democrats were in power in 
2009. Despite the introduction of the new media laws in August 2014, the current 
Serbian government under the Progressives has only demonstrated compliance 
on the surface vis-à-vis the media laws and Action Plan for their implementation, 
but legal enforcement of the laws was limited, positing a strategy of fake 
compliance. Political interference in the media through advertising and project co-
financing as well as violations of freedom of expression through attacks on 
journalists and removal of websites and articles critical of the government, 
continue to define the Serbian media landscape. In July 2016, the Serbian 
Progressive Party opened an exhibition at a gallery in Belgrade, titled, 
“Uncensored Lies,” featuring over 2,500 examples of negative media content 
regarding the government and Aleksandar Vučić. The Progressives claimed that 
the purpose of the exhibition was to demonstrate that there is media pluralism in 
Serbia despite the attacks on the government claiming that there was not (Tomović 
and Pantović 2016).  In addition, the Serbian government stated that they wanted 
“to document wrongful attacks on the government it leads, not to target 
journalists that are critical of it” (Tomović and Pantović 2016). According to 
Tomović and Pantović from the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (2016),  
“most of the articles on display were from the weekly magazines NIN and 
Vreme, BIRN and television station N1, but there was also material from 
comedy shows as ‘24 Minutes’, which is hosted by satirist Zoran Kesić, 
who was recently accused of being a ‘traitor by pro-government media” 
(Tomović and Pantović 2016).  
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However, journalists such as Vukašin Obradović from the Independent 
Association of Journalists remarked that this kind of display was “anti-democratic” 
and did not promote media pluralism, accusing the government of creating “an 
atmosphere of hate towards journalists” by creating such a “wanted list” of 
journalists that are critical towards the government (Tomović and Pantović 2016). 
Aside from caricatures from the partially state-owned Politika, most of the articles 
came from a few newspapers and magazines with lower readership (i.e. NIN and 
Vreme).37 According to a member from BIRN, “as for the exhibition, I think that this 
is another form of pressure. Practically, all the enemies of the current government 
are being “mapped;” put on the pillar of shame, they become targets for public 
condemnation” (Journalist from BIRN 2016c).  
Rationalist and statecraft theories suggest Serbian politicians engaged in 
fake compliance to EU conditionality pertaining to media freedom in order to 
manage both the high reputational costs of media freedom conditionality and EU 
accession. Considering EU membership remains the goal of the Progressive-led 
government, fake compliance was cheaper than non-compliance because “the 
costs of non-compliance are higher than the costs of simulating EU-compliant 
change in the short run while seeking ways of reversing that change and 
maximising profits in the long run” (Noutcheva 2006, p. 11). According to a former 
member of Balkans Policy Research Group from our interview data, “since Vučić 
came to power, the priority has been to trade pliancy on Kosovo for a free hand at 
home; and Europe has been happy to accept that deal” (Former member at 
Balkans Policy Research Group 2016). Many journalists and journalists’ 
associations have claimed that the EU has adopted a quite tolerant attitude 
towards Vučić’s authoritarian policy regarding the media in exchange for his 
political commitment towards the Brussels Agreement. By doing so, the thesis 
argues that the EU has prioritised stability over democracy, thereby undermining 
its legitimacy and capacity to export its values and norms to member states and 
applicant countries.  
The EU’s emphasis in ensuring regional stability over democracy was also 
exacerbated by its lack of competence when it came to enforcing and regulating 
media freedom in both applicant and member states because media legislation 
was mainly in the hands of national governments. We argue that this in turn 
severely limits the EU’s ability to scrutinise non-compliance/compliance-- the EU 
                                                          
37 NIN has approximately 9853 in readership while Vreme has approximately 5077 
readership as of 2014 according to the Serbian Business Registers Agency (i.e. Media 
Register). 
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relies on Serbian government progress reports, primarily the Action Plan for 
implementation of the media laws, but these only constitute compliance on paper 
and not any legal enforcement of the media laws. Moreover, the presence of 
external actors is greater in a foreign policy area (i.e. Kosovo) as opposed to an 
internal issue (media freedom), also inhibiting the EU from pressuring political 
actors for fake/non-compliance.  
To conclude, compliance to media freedom conditionality was an area 
where the degree of Europeanisation was low, falling short of absorption; political 
actors in Serbia adopted laws alongside an Action Plan that would have brought 
the media up to European standards but an overall lack of legal enforcement did 
not lead to genuine reforms in the media sector. The EU’s non-involvement policy 
in the Serbian media in conjunction with its lack of capacity to punish Serbia’s lack 
of compliance was exploited by the Serbian government in a manner that would 
serve both the party and individual interests of Aleksandar Vučić and his 
Progressive Party, even at the expense of declining conditions for media freedom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
163 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 The constructivist argument assumes that accession will lead to a change 
in values and adoption of EU standards, but this has not been the case in some of 
the Central and East European countries, such as Poland and Hungary, who 
joined the EU in the 2004 enlargement. From the start of the thesis, the goal has 
been to analyse the EU’s carrot-and-stick conditionality approach through a 
country analysis using Serbia to determine whether applicant states can 
circumvent EU conditionality, therefore making the constructivist argument 
inadequate when describing accession strategies of applicant states. The current 
scholarship on Serbia has employed a rationalist framework of cost-benefits when 
analysing the strategies towards European integration of the Serbian government 
under the Progressive Party since their election in May 2012. This has been 
particularly the case when examining the Serbian government’s policy shift 
towards Kosovo. However, the thesis addressed the current gaps in the literature, 
arguing that while Serbian government strategy can partly be explained by rational 
cost-benefit calculations of the material benefits EU accession would bring, this 
theory is inadequate when fully examining compliance outcomes towards EU 
conditionality. Therefore, our research addressed the current gap by positing that 
Serbian compliance can be explained by both rationalist and statecraft theories, 
where electoral considerations took precedence over conformity with European 
values.  Bulpitt’s (1986) statecraft theory posits that politicians will act according 
to their own self-interest, in order to demonstrate governing competence and 
maintain power; thus the Serbian political elites’ decisions to engage in compliance 
(fake or partial)  were based on rational cost benefit calculations of what was seen 
to be the national and party interests of the Serbian Progressive Party.  
 While previous scholarship has examined the outcomes of Serbian 
domestic policy under the Progressive Party, with a single policy area (Kosovo) as 
a unit of analysis, our research analysed Serbia integration strategy as a two-level 
game, which can only be fully understood by examining another policy area (media 
freedom) in conjunction with Kosovo. In this regard, the thesis argued that it is 
insufficient to consider one side of the bargaining relationship-how the EU imposes 
conditionality on applicant states or pressures them into compliance- but looking 
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at the domestic side, or how applicant states respond to or download 
conditionality, is crucial for a full analysis of integration strategy and how acceding 
countries employ it. Thus far, this has not been explored in recent scholarship on 
Serbia’s EU integration process under the Progressive Party.  
To explain Serbian government strategy (compliance outcomes), a case 
study approach was identified as appropriate for the research, employing the two 
case studies of Kosovo and media freedom. The research argued that the two 
case studies were expected to cause the different outcomes of fake and partial 
compliance, respectively. In the conclusion, we revisit the hypothesis in the 
following section (6.2.), positing our findings through an evaluation of the 
theoretical framework. In 6.3, we provide an analysis of the current state of Serbian 
government strategy towards both policy areas of Kosovo and media freedom 
while in the final section (6.4), we examine how our single country study research 
can be applied to the wider constructivist-rationalist debate whereby countries are 
able to accede while not adopting an EU mindset. Additionally, we provide 
directions for future research, questioning the EU’s capacity as a normative power 
to export its values when illiberal democracies are on the rise. 
 
6.2 A Re-visitation of the Hypotheses 
 
6.2.1 Kosovo 
 
The research examined Serbian compliance towards EU conditionality 
stemming from Chapter 35 and the Brussels Agreement towards Kosovo and 
found that Serbian political elites were engaging in partial compliance due to the 
prohibitive adaptation costs of Kosovo conditionality. In the case of Kosovo, the 
Progressive Party were confronted with two competing tensions: both accession 
to the EU, which would bring substantial economic benefits to Serbia, and 
retention of Kosovo. Given the salience the EU placed on compliance to Kosovo 
conditionality, the research argued that Serbian non-compliance would have been 
difficult to hide, particularly given the presence of numerous external actors 
(Kosovo, the EU, the international community) who were able to monitor Serbian 
compliance/non-compliance through progress reports. Thus, because accession 
was a genuine goal of the Progressive-led government, partial compliance was a 
strategy political actors employed to manage the two competing tensions of 
retaining Kosovo and accession to the EU. In this regard, an official from the EU 
Commission that had been interviewed for the purpose of the research, claimed 
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that the Progressives achieved the minimum they could that would satisfy the EU 
while maintaining the fiction that Kosovo was still an integral part of Serbia through 
public discourse. Partial compliance, therefore, allowed for the EU to not only offer 
rewards to Serbia, but it had also allowed the Serbian government to engage in 
multilevel games where political actors had attempted to “hammer” out 
compromises which they sold to their domestic constituency as favourable to 
Serbia, thus enabling them to garner further public support.  
Although there has been a policy shift regarding Serbian government 
strategy towards Kosovo which indicates that Serbian politicians had de facto 
recognised Kosovan independence through the Brussels dialogue, the Serbian 
government has nonetheless attempted to retain control over areas where they 
were able such as in energy, telecom and the Association of Serbian 
Municipalities, demonstrating a strategy of partial compliance. Therefore, as our 
findings have elucidated in the Kosovo case study chapter, the Serbian strategy 
regarding Kosovo has been what is the minimum they could achieve that would 
allow for the EU to be satisfied and lead to rewards or advancements in the 
accession negotiations while satisfying their domestic public at home. 
Compliance to Kosovo conditionality potentially resulted in high adjustment 
costs, thus, in order to manage these costs, the Serbian government employed a 
strategy of discursive denial underpinned by discursive institutionalism. This 
strategy allowed Serbian politicians to deny recognition of Kosovo, also denying 
the extent of compliance to Kosovo conditionality, in order to hide/mask the policy 
shift over Kosovo. Denial of the extent of policy change also enabled Serbia’s 
compliance to Kosovo conditionality and was a way for the Serbian government to 
manage both competing tensions of EU accession and public demand for retention 
of Kosovo. As Kostovicova (2014b) argues, “denial of policy adaptation in the 
discourse allowed the Serbian leadership to implement policy change by 
managing the contradiction between the real strategic objective with the objective 
as it is construed” (p. 82). In this regard, Serbian politicians addressed a 
controversial issue in a way that would satisfy the EU and lead to progress in the 
accession negotiations while the discursive denial of its de facto recognition 
allowed Serbian politicians to maintain the popular support they enjoy at home. 
This strategy is therefore, elucidated by Bulpitt’s (1986) concept of statecraft 
where the decisions of political elites are based on the desire for power.  
  Neither Kostovicova (2014b) nor recent scholarship on Serbia’s policy shift 
towards Kosovo take account of statecraft theory to explain Serbian compliance 
over Kosovo under the Progressive Party. The research addressed this current 
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gap by positing that the rationalist argument of material concerns being the reason 
behind the policy shift are only secondary. The government’s decisions to comply 
in a manner that would satisfy both the EU and their domestic constituency was a 
result of electoral tactics of the best way to maintain power. In this regard, Serbian 
strategy, follows the logic of two level games, where Serbian political elites are 
players at both the domestic and international table and thus, it became imperative 
to consider both sides when making compliance decisions.  
 
6.2.2 Media Freedom 
 
The final hypothesis dealt with compliance to media freedom conditionality 
originating from Chapter 23 on Justice and Fundamental Rights. The EU’s lack of 
competences in the area of media freedom, particularly in enforcing media 
freedom in some of the member states, had enabled Serbian political elites to 
engage in fake compliance. The research has argued that the EU has no clear 
guidelines or definitions of media freedom, taken to mean both media 
independence and pluralism. Independence and pluralism are mentioned explicitly 
in the EU’s Charter for Fundamental Rights under freedom of expression, which 
is a basic human right, forming part of the political criteria for applicant countries. 
However, our interview data has posited that these criteria are complex and open 
to interpretation. Karppinen and Moe (2016) argue that “[media] independence is 
an “essentially contested concept”, inherently subject to endless revisions and 
interpretations” (p. 105). Due to the EU’s lack of clear criteria of what constitutes 
media freedom, the analysis was underpinned by the EU’s interim benchmarks 
from Chapter 23 on Justice and Fundamental Rights which included: 
 
“full respect for independence of the media, a zero-tolerance policy as 
regards to threats and attacks against journalists” as well as “creating an 
enabling environment for freedom of expression, based on transparency 
(including on ownership of the media), integrity and pluralism” (Conference 
on Accession to the European Union-Serbia 2016, p. 28).  
 
State intervention in the media including ownership and financing of the 
media is not mentioned explicitly in the interim benchmarks. Moreover, the 
conditionality from Chapter 23 mentions ownership transparency but this does not 
account for transparency in financing of the media. Although what constitutes an 
independent media is very difficult to determine, a former official from the EU 
Commission we interviewed for the purpose of the research, posited: media that 
167 
 
was free from political control was the core principle of media independence (EU 
Commission Official Y 2016b). Media independence is a contested, often 
ambiguous principle; Karppinen and Moe (2016) nonetheless claim that “in 
general terms, independence refers to an absence of external control. 
Independence means freedom from the influence of others, but also describes the 
capacity of an individual or institution to make decisions and act according to its 
own logic” (p. 106). Referring to the Habermasian ideal, “the notion of media 
independence as a normative principle has often been linked to the autonomy of 
the public sphere from the systemic forces of state and economic power” 
(Karppinen and Moe 2016, p. 106).  
In Serbia, the media is highly dependent on governments and business 
tycoons closely associated with the ruling party, and they function more often than 
not as tools for trading influence and manipulating public opinion in the interests 
of power-holders rather than being autonomous from political control. Therefore, 
given the significant government interference in the Serbian media, it was 
important to take into consideration political independence when analysing 
Serbian compliance towards media freedom conditionality. However, given the 
fact that media independent from government control does not form part of the EU 
benchmarks, the state was in no way obliged to withdraw from the media nor limit 
the amount of funding towards some of the politically aligned media outlets despite 
increasing criticism from journalists’ associations in Serbia. The EU, on the other 
hand, published its annual progress reports through the Commission, retaining a 
critical stance towards Aleksandar Vučić’s authoritarian policy towards the media 
and offered recommendations on bringing the media environment up to European 
standards. This included the full implementation of the 2014 media laws and 
providing adequate funding for the public service broadcasters from the state 
budget that would also ensure their editorial independence.  
The research has argued that the degree of Europeanisation with regard 
to compliance to media freedom conditionality did not go beyond mere absorption. 
The aim of the media laws adopted in 2014 by the Progressive Party was to 
convince the EU that it was bringing the media environment up to European 
standards; but essentially their adoption and partial implementation had not 
altered nor reformed the media sector in Serbia in line with EU legislation, 
therefore the degree of Europeanisation was low. Government interference in the 
media persisted even following privatisation where business tycoons closely 
associated with the government had bought up some of the media companies. 
Non-transparency (including in ownership and financing) and political pressures 
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and threats against journalists continued to be main features of the Serbian 
mediascape. The state’s autocratic control of the media was most visible in the 
period leading up to the presidential elections in April 2017, where advertising 
dedicated to Aleksandar Vučić predominated, helping to secure his victory. As 
discussed in the media freedom chapter, Vučić’s dominion over the media was 
most visible in the election campaign where he abused his position as prime 
minister to campaign and where pro-government tabloids published vicious 
attacks on opposition candidates and on people close to them (Rudić 2017b). 
Shortly following the 2017 elections, many had taken to the streets to protest the 
government’s autocratic regime, demanding more rights relating to a free media 
which included: “the removal of the top management of the public broadcaster, 
RTS, and of the provincial broadcaster RTV; and the sanctioning of all editors who 
breach media laws and the journalists’ code” (Rudić 2017b).  
Thus far, the EU has been criticised for its non-intervention policy, including 
lack of sanctioning and setting of clear red lines with regard to media freedom 
conditionality in Serbia.  Instead, the research has argued that the EU has 
prioritised regional stability over democracy, which included Serbia’s normalisation 
of relations with Kosovo. Pavlović, at the London School of Economics, has 
referred to such a weak, illiberal democracy as a “stabilitocracy” (cited in Huszka 
2017). Stabilitocracies have been described as “semi-authoritarian regimes in the 
region which receive external support, in particular from EU member states, for 
the sake of the (false) promise of stability. Thus, a stabilitocracy is a regime that 
includes considerable shortcomings in terms of democratic governance, yet 
enjoys external legitimacy by offering some supposed stability” (Bieber 
2017). These are regimes with autocratic leaders, such as Aleksandar Vučić in 
Serbia, whom the EU supports for the sake of his commitment in providing a (false) 
sense of regional stability with regard to Kosovo while neglecting democratic 
values including those relating to freedom of expression. However, we argue that 
the emergence of stabilitocracies in Serbia and some of its Western Balkan 
neighbours is not merely a consequence of the EU’s leniency when it comes to 
upholding democratic values in exchange for stability, but is more so a 
consequence of the EU’s own lack in capacity in regulating and enforcing media 
freedom. It is this lack of competences to regulate and enforce media freedom in 
some of its own member states that has allowed for Serbian political elites to 
engage in fake compliance. Media freedom regulations are in the hands of national 
governments, thereby making freedom of expression an internal issue, with few 
external actors. We argue that this has considerably weakened the EU’s ability to 
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scrutinise media freedom policy in Serbia—the EU relies on Serbian government 
progress reports, primarily the Action Plan for implementation of the media laws, 
but these only constitute compliance on paper and not any legal enforcement of 
the laws.  
Serbia’s strategy of fake compliance is not only attributed to an absence in 
the EU’s capacity to regulate and enforce media freedom both in applicant and 
member states; rational choice institutionalism would posit that the failure of media 
reforms and the decline in media freedom is also a consequence of an overall lack 
of willingness and incentives for politicians to comply with the EU’s conditions. The 
reputational costs of compliance to media freedom conditionality would have 
limited the government’s ability to continue their power concentration efforts in the 
media sector. In line with the statecraft argument, this limitation would have 
expected to lead to a decrease in popular support for the ruling party if political 
elites were unable to interfere in the media and influence public opinion. The media 
sector proved to be another example where the lack of incentives and even 
sanctions (as was the case of Kosovo) did not facilitate genuine or even partial 
compliance to EU conditionality.  
 To sum up, Serbian government strategy cannot solely be explained by 
rational choice institutionalism as electoral concerns and the maintenance of 
power in the Serbian case took precedence over economic benefits arising from 
accession, which were only secondary when addressing compliance issues. 
Statecraft relates to how domestic actors employ strategies for achieving and 
maintaining power, thus the domestic side of the EU-applicant state bargaining 
relationship must also be taken into account in order to offer a comprehensive 
understanding of a candidate country’s (i.e. Serbia) integration strategy. Putnam’s 
(1988) logic of two level games posits that political actors are players at both the 
international table and the domestic one, and their decisions are constrained by 
both sides, but they will consider power-based strategies when making them. 
 
6.3 Current State of Europeanisation in Serbia under the Progressive Party  
 
 Opinion poll research published and carried out by the Serbian Ministry for 
European Integration shows that Serbia’s accession to the EU is still supported by 
half the population with 49 per cent for accession and 27 per cent against 
(Government of Serbia, Ministry for European Integration 2017). However, other 
independent opinion poll research carried out by the Belgrade Centre for Security 
Policy (BCSP) shows slightly different results with 43 per cent in support of 
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accession and 35 per cent against as of January 2017 (Belgrade Centre for 
Security Policy 2017). These results do not seem to show a vast difference or 
decline in support for Serbian accession. Nonetheless, the opinion poll seems to 
suggest that Serbian citizens might in fact be losing faith in the integration 
process. This is indicated by other results in the same opinion poll whereby 41 per 
cent believe Serbia will never become a member of the EU while 45 per cent have 
expressed the view that the speed of integration is slow with only 4 per cent 
claiming it is quick (Belgrade Centre for Security Policy 2017). As expressed in 
Chapter Four on Kosovo, many in Serbia would not support accession if 
recognition of Kosovo’s independence became a condition for membership—69 
per cent have indicated they would not support accession; 13 per cent have 
claimed they would while 18 per cent did not know (Belgrade Centre for Security 
Policy 2017).  
While support for the EU tends to decrease with the progress of the 
accession negotiations, this slightly downward trend in support for the EU felt 
among Serbian citizens can also be attributed to the rise of far right, nationalist 
parties. Dveri, the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and the Serbian Radical Party 
(SRS) all have entered into parliament during the May 2016 general elections. 
Vojislav Šešelj’s38 Radicals are the third largest party in the Serbian government 
with 22 seats (out of 250) while the Dveri-DSS coalition constitute 13 seats 
(National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 2016). The rise of extreme right-
nationalist parties is also coupled with Serbia’s strong ties with Russia. Despite 
Vučić’s pro-EU agenda, the Serbian President has been reluctant to support EU 
sanctions against Russia for the crisis over Crimea, mainly as Russia’s 
relationship with Serbia is based on historical, religious and cultural ties. 
Therefore, both the pro-European (SNS) versus pro-Russian (nationalist parties) 
divide represents a paradox as the gap between the two is virtually absent. Vučić’s 
policy towards EU integration follows Putnam’s logic of two level games where, 
“[the Serbian President] has seized the EU agenda, while at the same time 
ensuring complete control of domestic politics and using nationalist and pro-
Russian positions to satisfy a more nationalist and conservative section of the 
electorate” (Bieber and Kmezić 2016).  
                                                          
38 Šešelj was extradited for war crimes to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) but was acquitted in March 2016. Shortly after, he re-joined 
the Radicals in May of that same year and campaigned as Serbian President in April 
2017, where he came in fourth with 4.5% of the vote (Rudić 2017a).  
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The Serbian government’s ethno-nationalist outlook is linked to its 
aspirations of retaining Kosovo despite the indication that the Brussels Agreement 
and its partial implementation was Serbia’s de facto recognition of its southern 
province.  Although not yet a condition for membership, voices in the EU, 
particularly Germany, are calling for Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo prior to 
membership. As indicated by opinion poll research, such a move by the Serbian 
government would lead to a decline in support for Serbian membership and risk a 
possible breakdown in the accession negotiations. Vučić has risked such a 
potential breakdown in his decision to call for an internal dialogue on Kosovo in 
July 2017 that would incorporate all members of society, including the Serbian 
Orthodox Church, the Serbian Academy for Sciences and Arts and all 
parliamentary groups and parties (B92 2017a).  Vladimir Pejić from the Faktor Plus 
agency told the Serbian independent daily, Danas, that the dialogue could pose a 
possible risk for the ratings of Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party, and could 
have a negative impact on the rating of the Serbian President particularly if it were 
to lead toward recognition (Valtner 2017). However, after hearing accusations that 
the opening of the dialogue leads to recognition, Vučić denied this statement and 
claimed that his decision to call for a dialogue did not mean the recognition of 
Kosovo, once more reaffirming the Serbian government’s ethno-nationalist 
position on Kosovo (B92 2017b). 
Drawing on the previous chapters and the literature on Europeanisation, 
the Serbian government’s strategy towards European integration, although 
dynamic and complex, can be attributed to that which Stahl (2013) has termed as 
a “strategic accession” where applicant states will accede out of economic 
necessity in order not to become marginalised (Stahl 2013, p. 451). Candidates 
like Serbia will seek EU accession for the short term concessions (i.e. access to 
EU funds) or long term political and economic gains membership would bring. We 
have argued that the Serbian government’s aspirations of seeking EU 
membership go beyond material incentives that are expected to boost the 
country’s dysfunctional economy, but rather Serbian rent-seeking political elites 
have used EU integration in the hopes of gaining popular support. According to 
the Serbian government, not only would accession bring the aforementioned 
benefits, but as we have examined in the chapter on Kosovo, Serbian politicians 
can also use the EU integration process to protect national interests such as 
continuing to maintain the fiction of retaining Kosovo vis-à-vis the government’s 
non-recognition policy, with significant concessions to Serbs along the way. 
However, as we have argued previously, this strategy is not viable in the long run. 
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As recent events have demonstrated, crucial agreements in the Brussels dialogue 
such as the agreement on energy and the Association of Serbian Municipalities 
remain frozen as a consequence of disputes by both sides regarding the 
ownership structures in energy and the competencies of the ASM which can only 
be resolved through recognition. The choice between the EU and Kosovo will have 
to be made at some point in the accession negotiations. The suspension of 
agreements and the latest political developments in Kosovo, also show that the 
fault does not solely rest on Serbian political elites; the EU’s ‘status neutral’ policy,’ 
is not sustainable in the long term, especially considering that “the process of EU 
accession ‘entails an acceptance of de facto international borders’” (European 
Parliament 2016a).  
Stahl (2013) additionally links a strategic accession with that of non-
compliance/fake compliance and superficial adaptation, which, as the research 
has demonstrated, has not been entirely the case with regard to Serbian 
compliance. The Kosovo case study has demonstrated that the Progressive-led 
government has engaged in partial compliance towards EU conditionality 
stemming from Chapter 35 and the Brussels Agreement. Serbian politicians have 
either fully or partially implemented some agreements that had a bearing on the 
sovereignty of Kosovo in the Brussels dialogue. Arguably, the discursive 
institutionalist approach  would posit that the government’s discursive denial of the 
fact that they had recognised Kosovo through the Brussels Agreement, did not 
legitimise policy change precisely because of normative incongruence between 
discourse and policy. Although not a condition for membership, Serbia’s 
continuous insistence on its non-recognition policy coupled with the hindering of 
significant agreements such as the Association of Serbian Municipalities and the 
agreement on energy, raises questions about the long term sustainability of such 
a policy and its compatibility with Europeanisation understood as norm 
convergence in the constructivist sense. Drawing on Stahl’s (2013) suggestion 
that a fulfilment of European criteria would seem to guarantee a “Europeanised” 
Serbia, our research argues that this is not the case so far as Serbian identity had 
not been transformed nor were the compliance decisions of Serbian politicians 
pertaining to both Kosovo (partial) and media freedom (fake) a reflection of 
European values and norms (p. 451).  
Despite the EU’s claim that Vučić had endorsed EU policies, particularly 
visible in relation to Serbia’s compliance with Kosovo conditionality, the Serbian 
president had only paid lip service to the importance of EU integration, while his 
autocratic governing style evident in the erosion of democracy and media freedom, 
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does not suggest conformity with core European values (T. Prelec 2016). Instead, 
rational choice institutionalism would posit that Serbian political elites had been 
able to circumvent EU conditionality-particularly with regard to the media-while 
advancing in the accession negotiations, including the opening of chapters and 
access to structural funds. Such a strategy was in part enabled by the EU, due to 
its inconsistent approach in enforcing conditionality in one policy area (Kosovo) 
while lacking the ability to enforce sanctions and provide credible incentives in 
another (media freedom). 
 In this regard, the constructivist argument of Europeanisation leading to 
identity convergence and normative adaptation becomes inadequate when 
analysing some of the strategies applicant states will employ regarding EU 
accession. Drawing on Economides and Ker-Lindsay’s (2015) distinction of 
Europeanisation as a rationalist policy of the carrot-and-stick variety rather than a 
process of normative rule adoption and identity convergence, suggests that 
candidate countries Europeanise as a condition and not as a consequence of EU 
membership (Economides and Ker-Lindsay 2015, p. 1031; Börzel and Risse 2011, 
p. 15). The conditionality approach has been applied to both the Central and East 
European countries (CEECs) that acceded in 2004 and 2007 and the Western 
Balkans. In this respect, the constructivist argument becomes political naivety 
because it assumes that accession will lead to a change in values and adoption of 
EU standards and norms, but this has not always been the case particularly with 
the Western Balkans and CEECs. In the final section of the chapter, we offer some 
conclusions on how our single country research can be applied to the 
constructivist-rationalist debate and provide for possible avenues and directions 
for future research.  
 
6.4 Conclusions and Future Avenues 
 
 Stahl (2013) argues that “the incorporation of the acquis serves as a central 
pre-requisite to ascertain the ‘identity match’” (p. 449). However, our research 
study has shown that this is not always the case as countries like Serbia may 
comply with the EU’s acquis but this had not translated to a ‘cultural match’ or 
‘resonance’ between EU demands and domestic rules and political discourses 
(Sedelmeier 2011 p. 16). The ethno-nationalist outlook of Serbian political elites 
vis-à-vis the government’s Kosovo policy suggests that Serbian identity was not 
being transformed to that of European one. Instead, as we have argued, the 
Serbian government’s strategy towards compliance with EU conditionality was a 
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pragmatic approach based on careful cost-benefit calculations of what would lead 
to significant electoral gains. The overwhelming support among the Serbian 
populace for Serbia’s non-recognition of Kosovo as demonstrated by opinion poll 
research, coupled with the rise of nationalist parties in the Serbian parliament, 
contributed to the Serbian government’s strategy of statecraft when it came to 
compliance with EU conditionality on Kosovo. Although partial compliance 
enabled significant EU-related gains, including access to funds and the opening 
of chapters in the accession negotiations, it also demonstrated that the Kosovo 
question still remained central to Serbian national identity.  
 Albeit not yet a pre-condition for Serbian accession, possible directions for 
future research could explore whether Serbia would be able to join the EU without 
recognising Kosovo and the sustainability of such a policy in the long term. As long 
as Serbia had fulfilled all conditionality pertaining to Kosovo stemming from 
Chapter 35, including the full implementation of the Brussels agreements, the EU 
could potentially allow Serbia to join. For Kosovan political elites, this would be 
unacceptable as normalisation without recognition would be inconceivable (Gashi 
and Novaković 2017, p. 3). Altmann (2009) argues that Serbia’s entry into the EU 
without recognition of Kosovo’s statehood could lead to Serbia attempting to block 
any action in favour of Kosovo, including Kosovo’s EU accession and membership 
of other international organisations, such as the United Nations, which Serbia had 
previously blocked in 2015 (p. 75). Even Kosovo representatives have expressed 
concern over the implications of Serbian accession without recognition. Such a 
policy would not only allow the EU to import another frozen conflict and thus further 
erode its legitimacy as a normative power, but also has repercussions for the wider 
constructivist-rationalist debate. Following this, the example of Serbia can also be 
applied to other case studies such as Turkey, another candidate state. The July 
2016 coup, which had been an attempt to overthrow the Erdogan government,39 
saw the crackdown and purge of thousands alleged to have some connection to 
the religious movement that had staged the coup. AlJazeera claims that “the post-
coup purge led to a rift in Turkey’s relations with the European Union, which 
accused Erdogan of using the coup attempt as an excuse to eliminate the 
opposition” (AlJazeera 2017). Another blow to Turkey’s membership bid was the 
                                                          
39 On 15th July 2016, a bloody military coup was staged in Turkey led by an influential 
religious movement known as Hizmet to overthrow the Erdogan government. Following 
the coup, the Turkish president used the post-coup period to arrest and purge anyone with 
suspected ties to the organisation. The coup saw the arrests of thousands of journalists 
and teachers, judges, police, civil servants, state officials, and anyone suspected of having 
alleged connection to the group (AlJazeera 2017). 
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passing of a questionable constitutional reform in April 2017, which would give 
unprecedented power to President Erdogan to that resembling a dictatorship 
(Gotev 2017). Such political developments, which currently block Turkey’s 
accession, are testament to the fact that Turkey remains an illiberal state where 
there is no resonance with EU norms and values. Though not a member state, the 
example of Turkey nevertheless demonstrates the EU’s lack of capacity in 
diffusing and exporting norms and values to third countries, thus undermining its 
legitimacy as a normative power.  
 The analysis suggests another possible avenue for future research that 
would further bring the constructivist argument into question—if Serbia’s fulfilment 
of EU conditionality towards Kosovo leads to the EU allowing Serbian accession 
at the expense of fake compliance in other areas (media freedom). Drawing on 
the discussion from the media freedom chapter, the EU lacks the competences in 
enforcing media freedom legislation and reforms in some of its own member states 
as well as applicant states such as Serbia. Given the overall declining media 
freedom standards in the member states such as the primary example of Hungary 
shows, Serbian politicians could pay lip service to the importance of media 
freedom and thus, simulate EU-compliant change, expecting to accede as other 
applicant states who had violated media freedoms have done in the past. The EU’s 
hard-line stance vis-à-vis Kosovo at the expense of other policy areas in many 
ways contributed to Serbian elite manipulation of EU norms as Serbian politicians 
were provided with a margin for manoeuvre when it came to compliance with EU 
conditionality regarding media freedom. In other words, fake compliance in the 
area of media freedom-a basic human right and part of the EU’s political criteria-
did not contribute to normative congruence between policy implementation and 
adoption of EU norms/values.  
As the case of Serbia, and the previous discussion on Turkey has shown, 
the EU’s capacity to export its values and norms to applicants and third countries 
is being undermined with the rise of illiberal democracies. This is not only particular 
to the case of Turkey, but all Western Balkan candidates are facing democratic 
backslide, which is more evident now especially in light of the EU’s new strategy 
to incorporate new members (i.e. Serbia, Montenegro) by 2025, and open 
accession negotiations with Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (European Commission 2018a). A report published on behalf of the 
European Fund for the Balkans in 2017 regarding the state of democracy in the 
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Western Balkan applicants40 listed “imperfect legislation, dysfunctionality of the 
key institutions and often disrespect of the political elites against basic democratic 
institutions and values” as features of their democratic systems (Burazer et al. 
2017, p. 55). Several studies (Burazer et al. 2017; Nebiu et al. 2017) point to the 
declining standards in media freedom in the Balkans (namely, Serbia, Albania and 
Macedonia). Nonetheless, the EU remains committed to the integration project, 
offering the economic carrot of membership to accession countries even at the 
expense of trading leniency regarding democratic values in exchange for regional 
stability. With enlargement fatigue on the rise and the EU’s own economic crisis, 
the question remains to be seen whether the EU should an import an illiberal 
democracy such as Serbia in the hopes that accession would bring considerable 
reforms in the country, or not become involved in Serbian domestic affairs at the 
cost of regional instability.  
Given the failure of preventing a conflict on its own doorstep as a 
consequence of its non-involvement in the Balkan Wars in the 1990s, the EU’s 
commitment in fostering peace, stability and democracy in the region remained 
pivotal in securing its legitimacy as a normative power. However, the thesis argues 
that even this attempt to secure legitimacy through pressuring applicant states 
such as Serbia to comply with conditionality regarding regional cooperation has 
achieved limited results. Instead, as the case study on Serbia has shown, through 
support of Vučić and the Progressives, the EU has backtracked on democratic 
values in exchange for a false sense of security and regional stability. If the 
incident in January 2017 in which Serbia had dispatched a train to North Kosovo 
with the slogan, “Kosovo is Serbia,” written in both Serbian and Albanian does not 
demonstrate Serbia’s promotion of a false sense of security, recent tensions 
provide further testament that the EU’s strategy in Serbia is ineffective.41  
To sum up, the findings in this study could potentially have significance for 
the EU as a “norm-diffuser” in a period where illiberal democracies are on the rise. 
While the EU’s membership incentive may be enough to initiate some change as 
the Serbian case has shown, even this type of partial compliance to EU 
                                                          
40 The report included Serbia, Albania, Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav |Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM).  
41 Head of the Office for Kosovo and Progressive Party MP, Marko Djurić, in North 
Kosovo was arrested and deported on 26 March 2018 for potentially violating the 
Brussels Agreement leading up to claims from the Serb List that they would quit the 
Kosovan government. According to Kosovan representatives, Djurić had illegally entered 
Kosovo, defying a ban from Kosovan authorities which had claimed he could not enter 
(Gadzo 2018; Morina and Živanović 2018).   
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conditionally may not be sustained beyond the delivery of anticipated benefits and 
could even lead to a reversal of compliant-change following accession as the 
cases of Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary have demonstrated. This leads to the 
question over whether EU membership is enough to guarantee the maintenance 
of democracy. As our research has posited, the rise of illiberal democracies in 
Europe demonstrates that the EU’s ability to promote democratic values has 
considerably weakened and even led to a reversal of EU values in the post-
accession phase. It can be argued that the EU’s failure in imposing sanctions 
following accession on member states that lapse into democratic backsliding 
contributes to the EU’s lack of capacity as a norm diffuser (Vida 2017). We argue 
that this is mainly a result of the absence of exclusion- once candidate countries 
have successfully joined the EU, the prevalent threat of exclusion becomes 
meaningless. However, the EU’s lack of capacity in exporting its norms and values 
to both member states and applicants is also in part due to the EU’s own lack of 
competences in enforcing these norms in certain areas such as freedom of 
expression.  
The extent of the EU’s impact in promoting democracy in applicant 
countries can be viewed through its conditionality-driven approach, which can be 
enough to enforce democratic-compliant change. However, this external-
incentives model is based on the economic ‘carrot’, or reward, of membership, 
which does not always lead to internalisation of norms, particularly evident in the 
post-accession phase. With regard to the Central and Eastern European member 
states, the existence of pre-communist democratic traditions to fall back on is 
scarce as Dekker et. al (2015) posit (p. 71). Moreover, with the Western Balkan 
countries, the civil wars had left behind remnants of nationalism that are still 
evident today, even in the pro-EU policies of political leaders such as is the case 
with Serbia and the Serbian President, Aleksandar Vučić. Autocracy is prevalent, 
even more visible now than in previous years, especially with the acceleration of 
some Balkan countries’ EU integration process (i.e. Serbia, Montenegro) and the 
examples of member states that have lapsed to democratic backsliding as is the 
case of Hungary, which countries like Serbia can use as a margin for manoeuvre. 
The EU does not have the competences at its disposal to sanction countries that 
breach on democratic values. While legally, the EU can sanction a member state 
if it breaks EU rules according to Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty,” this clause has 
been of limited appeal or use.” Goksun and Polakow-Suransky (2015) argue that 
“the lack of political will and practical measures in cases of violations of the 
fundamental principles of the EU, such as in the case of Poland and Hungary, 
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demonstrates why” (p. 50). Grabbe and Lehne (2006) further posit that “the union’s 
judicial measures alone cannot work when “its legitimacy is under attack from its 
own members” (cited in Goksun and Polakow-Suransky 2015, p. 51). Therefore, 
even the EU’s use of hard power instruments such as Article 7 are insufficient to 
impose concrete sanctions on member states that violate democratic values and 
freedoms. We argue that this lack of clear and binding competences given the 
absence of unanimity in the EU’s own member states undermines its own 
legitimacy as an upholder of norms and values. Moreover, as the research has 
posited, the leniency on democracy promotion for the sake of regional stability in 
some countries such as the Western Balkan states (namely Serbia) has also led 
to the rise of illiberal democracies and has further contributed to the debate on the 
EU as a force for good. 
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Appendix I: List of Interviewees 
Serbian Journalists, Belgrade and Novi Sad, Serbia 
Editor of KRIK (Crime and Corruption Reporting Network), Face-to-face interview, 
22 June 2015. 
Member of Journalists’ Association of Serbia, Face-to-face interview, 23 June 
2015. 
Member of Anti-Corruption Council from 2012-2016, Skype interview, 21 October 
2015. 
Journalist from the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina, Face-to-
face interview, 24 June 2015. 
Journalist from the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina, Email 
interview, 29 August 2016. 
Journalist from the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina, Email 
interview, 5 September 2016. 
Journalist from the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina, Email 
interview, 6 September 2016. 
Journalist from the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina, Email 
interview, 8 September 2016. 
Journalist from the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina, Email 
interview, 31 October 2016. 
Journalist from the Independent Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina, Email 
communication 31 January 2017. 
Journalist from BIRN (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network), Email interview, 7 
September 2016. 
Journalist from BIRN (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network), Email interview, 
31 October 2016. 
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Journalist from BIRN (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network), Email interview, 
15 November 2016. 
Journalist from BIRN (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network), Email interview, 
13 March November 2018. 
Member of Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, Email interview, 15 March 2017. 
 
Member of Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, Email interview, 21 September 
2016. 
 
Former Journalist from Politika, Email interview, 14 February 2016. 
 
 
Ministry for European Integration, Republic of Serbia Government, Belgrade, 
Serbia 
Ministry for European Integration Official A Face-to-face interview, 23 June 2015. 
Ministry for European Integration Official B, Face-to-face interview, 22 June 2015. 
Ministry for European Integration Official C, Face-to-face interview, 23 July 2015. 
Ministry for European Integration Official D, Email interview, 25 April 2017. 
 
Brussels, Belgium, EU Officials 
European Commission Official W, Face-to-face interview 23 June 2015. 
European Commission Official X, Face-to-face interview, 14 April 2015. 
European Commission Official X, Face-to-face interview, 23 June 2015. 
European Commission Official Y, Face-to-face interview, 14 April 2015. 
European Commission Official Z, Face-to-face interview, 14 April 2015. 
European External Action Service Official, Face-to-face interview, 12 April 2016. 
 
Various, Serbia and Kosovo 
Former member of NGOAktiv, Skype interview, 24 March 2016. 
Former member of NGOAktiv, Email interview, 16 March 2016. 
Member of NGO Advocacy Centre for Democratic Culture, Skype interview, 3 
March 2016. 
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Former municipal assembly member Leposavić, Kosovo, Skype interview, 5 
March 2016. 
Political analyst from Belgrade, face-to-face interview, 26 September 2016. 
Political analyst from Belgrade, Email interview, 12 January 2017. 
Former member of NGO Policy Centre from 2010-2016, Email interview, 22 
March 2016. 
Professor in Novi Sad, former Regional Assembly Member from 2000-2005 Novi 
Sad, Email interview, 21 January 2016. 
Former member at Balkans Policy Research Group, Email interview, 30 
November 2016. 
Member of Democratic Party of Kosovo, Email interview, 8 October 2017. 
EULEX Official in North Kosovo, Skype interview, 28 November 2017. 
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Appendix II: Questionnaires for semi-structured 
interviews 
Questions for officials from the Serbian Ministry for European Integration 
1. How has the new government under the Serbian Progressive Party 
advocated European integration during their election campaigns? Since 
when have they begun doing this? 
 
2. In terms of progress made towards the EU, what has Serbia achieved thus 
far and what remains to be achieved? 
 
3. What would be the benefits both for Serbia and the Serbian citizens if 
Serbia were to join the EU? 
 
4. What would be costs for Serbia (transaction and autonomy) by complying 
with the EU's strict conditionality? 
 
5. There has been talk about changing the Constitution by 2017 so that the 
reference to Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia would be omitted. Is this 
true and would Kosovo have to be recognised by Serbia in the end?  
 
6. What is being done to introduce media transparency in Serbia? 
 
7. How will these new media strategy laws adopted in August of last year 
(2014) affect the Serbian government? 
 
8. How will the media outlets be financed from now on? 
 
9. What costs would privatization have for the Serbian government? How 
can/will these be mitigated? 
 
Follow up questions: 
 
Referring to number 5. 
 
1. What if this is a ‘red line’ for the EU? How has the media been used to 
promote this policy? 
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Questions for EU officials in Brussels 
1. What has been the most significant progress Serbia has achieved in terms 
of complying with the EU’s conditionality, and what more remains to be 
done? 
 
2. In regards to the Brussels Agreement and the dialogue for the 
normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, where has the most 
progress been achieved? 
 
3. From your point of view, would you say Kosovo's recognition is non-
negotiable and that Serbia would have to recognise Kosovo prior to 
accession? 
 
4. What are the conditions the EU is calling for in regards to media freedom 
and transparency in Serbia? 
 
5. How close would you say Serbia is to fulfilling this criteria? 
 
6. Does Serbia understand/is clear about the conditions it needs to fulfil in 
regards to media freedom? 
 
7. What happens if the three new laws on media: law on public information 
media, law on electronic media and law of public services are not 
implemented or results are unsatisfactory? 
 
8. What has Brussels given/done for Serbia (in terms of incentives) to get the 
government to comply with the conditionality? 
 
9. When do you believe Serbia will be ready to join the EU? 
 
Supplementary questions: 
Referring to number 1. 
1. What would happen if full conditionality is not complied with? 
Referring to number 6. 
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1. In regards to media strategy, the EU is calling for new laws on privatization 
and the need for the media to be adjusted to European standards. What is 
the Serbian state doing to relinquish control of the media? 
Referring to number 9. 
1. Has Brussels seen clear, verifiable results in terms of compliance with 
conditionality from Serbia? 
 
 
Questions for Serbian journalists 
1. How much does the state own of the media outlets in Serbia? How much 
control does the Serbian government have over the media?  
2. Do you believe that the Serbian government would try to retain control even 
after the new laws are introduced? 
3. The EU is calling for new laws on privatization and the need for the media 
to be adjusted to European standards. What is the Serbian state doing to 
relinquish control of the media? 
4. What is being done to introduce transparency in ownership of the media? 
5. What happens if the three new laws on media: law on public information 
media, law on electronic media and law of public services are not 
implemented? 
6. How will the media outlets be financed after the new laws are implemented 
if the state withdraws total ownership/control? 
7. What costs would these new laws regarding the media strategy have for 
the Serbian government? 
8. How has the government used the media to promote its actions over Serbia 
(make loss of control acceptable to the public?) 
 
 
 
 
